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## Embodiments of the Buddha in Sarvāstivāda Doctrine: With Special Reference to the \**Mahāvibhāṣā*<sup>1</sup>

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### Introduction

Past studies of ideas about the embodiments of the Buddha have typically held that "Schools" ideas, among which those of the Sarvāstivāda are considered particularly important, predate Mahāyāna materials on the whole; and that where ideas are found in both "Schools" and Mahāyāna texts, the direction of borrowing and influence must be from the Schools to the Mahāyāna. Scholars have also thought that Sarvāstivāda in particular, or Mainstream schools more generally, propounded a doctrine holding that the Buddha is embodied in two main forms, a *dharmakāya* and a *rūpakāya*. This two-body doctrine is sometimes even imagined to reach back to the Nikāyas<sup>2</sup> and Āgamas. The Mahāyāna, especially the Prajñāpāramitā, is then supposed to have passively accepted this doctrine. In the process, Mahāyāna texts are thought to have reinterpreted an originally pluralistic notion of *dharmakāya* (*dharma* = plural qualities of the Buddha) and replaced it with a more monistic, quasi-metaphysical concept.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This paper is based upon work found in my PhD dissertation. See Michael Radich, "The Somatics of Liberation: Ideas about Embodiment in Buddhism from Its Origins to the Fifth Century C.E." (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2007), Chapter 4.4. I am grateful to the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism at Soka University in Tokyo for the opportunity to present the work contained here on December 1, 2009, and to Profs. Jan Nattier, John McRae, Kanno Hiroshi and Karashima Seishi for useful comments and corrections on that occasion that helped me improve the draft. All remaining errors are of course my responsibility.

<sup>2</sup> There is no concept of \**rūpakāya* in the Pāli canon, though scholars sometimes assume there must be.

<sup>3</sup> For expressions of this received view and its component parts, see for example Takeuchi Shōkō 武内紹晃, "Buddakan no hensen 仏陀観の変遷," in *Daijō bukkō* vol. 1, ed. Hirakawa Akira (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1983), 160-162; Ruben L. F. Habito ルーベン・L・F・アビト, "Busshin ron no tenkai – sanshinsetsu no seiritsu wo megutte 仏身論の展開 – 三身説の成立をめぐって," *Shūkyō kenkyū* 宗教研究 52, no. 2 (1978): 4-5; John J. Makransky, *Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), Ch. 2 and 3, where Sarvāstivāda precedence is implied by the order of presentation; Guang Xing, *The Concept of the Buddha: Its Evolution from Early Buddhism to the Trikāya Theory* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), Ch. 2. Nagao Gadjin, "On the Theory of the Buddha-Body (*Buddha-kāya*)," trans. Hirano Umeyo, *The Eastern Buddhist*, n.s. 6, no. 1 (1973): 25-53, does not mention Sarvāstivāda, but presents the two-body theory (within the "one-two-three" model, which Nagao still endorses) as an entirely Mahāyāna innovation, predominantly of the Prajñāpāramitā, 26; implying, primarily on the basis of the traditional ascription of the \**Mahāprajñāpāramitōpadeśa* 大智度論 T1509 to Nāgārjuna, that Nāgārjuna must have been instrumental in its elaboration; 30. Nagao's presentation, however, is very generalised and ahistorical. Habito seems similarly to regard the true two-body theory as a Prajñāpāramitā invention, implying that Sarvāstivāda merely prepares the ground; "Busshinron" 5. One significant departure from this general pattern is Louis de la Vallée Poussin, who presents Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma as propounding a theory of *three* bodies; "Notes sur les corps du Bouddha," *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang* (Paris: P. Geunther, 1928-29), 766-773. However, his claim that the Sarvāstivāda recognise *nirmānakāya* as a body of the Buddha is flawed; see Appendix 2. For the view that a plural Mainstream *dharmakāya* was only gradually replaced by a Mahāyāna reinterpretation, see most influentially Paul Maxwell Harrison, "Is the *Dharma-kāya* the Real

In this paper, I will argue that this understanding is flawed for several reasons. First, while some Sarvāstivāda texts do posit two bodies, the ordinary body in this pair is not best characterised as *rūpakāya*. Rather, the most dominant Sarvāstivāda doctrine is that the Buddha has a "body of birth", which links their ideas closely with those of the *\*Mahāprajñāpāramitōpadeśa*. Second, the *dharmakāya* in Sarvāstivāda doctrine, which has never been presented in its full range by previous scholars, actually centres on a notion that the Buddha is embodied in his gnosis (*bodhi*, *jñāna*), which is much more compatible with the Mahāyāna understanding than previous analysis would suggest. Third, our present record cannot prove that the doctrines in question chronologically precede important Mahāyāna body doctrines. Sarvāstivāda texts before the *\*Mahāvibhāṣā* ("Vibh") are in fact largely uninterested in the very problem of the Buddha's embodiment, and even the ideas found in *Vibh* may have remained in ferment much later than the advent of similar ideas in the Mahāyāna.

I will attempt to demonstrate these claims, first, by giving a more accurate description of actual Sarvāstivāda doctrine about Buddha bodies. I will examine in detail the actual doctrine of the Buddha's special bodies as found in the *Vibh*. I will then examine similar ideas as they are found (or not found) in earlier works in the Sarvāstivāda canon, and variations between body doctrine in the multiple extant translations of *Vibh*. On this basis, I will argue that it is highly unlikely any Sarvāstivāda ideas about Buddha-bodies predate similar Mahāyāna ideas. In closing I will briefly discuss the place of this revised picture of Sarvāstivāda in the larger history of ideas about the Buddha's bodies.

### The *\*Mahāvibhāṣā*

My main focus for the exploration of Sarvāstivāda body doctrine will be the massive *Vibh*. This is a commentary on the earlier *Jñānaprasthāna*, and is regarded as a seminal compendium of Sarvāstivāda doctrine. I have chosen this text as my focus for three main reasons. First, as opposed e.g. to a text like the *Abhidharmakośa*, its traditional date makes it still early enough to possibly count for the question of the chronological priority of Sarvāstivāda versus Mahāyāna body doctrine. Second, unlike earlier Sarvāstivāda texts, it contains substantial treatment of the doctrine of Buddha bodies, so that we have ample material for discussion. Third, we are fortunate that it exists in several Chinese translations, comparison between which allows for detailed exploration of problems of dating.

*Vibh* exists in three Chinese translations. The two earlier translations are each partial:

- (1) by *\*Saṃghabhūti* 僧伽跋澄, dating from 383 (*\*Vibhāṣāśāstra* 鞞婆沙論, T1547);
- (2) by Buddhavarman 浮陀跋摩, dating from 437 (阿毘曇毘婆沙論, T1546);
- (3) by Xuanzang 玄奘 (602-664) (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 T1545).

These three texts are best treated as plural texts in a *genre* of *vibhāṣā* (commentary), rather than as parallel translations of the same text.<sup>4</sup> The *\*Saṃghabhūti* version is much

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'Phantom Body' of the Buddha?" *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 15, no. 1 (1992): 44-94.

<sup>4</sup> Charles Willemsen, Bart Dessein and Collett Cox, *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), "The *Vibhāṣā* Compendia", 229-239. There is evidence that more such texts existed and were lost, and that others in the genre were based upon other texts.

smaller than the other two, at only fourteen fascicles. It is also very different in structure from the other two, and comments only on selected portions of the root text *Jñānaprasthāna* (JñP).<sup>5</sup> The Buddhavarman translation was originally a hundred fascicles, but it was lost in political turmoil almost immediately upon completion in 439, and only partially restored. Our extant text is thus a partial text in sixty fascicles, covering only the first three of the eight chapters of JñP.<sup>6</sup>

In what follows, I will take Xuanzang ("XZ") as my primary point of reference, but I will check whether each of the ideas treated is present in all three versions. Discrepancies between XZ and earlier versions will be noted in the footnotes, but also discussed in overview later in the paper (p. 147 ff.). Where an idea is missing from an earlier version but found in Xuanzang, we will obviously have reason to fear that it is of later origin.<sup>7</sup>

### *Vibh* does not propound *rūpakāya* vs. a pluralistic *dharmakāya*

It is commonly said that the Sarvāstivāda ascribes two bodies to the Buddha, a *rūpakāya* and a *dharmakāya*.<sup>8</sup> At least if we consider the problem in terms of *Vibh*, this claim is factually incorrect. First, *rūpakāya* is not, properly speaking, depicted as a body "of the Buddha" at all; it is rather used for the ordinary body of all sentient beings. Second, where the text does speak of the Buddha's fleshly body, it uses a different set of terms, which have been overlooked by previous scholarship in favour of the mistaken understanding of *rūpakāya*. Third, while the text does teach a *dharmakāya*, the precise meaning of that term is somewhat different from the interpretations prior scholars have given it. I will address each of these points in turn.

### *Rūpakāya* is not really a body of the Buddha in *Vibh*

In *Vibh*, the Buddha has a *rūpakāya* only insofar as he shares dimensions of his being with ordinary sentient beings. Thus, in a significant sense, the Buddha can be said to "have" a *rūpakāya* only insofar as he is *not* a Buddha, that is, insofar as he is an ordinary sentient being. If anything, the *rūpakāya* is *dissociated* from the Buddha.

The text uses the term *rūpakāya* (*sesheṇ* 色身) relatively frequently (38 times). In places, the context, in discussions about differences between rebirth in the three realms (*kāmadhātu*, *rūpadhātu*, *ārūpyadhātu*) makes it clear that *rūpakāya* is the very general,

<sup>5</sup> Willemen, Dessein and Cox 235, also 228-229. Kawamura Kōshō holds that this focus is the result of "an intention to concentrate on these sections; therefore, the text as extant should not, necessarily, be seen as a remnant of a once complete commentary;" cited in Willemen, Dessein and Cox 236. Internal evidence suggests that this version of the text (i.e. the text itself, not the Chinese translation) may be earlier than either of the other extant *Vibhāsā*; 236.

<sup>6</sup> Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 232-233.

<sup>7</sup> At the same time, we must be careful to check that a given idea is not missing e.g. because \*Saṃghabhūti is perhaps only a partial translation, and the relevant portion of Buddhavarman might have been lost.

<sup>8</sup> Takeuchi Shōkō proposes that the texts also use *shishen* 實身 for *rūpakāya*, referring both to Āgama and "schools" (部派) sources. However, I cannot see his reasons. *Shishen* is rare in the Chinese canon, and never used, that I could discover, in opposition to *fashen* 法身 as Takeuchi claims. Takeuchi does not give sources. See Takeuchi, "Buddakan", 160. La Vallée Poussin proposes that in the Sarvāstivāda *vipākakāya* is a synonym of *rūpakāya*, but does not provide sources. However, within the Sarvāstivāda corpus surveyed here, *baoshen* = \**vipākakāya* is only applied to the Buddha (more precisely, to the *bodhisattva* Śākyamuni) in one version of the passage considering the question of why the Buddha was not born into a rarefied heaven rather than among men in the *kāmadhātu*, for which see below, n. 39. The term is otherwise rare, if not non-existent, in these texts.

ordinary body of incarnation in the *kāmadhātu*.<sup>9</sup> Sometimes *rūpakāya* is even understood specifically as the unsatisfactory body of suffering, as for example when it is discussed in terms of the five *upādānaskandhas* (which a Buddha would not have).<sup>10</sup> Other passages say sentient beings can either have (a) bodies of form (*śeṣhen*) or (b) formless bodies (色無色身), depending upon the level of the cosmological hierarchy;<sup>11</sup> this too shows *śeṣhen* can be properties of any sentient being. In one passage, *tiannü* 天女 ("āpsaras") are even said to have *śeṣhen* as a result of their magical powers.<sup>12</sup> In all these passages, *rūpakāya* is clearly a body of ordinary sentient beings, in various senses.

On the other hand, only once is *śeṣhen* clearly predicated of the Buddha.<sup>13</sup> The context is a discussion of whether or not it is possible to engage in a contemplation of impurity (不淨觀, *\*aśubhabhāvaṇā*<sup>14</sup>) taking the *rūpa*[-*skandha*] of the Buddha as the contemplative object.

"Question: Is it possible to engage in contemplation of impurity taking the Buddha's body of physical form (佛色身, *\*buddhasya rūpakāya*) as the meditative object?

"[Answer:] Some hold that this is impossible, because the Buddha's physical form (*\*buddha-rūpa*, 佛色) is extremely subtle, exceedingly bright and clean, like pure light, and it is therefore impossible to be disgusted by it. Other masters, however, hold that it is possible for a Buddha to engage in contemplation of impurity taking himself as a meditative object, but that it is not possible for other people [to engage in such a contemplation with him as the object]. Others again hold that there are two kinds of contemplation of impurity: (1) of the conditioned nature (*\*pratītyasamutpannatva*?) of physical form; and (2) of physical form as evil and ill-omened. [It is held that the contemplation of impurity] of the conditioned nature can take the Buddha as the meditative object, but that [the contemplation of impurity as] evil and ill-omened cannot take the Buddha as the meditative object. Finally, there are those who hold that there are [a different] two kinds of contemplation of impurity: (1) at the level<sup>15</sup> of universal

<sup>9</sup> This body features as the "support" (所依, *āśraya*) of the fourth *dhyāna*, T1545:27.417c02; contrasted with other *dhyānas* which do not need it as support, but are supported by the *manodhātu* alone, 374b03-04; all beings in places where there are *rūpakāya* must have either male or female organs, 745c01-02; some theorise that longevity in the *kāmadhātu* is dependent upon the *rūpakāya* (defined as *saṃtāna* 相續), and unless a being enters into *asamjñāsamāpatti*, *nirodhasamāpatti* etc., the destruction of the body will bring about the premature end of their lifespan, 771b09-10; *avijñapti* is dependent upon a body of *rūpa*, and so in the cases of beings incarnated in *ārūpya* bodies, there is no *avijñapti*, 860c20-21.

<sup>10</sup> T1545:27.37b15-17. So, too, the text discusses the contemplation of impermanence in the *rūpakāya*, 136c04-05; it is the rubric under which the text mentions contemplation of the impure, 545a24; as part of the overall schema of *saṃskāradharmas*, the "body of form" (the body of four elements) is associated with the body of the five sense organs, and contrasted with *citta*- and *caitāsikadharmas*, 167c23-24 ff.; in a discussion of the four *smṛtyupasthānas*, it is explained that mindfulness of the body, and not of *vedanā*, *citta* and *dharma*, is based upon the *rūpakāya*, 938c07-15; in a discussion of the error of taking the body for a self (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*), it is the *rūpakāya* that would be mistakenly taken for the self, 1001a11, b05; in Vasumitra's explanation of why *tīrthakas* think that *jīvaka* is distinct from the body, *rūpakāya* is the term used, 1003a17-28.

<sup>11</sup> T1545:27.707a14-b24, 387b22-28, 685c27-28, 879b23-26.

<sup>12</sup> T1545:27.207a01-06.

<sup>13</sup> Astonishingly, given that this is the only passage in which the *Vibhāṣā* comes close to speaking of a *rūpakāya* of the Buddha in any sense at all, Guang Xing does not study it closely in his chapter claiming that *Vibh* teaches a *rūpakāya* of the Buddha as part of its two-body theory (he refers to it in passing only once, so far as I could determine; *Concept of the Buddha* 35).

<sup>14</sup> Pāli *paṭikkūlamānasikāra*; see Radich, "Somatics" §2.1.3d.

<sup>15</sup> This is a clumsy translation of *jing* 境, usually for Sanskrit *viśaya*, referring to a kind of cognitive "object". I wanted to distinguish between this *jing* and *yuan* 緣, usu. for Skt. *ālambana*, which I have translated "meditative object". The distinction, I take it, is that the *yuan*=*ālambana* is the general object (or "topic", if you like) that serves as the occasion for the contemplation as a whole, but the *jing*=*viśaya* is the

characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*); and (2) at the level of particularity (*śvalakṣaṇa*). [It is held that contemplation of impurity at] the level of universal characteristics can take the Buddha's body (佛身, *\*buddhakāya*) as the meditative object, while [the contemplation of impurity at] the level of particularity cannot take the Buddha (佛) as the meditative object."<sup>16</sup>

The use of the term *rūpakāya* here seems loose. In a parallel passage elsewhere in Xuanzang's translation ("XZ"), the term *rūpakāya* does not appear at all.<sup>17</sup> Even in this passage, the text immediately goes on to speak of both "the visible form (*rūpa*) of the Buddha" (佛色) and "the body of the Buddha" (佛身) *separately*, so that that the association between the two members of the compound (*se* 色 and *shen* 身) is at best loose. In this light, we might well translate the opening question, "Is it possible . . . taking the material form *or* body of the Buddha (佛色身) as the meditative object?" The passage also refers loosely back to the notion in question as just "the Buddha". Further, the term *rūpakāya* does not appear in the same passage in Saṃghabhūti.<sup>18</sup> All of this suggests that the passage was not composed with a formalised doctrine of *rūpakāya* as one of two particular embodiments of the Buddha in mind.

Thus, in *Vibh*, the term *rūpakāya* is most consistently used as part of the attempt to conceptualise rebirth at different levels of the cosmological schema. *Rūpakāya* is explicitly associated with suffering and ignorance, and with sentient beings other than Buddhas. Even if a Buddha can have a *rūpakāya*, then, he shares it with ordinary worldlings, and it is incidental to his status as the Buddha. Finally, the one passage that does predicate a *rūpakāya* of the Buddha does so only loosely, in passing as it were, and furnishes no reason to believe *rūpakāya* is a component of a developed doctrine of various Buddha bodies. *Rūpakāya* is thus not an important part of the *Vibh*'s doctrine of Buddha bodies. We now turn, therefore, to what the text *does* say about the Buddha's bodies.

### Terms for the Buddha's ordinary physical body

When *Vibh* speaks of the ordinary physical body of the Buddha, in opposition to his *dharmakāya*, it most commonly either (1) uses no special term, but just calls it "the body"; or (2) refers to the "birth body" 生身, "the body born of father and mother" 父母生身, etc.

### The Buddha's physical body simply called "the body" etc.

particular, local aspect of that object with which cognitive engagement is achieved moment-to-moment through the course of the contemplation.

<sup>16</sup> 問有緣佛色身起不淨觀不。有作是說。無有能者。佛色微妙最極鮮潔如淨光明不可厭故。有餘師說。佛能自緣起不淨觀。餘無能者。或有說者。不淨觀有二種。一色緣起。二色過患。色緣起者。能緣佛身。色過患者。不能緣佛。復有說者。不淨觀有二種。一自相境。二自相境。共相境者能緣佛身。自相境者不能緣佛。T1545:27.207b02-10. This passage is already contained in the Saṃghabhūti version of the text, T1547:28.504c27-505a11; also in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.340b28-c06. However, there are some key differences between these earlier presentations and the version we find in Xuanzang. Most notable for our present purposes, of course, is the fact that they do not contain the term *rūpakāya* (indeed, as we shall see below, this term never appears in Saṃghabhūti). Saṃghabhūti also does not present the opinion that the Buddha can contemplate impurity with his own body as object, but not that of others; other opinions cited also differ.

<sup>17</sup> See T1545:27.439a15-26, where the question is presented thus: 緣佛身色頗有能起不淨觀不。

<sup>18</sup> See n. 16.

It is common for *Vibh* to speak of the Buddha's ordinary body simply as "the body" (*shen* 身) or "the body of the Buddha" (*foshen* 佛身), without calling it any particular *kind* of body. For example, the text clearly recognises the body of marks of the *mahāpuruṣa*<sup>19</sup> as a dimension of the overall range of the Buddha's embodiments. In speaking of this possibility, however, it *never* uses the term *rūpakāya*;<sup>20</sup> nor does it usually use the special terms that we will examine below. It speaks simply of "the body" or "the Buddha's body".<sup>21</sup> In one passage alone, it speaks of "the great body";<sup>22</sup> and in the narrative of Māra showing the body of a Buddha to Upagupta, it associates the body of marks with the "body of birth" (生身, see immediately below), in opposition to the *dharmakāya*.<sup>23</sup> This is the case also when the text speaks in isolation of the light emanated by the Buddha's body.<sup>24</sup>

"Body" alone, or interchangeably "body of the Buddha", are the terms used when the text discusses the reason that it is an *ānantarya* sin<sup>25</sup> to draw blood from the body of the Buddha.<sup>26</sup> The text also speaks simply of "the body of the Buddha" in discussing the

<sup>19</sup> Like other texts at this stage of doctrinal history, *Vibh* regularly groups the eighty minor marks, the golden complexion, and the halo of light with the thirty-two major marks.

<sup>20</sup> *Pace* Guang, *Concept of the Buddha*, Ch. 2, which contends that in supposed Sarvāstivāda two-body theory, *rūpakāya* is primarily the body of marks.

<sup>21</sup> Two passages are particularly telling. (1) Much of *juan* 177 discusses the marks, as part of a larger discussion of *karma* of body, speech and mind. (This entire discussion is missing from earlier versions of the text.) The term *foshen* 佛身 features in this discussion thirteen times, and 如來身 *\*tathāgatakāya* once. By contrast, no term for a special Buddha body is ever used. (2) In a passage discussing the means by which it was possible for the Tathāgata to prophesy that Maitreya will become a Buddha in future, the text lays down the twofold stipulation that "the bodies of all Buddhas must have the unsurpassed thirty-two marks and the unsurpassed *\*āryadharmas* (s), viz. *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*" 一切佛身必有無上三十二相及無上聖法。謂正等菩提, T1545:27.894c13-14. Again, no special term is used for the body of marks. See also 159c14-16, 361b24-25, 428c02-05, 590b02-04, 730a08-10.

<sup>22</sup> *Dashen* 大身, T1545:27.159c13-19, repeated almost verbatim 428c01-05. This passage is already in *Samghabhūti* and *Buddhavarman*; T1547:28.496b13-21, T1546:28.322a04-08. 大身 is used in explaining why the Buddha's compassion is called great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*); the unusual diction might thus be a way of bringing out more clearly the analogy between the "body of the great man" and the so-called "great compassion" which is there said to be so-called because it is based upon that body. I do not know of any concept of *\*mahākāya*, *\*mahāśarīra*, *\*mahāmabhāva* etc. to which this Ch. might correspond. However, 大 may somehow echo *mahāpuruṣa*. Cf. *da:hangfushen* 大丈夫身 = *\*mahāpuruṣakāya*, T1545:27.157a08-09, 158b22-23, 160a15-16, in the formula "the body of a human, a *mahāpuruṣa* in Jambudvīpa, in the *kāmadhātu*" 欲界人闍部洲大丈夫身, which is said to be the only "basis" (*āśraya* 依) upon which it is possible to become a Buddha (or to attain [his] great compassion). However, 大丈夫身 never appears in explicit connection with the marks. 216a23-25 mentions *zhangfushen* 丈夫身 (without *da*), but clearly does not refer to a Buddha. It rather tells the story of a she-elephant who, having carried the Buddha in a former life, attains by that merit to birth in a male body 丈夫身 (*\*puruṣakāya*) and then to Arhatship. Similarly, 丈夫身 at 889c01-03 refers to birth in a male body.

<sup>23</sup> Māra enters the forest and "transforms his body into the image of a Tathāgata" 化身作如來像, which has the marks; T1545:27.698a13-15. Immediately previously, however, Upagupta has said, "I have already seen the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha; what I have not seen is the Buddha's *body of birth* (my emphasis)" 如來法身吾今已見。所未見者。謂佛生身, 698a09-10. For this story, see John Strong, *The Legend and Cult of Upagupta: Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southeast Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 104-117. In the Skt. *Divyāvadāna* 26, the term is *rūpakāya*: *yad ahaṃ varṣaśataparinirvṛte bhagavati pravrajitāḥ, taddharmakāyo mayā tasya dr̥ṣṭah/ trailokyanāthasya kāñcanādrinibhastasya na dr̥ṣṭo rūpakāyo me/ tad anu nam anugraham apratimim iha vidarśaya buddhavigraham.*

<sup>24</sup> T1545:27.65c11.

<sup>25</sup> I.e. one of the five worst sins, which result in being reborn in Avīci hell in the immediately following rebirth. See Jonathan A. Silk, "Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism: The Five Sins of Immediate Retribution," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 35, no. 3 (2007): 253-286.

<sup>26</sup> See esp. T1545:27.177b04-13, numerous times, "body" interchangeably with "body of the Buddha", 506a06-b06. See also 588a04-10, 600a25-b17, 601c29-602b05, etc. Discussion of the five *ānantarya* sins also gives us clues about the relation of the Buddha's ordinary body and his *dharmakāya*. For example: If the Buddha is properly understood to be comprised of the *āsaikṣadharma*s (see below), why it is such a

whereabouts or transformation of the Buddha's body when he miraculously vanished.<sup>27</sup> The text uses the same term when contrasting the Buddha's physical strength with his "power of thought" (*yili* 意力).<sup>28</sup> "Body of the Buddha" (*fo shenxing* 佛身形) is also the term used when the Buddha becomes visibly physically weak near the time of his death (*parinirvāṇa*).<sup>29</sup>

In the majority of these examples, the terms "body" or "body of the Buddha" refer to the visible, physical body of the Buddha, during his last earthly incarnation or some related existence. Sometimes, however, the same term also refers clearly to what *Vibh* will also call *dharmakāya*.<sup>30</sup> It seems likely that *dharmakāya* is also meant when the text says ordinary compassion is based upon the body of the (ordinary) sentient being, whereas the "great compassion" (*mahākaruṇā*) of the Buddha is based upon the "body of the Buddha".<sup>31</sup>

In sum, even where the text discusses aspects of the embodiment of the Buddha that make it special, it does not necessarily apply *any* special term, but rather, often speaks just of "the Buddha's body".

### The Buddha's "body born of father and mother"/"body of birth"

Sometimes, *Vibh* does specify the kind of body it means when it speaks of the Buddha's ordinary body. In such contexts, far more common than *rūpakāya* are the related terms "body born of father and mother" and "body of birth". The former term, which we will see is quite rare outside *Vibh*, is the more specific, and so we will look at it first.

The term "body born of father and mother" (*fumushengshen* 父母生身, Skt.

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grave sin to attack his body of birth? (The *āśaikṣadharmas* presumably are not harmed by such an attack.) The text answers in part that "the *āśaikṣadharmas* that comprise the Buddha function (轉, \*/vrt) based upon (依, \*āśriya) the body of birth. It should be understood that if one harms the basis (所依), one also harms what is based upon it (能依), just as, if the bottle is broken, the milk [in it] will also be lost;" T1545:27.620c09-18.

<sup>27</sup> T1545:27.66a08-15. Such contexts would be associated with *nairmāṇikakāya* in later texts that posited such a body. Here we find *hua shen* 化身 but as a verb-object clause; see below. The passage varies considerably in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.54a15-24.

<sup>28</sup> T1545:27.156c16. Under "power of thought" the passage clearly discusses items associated with the *dharmakāya* (such as the eighteen *āvenikadharmas*).

<sup>29</sup> T1545:27.680a13-14.

<sup>30</sup> For example, when discussing "Buddha" in the context of three gems, the text says, "'Buddha' here refers to the *āśaikṣadharmas* in the body of the Buddha (*fo shen*). Taintless (i.e. without outflows, *anāsrava*) faith that takes that as its object (緣) is called 'realisation and purification by means of/with regard to buddha';" T1545:27.533b20-26. In the midst of further complications, the text here draws distinctions between the three gems in terms of their embodiment: (1) the *āśaikṣadharmas* in the body of the Buddha is what is referred to by the term *buddha*; (2) the term *dharma* refers to "the *śaikṣa* and *āśaikṣa dharmas*, i.e. the three *anāsravēndriyas* etc." (三無漏根等學無學法) in the body of the *pratyekabuddha*; or *śaikṣa dharmas* in the body of the *bodhisattva*; (3) the term *saṃgha* refers to the *śaikṣa*- and *āśaikṣadharmas* in the body of the *śrāvaka*, etc. Not just the Buddha, but adepts of all three vehicles can be characterised by their different modes of embodiment. That this passage appeals to the model of the three vehicles, with *śrāvakas* at the bottom, and to the *bodhisattva* ideal is one respect among several in which *Vibh* seems to tend towards some Mahāyāna ideas. Cf. also n. 36, 56.

<sup>31</sup> T1545:27.160b14-15. This passage is simpler in Buddhavarman, and this particular sentence is absent; see n. 171. Cf. 428a20-22: "[Ordinary] compassion is perfected in the body of the *śrāvaka*, the *pratyekabuddha*, and the Buddha; great compassion is only perfected in the body of the Buddha." This passage is already in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.322a04-08, where the text speaks of the "great body" (*dashen*, \**mahākāya*), rather than the "body of the Buddha"; see above n. 22. Immediately before this, it is stated that the Buddha's compassion is called "great" (*mahā*-) because "all the limitless merits in the Buddha's body are great", 以佛身中一切功德皆是大, 428a06-07.

\**mātrpitṛkasambhava*kāya)<sup>32</sup> can be traced back to the oldest layers of Buddhist literature, in *Dīghanikāya* 2, the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*. At an advanced stage of practice, the monk prepares himself for the elaboration of a *manomayakāya* (in what we called the "snake slough" model) by coming to the realisation:

"This my body is material (*rūpī*), made up from the four great elements, born of mother and father (*mātāpettikasambhavo*, more lit. "parentally engendered"), fed on rice and gruel, impermanent, liable to be injured and abraded, broken and destroyed, and this is my consciousness which is bound to it and dependent on it."<sup>33</sup>

This passage does note that the dissatisfactory given body, which is about to be transcended, is composed of visible material form (*rūpī*). However, *Vibh* has picked up *not* that characterisation (as would be the case if it spoke of *rūpakāya*), but rather the notion of being born of parents. Under the aegis of this \**mātrpitṛkasambhava*kāya, further, *Vibh* makes a systematic distinction not found in its source in DN 2; the term has undergone creative elaboration.

In discussing the Buddha as refuge, *Vibh* explicitly opposes the \**mātrpitṛkasambhava*kāya to the *dharmakāya*. One does not take refuge in the Buddha's "body comprised of head, neck, belly, back, hands, feet etc."; "this body born of father and mother is a defiled (*sāsrava*) *dharma*, and is not the object of refuge-taking".<sup>34</sup> Here, the emphasis is on the imperfection and impurity of the \**mātrpitṛkasambhava*kāya, and so it seems closer to the body shared by the Buddha with ordinary sentient beings.

Elsewhere, however, the emphasis is on ways the Buddha's \**mātrpitṛkasambhava*kāya is extraordinary. For example, the Buddha tells Ānanda that he can travel in a *manomayakāya* to the Brahmā Heavens.<sup>35</sup> However, Ānanda is unimpressed, saying that

<sup>32</sup> In his translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitōpadeśa* ("MPPU", T1509), Lamotte reconstructs this term \**pitṛmātrjakāya*; see e.g. *La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra)* (Louvain: Institut orientaliste de Louvain, 1966-1980), 513. On the basis of Pāli *mātāpettikasambhavo*, however, it seems more accurate to suggest *mātrpitṛkasambhava*[-kāya]. See e.g. the *Mahāvastu* (Sanskrit) parallel to DN 2, *mātāpitṛsambhavo śrāmanakāyo odanakumbhāśopacayo* etc., Émile Senart, *Le Mahāvastu: Texte sanscrit publié pour la première fois et accompagné d'introduction et d'un commentaire* (Paris: Impr. Nationale, 1882-1887) II, 269, 277-278. I call this body \**mātrpitṛsambhava*kāya as a matter of convenience, though I do not know that it is attested in Skt. We will see at the end of this paper that this term is extremely unusual outside *Vibh*, but also occurs a number of times in MPPU, which suggests a link between the body doctrine of the two texts. See Appendix 4.

<sup>33</sup> *ayam kho me kāyo rūpī cātummahābhūṭiko mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsūpacayo aniccucchādanaparimaddanabhedanaviddhamsanadhammo. idam ca pana me viññāṇam ettha sitam ettha paṭibaddhanti*; PTS DN 1, 76; Maurice Walshe, trans., *The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 104. See Radich, "Somatics" §2.3.3.

<sup>34</sup> 歸依佛者。歸依如來頭項腹背。及手足等所合成身。今顯此身父母生長是有漏法非所歸依。所歸依者謂佛無學成菩提法即是法身。1545.177a14-18; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma 2. Doctrine des Refuges", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 1 (1931-32): 75. This passage is in Buddhavarman (see below n. 159), though not Saṃghabhūti. See also the similar AKBh 4.32, where *dharmakāya* is the *asaikṣadharmas* (see further below), and contrasted with *rūpakāya*: "As for the *rūpakāya* of the Buddha, it has undergone no modification in virtue of the acquisition of the qualities of a Buddha. Thus one does not take refuge in the *rūpakāya* of the Buddha which is, in fact, the *rūpakāya* of the Bodhisattva"; see VP III, 77.

<sup>35</sup> As we will see, this passage can be traced back at least to the *Prajñapti śāstra*; see below n. 135. This seems to mean that it is the oldest statement in the Sarvāstivāda literature of any body-related passage found in *Vibh*. Cf. PTS SN 5.282, "The Iron Ball"; Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans., *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikāya* (Somerville MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000), 1740-1742. Ānanda asks the Buddha, "Does the Blessed One recall ever having gone to the brahmā world by spiritual power with a mind-made body (*abhiññāṇī nu kho bhante, bhagavā iddhiyā manomayena kāyena*

since Śrāvakas<sup>36</sup> can also achieve this, it is a pretty mediocre feat (何其劣哉!) and isn't much to brag about (世尊何足自歎). Hasn't the Buddha got something unique about him? Can the Buddha make the same journey in his *body born of father and mother* 父母生身, comprised of the material great elements (龜大種, cf. DN 2 Pāli *cātummahābhūtika*). The Buddha replies that indeed he can. Ānanda is at last genuinely impressed.<sup>37</sup> Another passage uses the same term for the Buddha's body as it is possessed of prodigious physical strength, which allows him to win a contest against a gaggle of strongmen.<sup>38</sup> In these passages, it is clear that the Buddha's *\*mātrpitṛkasambhava-kāya* is not a type of body shared with ordinary sentient beings, but a special body only pertaining to the Buddha.

In sum, in DN 2, the notion of *\*mātrpitṛkasambhava-kāya* was an epithet of the ordinary material body of any practitioner (not just the Buddha), implying the radically imperfect and dissatisfactory nature of that body. In *Vibh* it is not readily predicated of other beings. This special body has a number of remarkable properties: superhuman physical strength; the ability to travel to the Brahmā Heaven without elaborating a *manomayakāya*; being malleable like molten metal to the Buddha's will. Nonetheless, it is *not* entirely perfect, being impure, and therefore inappropriate as a refuge.

There are relatively few passages in which the "body born of father and mother" is named so precisely as such. In far more passages, the ordinary body of a Buddha,<sup>39</sup> in

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*brahmalokaṃ upasaṅkamitā*)" The Buddha replies, "I recall, Ānanda, having gone to the brahmā world by spiritual power with a mind-made body." La Vallée Poussin tries somewhat unconvincingly to link this to Saṅgkumāra's assumption of a different kind of body when he visits the Heaven of the Thirty-Three: "Notes" 764-765.

<sup>36</sup> That the text can be so derogatory about Śrāvakas suggests that *Vibh* might be open to adopting Mahāyāna ideas. Cf. also n. 30, 56.

<sup>37</sup> 契經中說。佛告阿難。我之神力能以意所成身倏爾至於梵世。阿難白佛。何其劣哉。此事聲聞亦能。世尊何足自歎。謂所化作名意所成身。聲聞亦能以此至於梵世。佛若爾者有何不共。世尊頗能離神通力。以龜大種父母生身。於倏忽間至梵世不。世尊告曰。此我亦能。阿難復言。此事實難。 T1545:27.699a20-26. By contrast, in DN 2, *\*mātrpitṛkasambhava-kāya* was sloughed off precisely as preparation for such rarefied travel. Naturally enough, Ānanda finds it hard to understand celestial travel in the ordinary body, and the Buddha explains with a fascinating metallurgical image: just as iron, when placed in a furnace, becomes light, soft, pliable and pure, and can be shaped in accordance with desire, so too (?) the Buddha's body transforms in accordance with the dictates of his mind (如來身隨心轉); T1545:27.699a27-b02.

<sup>38</sup> T1545:27.156a13-29. Already in Buddhavarman, though not in Saṃghabhūti; see n. 158. None of the strongmen can move a boulder sixty cubits by thirty. The Buddha taunts them ("Come on, you bunch of babies, what do you think you're doing?" 汝諸童子欲何所作), and then flicks the boulder up with his toe and catches it in his hand; flings it high into the air and catches it again; blows it to smithereens with his breath; returns it to its original state, and puts it back where it came from. It was by his power of *abhijñā* that he blew it to bits; by his power of 勝解 (*\*adhimokṣa*?, "resolve"?) that he returned it to its original state; but by the power of his "body born of father and mother" that he could fling it about with such gay abandon. This strength is "not shared" with any other sentient beings, but possessed "only by the (or a?) *bodhisattva* in his final lifetime" 此力不共一切有情, 唯最後身菩薩得有, T1545:27.156b12-13. This prodigious strength begins to wane after the age of fifty, but the Buddha remains very strong; T1545:27.156b05-12; in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.119c23-24.

<sup>39</sup> In one passage, the "body of birth" is also spoken of in relation not just to the Buddha, but also to "the *bodhisattva*". Why is the *bodhisattva* born into the human realm, a destiny appropriate to "lower levels of good *karma*" 下品善業? To address this question, the text compares the *bodhisattva* to "gods who have power over the products of transformation produced by others" (the *paranirmitavaśavartidevas*, gods who dwell in the sixth and highest heaven of the *kāmadhātu*; they are opposed to the *nirmānarai* gods, who create the objects of their desire themselves, but similarly exercise power over those objects; AKBh to 3.1, VP II, 1-2; 3.69, VP II, 164; AKBh to 3.71ab, VP II, 166). The comparison is drawn in terms of bodies:

"There are some conditions (?有餘緣故) in virtue of which the *karma* of the *bodhisattva* is superior, [that is] because the *bodhisattva*'s body is based upon (所依止) limitless merits/virtues (功德), namely the [ten] powers, the [four] confidences, etc., [i.e. the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas*] whereas the

contrast with his *dharmakāya*, is referred to by the obviously related but less specific term *shengshen* 生身, "body of birth" (\**sāmbhavikakāya*, \**sambhava*kāya).<sup>40</sup> I take both terms to refer to the same conception of the Buddha's body.

In most passages where we find "body of birth", it means the ordinary living body of the Buddha, in explicit contrast to the *dharmakāya*.<sup>41</sup> The Buddha can receive offerings of goods because "the body of birth must depend upon clothing, food etc.;" he cannot receive offerings of *dharma* because his *dharmakāya* is already perfect.<sup>42</sup> The text stipulates the Buddha's "body of birth" when it discusses the Buddha's "bodily strength" 身力, by contrast with his "mental powers" 意力.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, causing a schism in the *saṃgha* is a terrible sin because it harms the Buddha's *dharmakāya*, which is contrasted with "a malicious attack that draws blood from the Buddha's body", where the body is sometimes called "body of birth".<sup>44</sup> The term "body of birth" is also used for the physical body in contrast to the *dharmakāya* in discussing which sense-organ is superior.<sup>45</sup> Again,

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*paranirmitavaśavartidevas* have nothing of the sort. [Conversely,] there are other conditions in virtue of which the *karma* of the *paranirmitavaśavartidevas* is superior, because the bodies of those gods are pure and subtle like the flame of a lamp, whereas the "body of birth" of the *bodhisattva* still has various excreta (便利) and impurities." 有餘緣故菩薩業勝。以菩薩身是力無畏等無邊功德所依止故。他化自在天身無如是事。有餘緣故他化自在天業勝。以彼天身清淨微妙如燈焰故。菩薩生身猶有種種便利不淨, T1545:27.101b06-13.

The eighteen *āvenikadharmas* are often identified with the *dharmakāya* (see below), so that the passage is proposing that the body of the *bodhisattva* is based upon the *dharmakāya*. The most plausible interpretation of this problem is just that boundaries between *bodhisattva* and Buddha are blurred. In application to the concept of "body of birth", at least, this is not too problematic. The Buddha is still a *bodhisattva* at the beginning of his last earthly life, i.e. at the moment he is "born", and the "body of birth" is the body he is then born into. The problem of how a *bodhisattva* can have a *dharmakāya* is less easy to evade. If it is possible to speak of the body of a *bodhisattva* (before his awakening under the *bodhi* tree) as "based upon" *buddhadharmas* or even the *dharmakāya*, this almost smacks of the ("Mahāsāṃghika") docetic doctrine that Sarvāstivādins should be opposing. This problem need not detain us here, however.

<sup>40</sup> T1545:27.392a13-15; 229a15-b02; 601c29-602a06, 620c12-18, 620c26-28; 佛生身 698a08-12, 871b29-c20, 391c21-392a11; etc. Some scholars note the terms "body of birth" or "body born of father and mother", but most present it as if it is interchangeable with *rūpakāya*. See Takeuchi, "Buddakan" 160 (Takeuchi proposes *shishen* 實身 as a synonym of the term; see n. 8 above); Paul Demiéville, "Busshin," s.v. *Hōbōgirin*: *dictionnaire encyclopédique du bouddhisme d'après les sources chinoises et japonaises*, ed. Sylvain Lévi, Takakusu Junjirō, Paul Demiéville, et. al. (Tokyo: Maison franco-japonaise, 1929-), 177; la Vallée Poussin, "Notes" 768 (la Vallée Poussin proposes *vipākakāya* as a synonym; see also n. 8 above). La Vallée Poussin reconstructs \**janmakāya*, e.g. "Notes" 768, but it seems more accurate to reconstruct *sambhava* on the basis of the Pāli antecedent for the "body born of father and mother" (see below).

<sup>41</sup> One curious passage explains why the Buddha's funeral pyre 焚如來身火 was miraculously extinguished by "fragrant milk". Multiple reasons are given, but one is that the Buddha's "body of birth" was nourished on milk, and thus it is appropriate that his relics (*śarira*-*āṇi*, 舍利羅) also be bathed in milk; T1545:27.958c11-26. The interest in relics itself is unusual. Relics are mentioned by name in only one other passage, T1545:27.956b04-05. See also, however, la Vallée Poussin, "Notes" 769, noting 627b06-08, which says the *bodhisattva* (Śākyamuni) did not choose a superior birth by metamorphosis because he wanted to leave behind 遺 a body 身 (\**śarira*ni?), so that sentient beings might win immeasurable merit by the worship of "elements of the corpse (Skt. probably *śariradhātu*, 'relics'; see la Vallée Poussin, AK 3.9, VP II, 30) as innumerable as mustard seeds" (遺身界如芥子許), 627c09-16. This passage already in *Samghabhūti*, T1547:28.522c17-18, 523a13-20. This disinterest in relics is in stark contrast to *Prajñāpāramitā* literature.

<sup>42</sup> T1545:27.154b05-08. This sentence is absent, but not the overall discussion, in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.117c04-27.

<sup>43</sup> The Buddha's physical strength reaches its fullness at twenty-five years of age, remains the same until fifty, but thereafter begins to decline. T1545:27.156b05-12; in Buddhavarman; T1546:28.119c23-24; see below n. 157. In understanding "mental strength", it helps to recall that ten powers are the first ten of the eighteen *āvenikadharmas*, which comprise the *dharmakāya*.

<sup>44</sup> T1545:27.601c29-602a03, 620c09-18. Cf. AKBh to 4.32, VP III, 78-79.

<sup>45</sup> T1545:27.731a11-21. One opinion is cited that the eye is best at guiding the body of birth, whereas the ear is best at "guiding" the *dharmakāya*. An opposing opinion holds that eye and ear can both guide both

in commenting on the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* tradition that the Buddha exhibited his physical body to the assembled monks just before he entered *parinirvāṇa*,<sup>46</sup> the text proposes that "see" (觀 *avalokayata*) is said with regard to the body of birth, where the virtually synonymous "behold" (察 *vyavalokayata*) is said of the *dharmakāya*.<sup>47</sup> "Body of birth" is also the term for the ordinary body in a curious passage that contrasts the clothing required by beings in the *rūpadhātu* with "modesty" as the garb of the *dharmakāya*.<sup>48</sup>

The term "body of birth" is also consistently used (interchangeably with "the body of the Buddha") in discussing the purity or impurity of the Buddha's body. Against the claim of the "Mahāsāṃghikas" that the Buddha's body is untainted ("without outflows", *anāsrava*), the Vaibhāṣikas argue that this would have made it impossible for Anupamā 無比女人 to feel lust for his body,<sup>49</sup> for Aṅgulīmālya to feel anger towards him, etc. Since it can be the objective support (緣, *\*ālambana*) for such impure emotions, "the *body of birth* of the Buddha is certainly not taintless (*anāsrava*)" (my emphasis).<sup>50</sup> Similarly, when the Mahāsāṃghika opponents cite a passage stating that the Tathāgata was not rendered impure by worldly *dharma*s,<sup>51</sup> the Vaibhāṣika retort that the scripture refers differentially to the "body of birth" and the *dharmakāya*. The statement that the Tathāgata was born and dwelt in the world, etc., is made with reference to the "body of birth" 依生身說, whereas the statement that he was not soiled by worldly *dharma*s is made with reference to his *dharmakāya*.<sup>52</sup> In all these passages, the opposition between the "body of birth" and the *dharmakāya* is clear.

bodies. This passage already in Saṃghabhūti and Buddhavarman.

<sup>46</sup> *avalokayata bhikṣavas tathāgatasya kāyam; vyavalokayata bhikṣavas tathāgatasya kāyam*. Ernst Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* Teil III (Berlin 1951), §42.10; cited in Gustav Roth, "The Physical Presence of the Buddha and Its Representation in Buddhist Literature," in *Investigating Indian Art: Proceedings of a Symposium on the Development of Early Buddhist and Hindu Iconography Held at the Museum of Indian Art Berlin in May 1986* (Berlin: Museen für Indische Kunst, Staatliche Museen Preussischen Kulturbesitz, 1987), 293.

<sup>47</sup> 應觀我者。謂於生身。應察我者。謂於法身, T1545:27.957c25-958a14.

<sup>48</sup> T1545:27.362b14-c14. In the *rūpadhātu*, beings are clothed at the very moment of birth, "because shame is greater in the *rūpadhātu*" (色界中慚愧增故). By contrast, "Modesty is the garb of the *dharmakāya*. Just as the *dharmakāya* is clad in this most excellent of robes, so, too, the body of birth [is clad] (?? 慚愧即是法身衣服。如彼法身具勝衣服生身亦爾)." Most creatures in the *kāmadhātu*, by contrast, are born naked, because "most [beings in] the *kāmadhātu* are without shame" (欲界中多無慚愧). In both of the earlier *Vibh* the term is also "body of birth", T1546:28.267c27, T1547:28.518b26-27. Exceptions in the *kāmadhātu* are *bodhisattvas* and the nun Śuklā (白淨苾芻尼, later in the same para. 白淨尼, 白淨比丘尼 in Saṃghabhūti, T1546:28.267c29); on Śuklā, see *Avadānaśataka* ascribed to Zhi Qian (this ascription is considered incorrect by modern scholars; Jan Nattier, *A Guide to the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Translations: Texts from the Eastern Han 東漢 and Three Kingdoms 三國 Periods*, Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica X [Tokyo: The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism, Soka University, 2008], 121-122), T200:4.239b17-c11; P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Avadāna-Śataka*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 19 (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1958), 180-182; Stanley Frye, trans., *Sutra of the Wise and the Foolish (mdo mdzangs blun) or Ocean of Narratives (üliger-ün dalai)* (Dharmasala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1981, 2000), 96-98, "The Beggar Woman Gives her Clothing."

<sup>49</sup> T1545:27.391c27-28, 於佛身無比女人不應起愛。For the story of Anupamā, see Andy Rotman, "The Erotics of Practice: Objects and Agency in Buddhist *Avadāna* Literature," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 71, no. 3 (2003): 567-570; "The Story of Makāndika the Wanderer", in Joel Tatelman, ed. and trans., *The Heavenly Exploits: Buddhist Biographies from the Divyāvadāna*, Volume One, The Clay Sanskrit Library (New York/Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk: New York University Press/JJC Foundation, 2005), 310-415; Yijing's 義淨 (635-713) *Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya*, T1442:23.886a19-c20.

<sup>50</sup> 既緣起愛及瞋慢癡故佛生身定非無漏, T1545:27.229a15-24, 392a04-11, 392b13-17.

<sup>51</sup> T1545:27.229a18-19, 871c02-05, etc.

<sup>52</sup> T1545:27.229a15-b02, 391c26.392a15, 871c17-20 etc. Note that this interpretation is also found in the Saṃghabhūti version of the text, T1547:28.463b06-10; and in Buddhavarman T1546:28.176a24-b13.

Elsewhere in the text, the contrast between the Buddha's "body of birth" and the *dharmakāya* is explicit ("the bodies of the Buddha are of two types"). Here, the text is discussing the "fruits of the monastic life", and trying to resolve a dilemma: scriptures sometimes say there are four such fruits 四果, i.e. the four grades of attainment from Stream-Enterer to Arhat; sometimes they say that the life of a monk is itself one of the fruits won by "going forth".

"There are two broad senses in which it is shown (現) that the Buddha is 'beyond the world' (\**lokōttara*, 出世): (1) the conventional (worldly) sense (世俗, \**vyāvahārika*); and (2) the ultimate sense (勝義, \**pāramārthika*). The 'worldly sense' refers to his abandoning the *dharma* of the householder and taking up [that of] the non-householder, [that is,] shaving off his hair and beard and donning the monastic robe, and taking up the observance of pure precepts with a correct mind of faith. The 'ultimate sense' refers to his attainment of perfect awakening to the four noble truths. When he first went forth from domestic life, it already shown that the Buddha was 'beyond the world' in the conventional sense; when, having left home, he engaged in practice (?展轉修行), it showed further that he was beyond the world in the ultimate sense. Now, when we speak of 'urging [people] to go forth from domestic life',<sup>53</sup> this means urging people to cultivate (or 'imitate', 學) the Buddha's bodies (即是勸人學諸佛身); it is for this reason that the *sūtras* teach [as they do?]. To explain, the bodies of the Buddha are, broadly speaking, of two types: (1) the body of birth; (2) the body of *dharma* (諸佛身略有二種。一者生身。二者法身). If someone abandons the *dharma* of the householder and takes up [that of] the non-householder, shaving off hair and beard, donning the monastic robe, and taking up the observance of pure precepts with a correct mind of faith, this should be understood to be cultivating/imitating the Buddha's body of birth (學佛生身). If, on the other hand, someone engages in the cultivation of correct practice, and gives rise to perfect awakening<sup>54</sup> to the four noble truths, this should be understood to be cultivating/imitating the Buddha's body of *dharma* (學佛法身)."<sup>55</sup>

In this rich passage, the following points are of special interest. (1) The Buddha, *qua* Buddha (and not as an ordinary sentient being) does indeed have two kinds of body, but that they are his *dharmakāya* and his "body of birth" (not *rūpakāya*). (2) Both are extraordinary (\**lokōttara*); neither is just the ordinary given body possessed by other, imperfect sentient beings. (3) Strictly speaking, in this passage, the "body of birth" (or its "cultivation") is only spoken of as such from the moment of departure from the household life. (4) The entirety of the monastic life is conceived of very broadly as an endeavour to cultivate and eventually realise these two kinds of Buddha *body*.<sup>56</sup>

When the "body of birth" is discussed in greatest detail, the text connects it with the problem of *sôpadhiṣeṣa*- and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa* (有/無餘依涅槃), "Nirvāṇa with and

<sup>53</sup> This topic is already at play in the text, given that it is commenting, as observed above, on the *Sāmaññaphala*/*Śrāmaṇyaphala* = DN 2, i.e. discussing the point of becoming a monk; see 341b10 ff.

<sup>54</sup> It is significant that the Buddha's *dharmakāya* is associated with his attainment of *bodhi*. We will return to this point below.

<sup>55</sup> T1545:27.342c14-25. The Buddhavarman version of this same passage is very underdeveloped by comparison, and makes no mention of bodies: 佛出世間。眾生入法凡有二種。一假名。二真實。假名者。剃除鬚髮而被法服正信出家。真實者。起世第一法。次第能入苦法忍, T1546:28.4c05-08.

<sup>56</sup> Note also that this is a model of practice in *imitatio buddhi* (學佛...身). We would usually associate this idea with the Mahāyāna. Such points are important in assessing the likelihood that the Sarvāstivāda, as represented by *Vibh*, was open to Mahāyāna influence. Cf. also n. 30, 36.

without a support". This *Vibh* passage is thus part of an extended history in which *sôpadhiśeṣa-* and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* came gradually to have corporeal meaning and be bound up in the larger discourse about the corporeal implications of the attainment of buddhahood. Because of the length of the passage, I translate it in full in Appendix 1 (below p. 155); here I will only summarise the main points pertinent to our discussion.

This passage says that the difference between the two types of *nirvāṇa* stems from the fact that in *sôpadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, the life(-force) is not yet exhausted; therefore the physical form comprised of the four elements (= *mahābhūtas*; 大種造色) still continues; because of this, mind (*citta*) and associated *dharma*s (*caitāsikadharmas*) continue to arise in dependence upon that physical form. Nirvāṇa without remainder is converse in all respects. "Physical form" (*se* 色, *rūpa*) is identified first with the "body of the five sense-organs" (五根身, \**pañcēndriyakāya*). It is then identified with *rūpakāya*: "[The phrase] 'physical form comprised of the elements' refers in general to the *rūpakāya*" (大種造色者總顯色身)." Most importantly for our current purposes, however, the text also speaks in the same connection of the Arhat's remaining physical body as a "body of birth".

This mention of *rūpakāya* and "body of birth" in the same sense and context<sup>57</sup> might lead us to suspect that the two bodies are to be identified. This might seem to lend limited support to the notion that the Buddha has a *rūpakāya*. Here too, *rūpakāya* and "body of birth" once more refer to a kind of embodiment shared by the Buddha with other beings – however, here, it is shared with other Arhats. This means that the "body of birth" is not entirely a unique property of the Buddha, as the *dharmakāya* is (see below); but even if it is shared, it is still, in distinction to the *rūpakāya*, a body which is possessed by *special* beings.<sup>58</sup> This confirms once more that "body of birth" is the specific term used to refer to the ordinary physical body *in the special situation where it is possessed by a perfected being*.

*Rūpakāya* here is not strictly relevant to the Buddha in another sense. The careful technical treatment of the *rūpakāya* in this passage shows that it refers primarily to a body of physical form (*rūpa*) as the property of sentient beings in the realms of desire (*kāmadhātu*) or form (*rūpadhātu*). This is contrasted to the kinds of bodies possessed by beings in the realm of formlessness/the immaterial realm (*ārūpyadhātu*). In other words, *rūpa-* in *rūpakāya* is not understood in opposition to *dharma*, but in opposition to *ārūpya*. We must therefore reorient our understanding of *rūpakāya* from Buddhological to cosmological questions.

In fact, the passage alternates carefully between *rūpakāya* and "body of birth". *Rūpakāya* is the term in all cases describing Abhidharmic analysis of the relationship between ordinary body as "support" and the operation of mind and associated *dharma*s (para. <2>);<sup>59</sup> or where discussing the physical body as it *does not* pertain to the Arhat (as something that has ceased upon entry into the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, paras <7>, <9>). By contrast, "body of birth" is the term for the physical body as it *does* still persist for some Arhats (e.g. as opposed to the *kleśas*, paras <5>, <10>). The text only uses the

<sup>57</sup> Compare esp. *rūpakāya* in para. <2> and "body of birth" in para. <5>, or *rūpakāya* in para. <9> and "body of birth" in para. <10>. However, *rūpakāya* only occurs in XZ, not in Buddhavarman; the whole passage is absent in Saṃghabhūti. Paragraph numbers refer to my numbering in Appendix 1.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. the attribution of the "body of birth" to the *bodhisattva* (see n. 39).

<sup>59</sup> Paragraph numbers refer to my numbering in Appendix 1.

term *rūpakāya* to refer to the body as it persists in an Arhat in discussion of anomalous cases (para. <12>), where the issue is the technical distinction between bodies obtaining in different cosmological realms. Thus, "body of birth" is the term for the special case where a physical body endures for a being who has already attained *nirvāṇa*. On the basis of this passage, then, we would say that "body of birth" refers to a body of the Buddha, too, insofar as it is the physical body of an Arhat.<sup>60</sup>

In sum, we have seen in this section that *Vibh*'s "two-body" theory opposes to the *dharmakāya* the "body of birth" or the "body born of father and mother", and not the *rūpakāya*. The most significant ideas about this body are: it is the Buddha's last physical earthly body right through his lifetime (from his early *bodhisattva* years to the very scene of his *parinirvāṇa* and even the relics); it is the body identified as the "remainder" in the corporeal interpretation of *sôpadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*; it is the object of offerings, and requires food and clothing; it is immensely strong; is the body from which drawing blood is an *ānantarya* sin; it is impure (tainted/with outflows', *sâsrava*); it is the "support" of the *dharmakāya*, and it is possible to harm the *dharmakāya* by harming it; it is "based upon" a set of "limitless merits" identical with the *āvenikadharmas* and therefore upon the *dharmakāya*; part of the practice of a monk is understood as the imitation of this body; and the Buddha alone is capable of travelling miraculously even to the Brahmā Heaven in this body. This body is partially mundane, being tainted or defiled, heir to harms and ills, dependent upon conditions of sustenance etc.; on the other hand, it is also certainly no ordinary body, existing in some ill-defined relation to the *dharmakāya*; having extraordinary strength; being capable of other miraculous feats; being a great field of merit as the object of offerings to the Buddha; and so on.

### *Dharmakāya* in *Vibh*

A *dharmakāya* is indeed ascribed to the Buddha in *Vibh*. However, the text's specific conception of the *dharmakāya* has often been partially misconstrued. Scholars have often understood this and other "Mainstream" texts to present *dharmakāya* pluralistically, as comprised by such collections as the Buddha's eighteen *āvenikadharmas* ("unique qualities") or the *anāsravaskandhas/śaikaṣadharmas* ("qualities without contamination", "qualities [of one] beyond any further practice"). Such interpretations are accurate, but fail to delve beneath the surface of the doctrine to a deeper claim. Following the lead of la Vallée Poussin, Makransky has shown that the Sarvāstivādin conception of the *dharmakāya* hinges on the idea that the Buddha is embodied in *bodhi*. I will argue that overlooking this underlying understanding can lead to exaggeration of the extent to which the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of *dharmakāya* is pluralistic. Further, this Sarvāstivādin doctrine of *dharmakāya* as embodiment in *bodhi* is part of a broader pattern in early Common-Era doctrines, and the gulf between Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna doctrines is thus not as great as has sometimes been thought.

### The eighteen *āvenikadharmas* as *dharmakāya*

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<sup>60</sup> This contradicts some other uses of "body of birth" seen above, for example, as applied to the body of the Buddha *before* his awakening; the body with titanic strength; the body that can visit the Brahmā world. In these cases, it is hard to imagine that these powers would also characterise the "body of birth" of other Arhats.

The claim is sometimes seen in the secondary literature,<sup>61</sup> and not entirely without justification, that the Sarvāstivāda define the *dharmakāya* as the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas* or "unique qualities" of a Buddha: ten "powers" (*bala*), four "confidences", three foundations of mindfulness, and great compassion. This characterisation is partially correct. However, it is also limited, first, because it presents only part of the overall picture; and second, because it fails to penetrate to the underlying idea of embodiment in *bodhi*.

The definition of the *dharmakāya* as the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas*<sup>62</sup> is usually taken from a passage in which the text is discussing respects in which all Buddhas are equal.<sup>63</sup> Among other things, the Buddhas are said to be equal "with regard to the *dharmakāya*" (法身等).<sup>64</sup> This resonates with more radical Mahāyāna statements that the Buddhas are *one* in virtue of the *dharmakāya*.<sup>65</sup> *Vibh* here stops short of asserting the absolute identity of the Buddhas, but it obviously tends in the same direction. The passage goes on:

"... that is to say, as one Buddha accomplishes (成就, *\*sidh*) limitless merits [of]/(such as? 等) the eighteen unique properties [of a Buddha] (*āveṇikadharmas*, 十八不共法), viz. the ten powers (*bala*), the four confidences (四無畏, *caturvaiśāradya*), great compassion, and the three foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*), (and so on? 等), so too do the other Buddhas, and thus we say [they are all] equal."<sup>66</sup>

Despite some ambiguity,<sup>67</sup> this passage clearly identifies *dharmakāya* with the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas*. Underlying this definition is the idea that the Buddha is embodied in his awakening. The whole list breaks down to various aspects of the Buddha's special gnosis.

<sup>61</sup> E.g. Guang Xing, *Concept of the Buddha* Ch. 2, esp. 35-36, more generally 35-44.

<sup>62</sup> In *Vibh*, *āveṇikadharmas* so named do not feature very largely in connections other than discussion of *dharmakāya*. The *āveṇikadharmas* are part of a definition of buddhahood without any mention of *dharmakāya*, T1545:27.735c16-18; they are part of a discussion of the difference between Buddhas, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, 189b05-16. Individual items on the list are discussed under the rubric of "powers of mind" (意力; cf. AKBh introducing AK 31a, *mānasam balaṃ*), 156c16-160c22; cf. AK & Bh 7.28-31, VP V, 66-74.

<sup>63</sup> As opposed, e.g., to their lifespan, etc., in which respect they are not equal. Other respects in which they are not equal, according to AK, are the families and castes into which they are born, the size of their physical body, the time for which their Dharma endures, etc.; VP V, 81.

<sup>64</sup> This doctrine of the "equality" of the Buddhas with respect to body and *āveṇikadharmas* is found in the Chinese canon as early as Zhi Qian's *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, though not yet under the name of *dharmakāya*. Lamotte implies it is there derived from Sarvāstivāda; once more, it is the central thrust of this study to show that we cannot be confident this is the case. See Radich, "Somatics" §4.5.2, p. 615. The other respects in which Buddhas are equal are in their "equipment" (*sambhāra*), that is, in the merits they have accumulated in virtue of countless aeons of prior *bodhisattva* practice; and in their service for the needs of other beings. Cf. AK 7.34, *sambhāradharmakāyābhyām jagataś cārthacaryayā/ samaiā sarvabuddhānām nāyurjātipramānataḥ*; VP V, 79-81.

<sup>65</sup> E.g. in the *Drumakinnararājapariprechā*, "knowing that all Buddhas are one Buddha, by virtue of [their] entry into the inconceivable *dharmadhātu*," *chos kyi dbyings bsam gyis mi khyab pa la zhugs pas/ sangs rgyas thams cad sangs rgyas gcig tu shes pa*; Lokakṣema reads, "All Buddhas are nothing but one Buddha. For what reason? Because [their] penetration of the 'body' of *dharma*s (*fashen*) is incalculable" 一切佛為一佛耳。何以故。法身所入不可計故, T624:15.358b05-06. See Harrison, "Real Phantom Body" 62; discussed in Radich, "Somatics" 767.

<sup>66</sup> 謂如一佛成就十力四無所畏大悲三念住。十八不共法等無邊功德。餘佛亦爾故名平等, T1545:27.85a26-28. See also 624a13-15, where the same ideas are repeated almost verbatim. See also 131b14-21, which differs slightly. This passage is in Buddhavarman; see below, n. 163. Compare AKBh to 7.34, discussed below p. 169.

<sup>67</sup> Stemming from the placement of 等 and the unclear notion of "merits of" the *āveṇikadharmas*. The wording of this list is somewhat garbled in Buddhavarman also; see n. 163.

The ten "powers" are all kinds of *jñāna* ("wisdom", "gnosis", "special knowledge"):<sup>68</sup>

- (1) the power of special knowledge of the possible and the impossible (處非處智力, *sthānāsthānajñānabala*);
- (2) the power of special knowledge of the arising of *dharma*s [as a result of] *karma* (二業法集智力, *karmavipāka(jphala)jñānabala*);
- (3) the power of special knowledge of *dhyāna*, *vimokṣa*, *samādhi* and *samāpatti* (靜慮解脫等持等至發起雜染清淨智力, *dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāpattijñānabala*);<sup>69</sup>
- (4) the power of special knowledge of [the dispositions of] various classes of beings (種種界智力, *nānādhātujñānabala*);<sup>70</sup>
- (5) the power of special knowledge of the aspirations<sup>71</sup> of various beings (種種勝解智力, *nānādhimuktijñānabala*);
- (6) the power of special knowledge of superior and inferior [moral] faculties [of beings] (根勝劣智力, *indriyaparāparaññānabala*);
- (7) the power of special knowledge of the ways that led to all destinies of rebirth (遍趣行智力, *sarvatragāminīpratipajñānabala*);
- (8) the power of special knowledge of the recollection<sup>72</sup> of prior dwelling-places (宿住隨念智力, *pūrvanivāsajñānabala*);
- (9) the power of special knowledge of the births and deaths of beings (死生智力, *cyutyupapādajñānabala*);
- (10) the power of special knowledge of the destruction of taints (outflows) (漏盡智力, *āsravakṣayajñānabala*).<sup>73</sup>

The four respects in which a Tathāgata is confident, that is, "without fear, dauntless" (Ch. *wuwei* 無畏)<sup>74</sup> or "assured" (VP's translation of AK's Skt. *vaiśāradya*),<sup>75</sup> are also very close to the Tathāgata's *jñāna*. They either directly comprise *jñāna*, or are its immediate derivatives:<sup>76</sup>

- (1) confidence in perfect, complete awakening [to all *dharma*s Skt.] (正等覺無畏, *sarvadharmābhisambodhivaiśāradya*);
- (2) confidence in having eternally destroyed all taints (outflows, *āsrava*) (漏永盡無畏, *sarvāsravakṣayajñānavaiśāradya*);

<sup>68</sup> Cf. T1545:27.156c19-23; for the (slightly imperfect) Skt. parallels, see AK 7.28c-29 and Bh, VP V, 68-71. AKBh explains that these *jñāna* are referred to as "powers" or "forces" (*bala*) only in the case of the Buddha, because his is a kind of knowledge that "knows without obstacle all the objects of knowledge" (*sarvatra jñāyete jñānam avyāhataṃ*).

<sup>69</sup> On the *dhyāna*s, *vimokṣa*s, *samādhi*s and *samāpatti*s as part of a larger list of *buddhadharma*s in both Sarvāstivādin and Prajñāpāramitā sources, see Radich, "Somatics" 794-796.

<sup>70</sup> The order of the following three items differs in AK.

<sup>71</sup> 勝解, Skt. *adhimukti*. I translate according to Skt., because our goal here is to examine the history of Indic concepts.

<sup>72</sup> Presuming that 隨念 is for *anusmṛti*, which is not found in the Skt. of AK.

<sup>73</sup> This tenth "power" is identical with *kṣayajñāna*, and thereby partially coterminous with the tenth *asaikṣadharma* (*saṃyagjñāna*) and the fifth *anāsravaskandha*. See below.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. AKBh to 7.32a-c: "The word *vaiśāradya* means 'absence of fear' (*nirbhāyā*). Because of these [*vaiśāradya*s understood as] *jñāna*s, [that is,] because he knows himself to have understood all *dharma*s, destroyed all taints, etc., the Buddha is exempt from fear."

<sup>75</sup> Cf. ordinary Skt. *viśārada*, "skilled, wise, proficient, learned, clever, clear of mind". The Buddhist term *vaiśāradya*, however seems rather to carry connotations of perfect self-assurance and confidence. The Buddha, in virtue of his perfection of the ten kinds of *jñāna* named as the ten "powers", is absolutely certain of these four things. For background to this rubric, see VP AKBh V, 74, n. 7.

<sup>76</sup> Once more, the Skt. given is from AKBh (to 7.32a-c, VP V, 75), and does not correspond perfectly to the Chinese terms.

- (3) confidence in the exposition of *dharma*s obstructing [realisation of the truth and deliverance] (說障法無畏, *antarāyikadharmavyākāraṇavaiśāradya*);  
 (4) confidence in the exposition of the paths leading to deliverance (說出道無畏, *nairyāṇikapratipadvāyākāraṇavaiśāradya*).<sup>77</sup>

(1) is a kind of confidence in the unshakeable nature of *anuttarasam̐yaksambodhi*. Whether or not that confidence is part and parcel of awakening or derivative of it, it is inextricably tied up with the Buddha's gnosis. (2) is confidence in or deriving from a kind of *jñāna*. The relation of (3) and (4) to gnosis is slightly more indirect. Strictly speaking, they are confidence in skills of exposition that derive from that gnosis. Nonetheless, they are still related to *jñāna*,<sup>78</sup> insofar as the Dharma is discourse about the truth which is the content of the Buddha's gnosis.<sup>79</sup> The close links between these four "confidences" and *jñāna* are further emphasised in discussion of the overlaps and identities between them and the ten "powers".<sup>80</sup>

The next category in the list of the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas* is of course the three "foundations of mindfulness" (*smṛtyupasthānas*). Each of these items represents a different way that the Buddha maintains a state of "indifference, mindfulness and full consciousness" (大捨住念正知, *upekṣas . . . tathāgato . . . smṛtaḥ saṃprajānan*) regardless of circumstances.<sup>81</sup> Mindfulness and consciousness are, once more, fundamentally mental, not to say gnostic, qualities. *Vibh* even says outright that these three *smṛtyupasthāna* are incorporated in the first of the ten "powers", i.e. a kind of *jñāna*.<sup>82</sup>

The last *āveṇikadharma* is "great compassion" (*mahākaruṇā*).<sup>83</sup> The close links between this item and gnosis is made explicit by *Vibh*'s own statement that it too is "incorporated" in the first of the ten powers.<sup>84</sup>

In sum, all eighteen *āveṇikadharmas* are identified with kinds of *jñāna*, or perhaps as products of *jñāna*.<sup>85</sup> The various kinds of *jñāna* are clearly aspects of the Buddha's special gnosis, in virtue of which he is a Buddha. Gnosis is thus the central focus of the whole rubric of the *āveṇikadharmas*, and therefore of this definition of *dharmakāya*.

<sup>77</sup> For these four categories in *Vibh*, see 1545.158a21-b13 etc.; see also AKBh 7.32a-c, VP V, 74-75.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Yogācāra *taṭprajñālabdhajñāna* versus *nirvikalpapakajñāna*.

<sup>79</sup> There seems to have been controversy within Sarvāstivāda about whether these four "confidences" themselves comprised kinds of *jñāna*, or were merely effects of *jñāna*. Vasubandhu asks rhetorically: "Why are *jñānas* [here] named *vaiśāradya*?" He cites an opinion that because of these attainments as *jñānas*, the Buddha is exempt from all fear, and then says, "Thus *vaiśāradya* is *jñāna*." However, he immediately disputes this, saying, "In our opinion, *vaiśāradya*, being an effect of *jñāna*, is not a *jñāna* by nature;" AKBh to 32a-c, VP V, 75.

<sup>80</sup> T1545:27.159a17-b02; see also AKBh to 7.32a-c, VP V, 75.

<sup>81</sup> 1545.160b19-29, Skt. from AKBh to 7.32, cited VP V, 76.

<sup>82</sup> 如是三種不共念住應知亦攝在處非處智力, T1545:27.160b29-c01. See la Vallée Poussin AKBh V, 76 n. 1.

<sup>83</sup> The complexities of *mahākaruṇā* in Sarvāstivāda texts need not detain us here. For a summary, see Guang Xing, *Concept of the Buddha* 40-44.

<sup>84</sup> 問此大悲何力攝。答處非處智力攝, T1545:27.160b05-06.

<sup>85</sup> The fundamentally gnostic quality of the *āveṇikadharmas* are also emphasised in other ways by Vasubandhu in AKBh. He introduces the ten *āveṇikadharmas* in the context of his seventh chapter, on *jñāna*; he explains that the various *guṇas*, of which the *āveṇikadharmas* constitute the foremost exemplars, are "made of (by?) *jñāna*" (*jñānamaya*); and he further notes that the *āveṇikadharmas* are acquired precisely at the moment when the *bodhisattva* realises the "special knowledge of the destruction [of the taints/outflows, *āsrava*]" (*[āsrava-]ksaya-jñāna*), that is, the moment at which he "becomes an *arhat* and, at the same time, *buddha*"; AKBh to 7.27, VP V, 66.

## The five *anāsravaskandhas* and the "*āsaikṣadharmas* comprising *bodhi*" as *dharmakāya*

Secondary scholarship also notes an alternative interpretation of the *dharmakāya* in Sarvāstivāda. On this reading, *dharmakāya* comprises the five *anāsravaskandhas* ("pure aggregates") of morality (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*), liberation (*vimukti*) and insight into the special knowledge of liberation (*vimuktijñānadarśana*).<sup>86</sup> This interpretation is also supported by the texts.<sup>87</sup> One problem with previous studies, however, is that they have not recognised the coexistence of *both* the *āveṇikadharma* model and this model. It is also important to note the way this notion of *dharmakāya*, too, is ultimately reducible to the Buddha embodied in his gnosis.

We already saw above<sup>88</sup> that in discussing the Buddha-refuge, *Vibh* says that one properly takes refuge in the *dharmakāya*, which it glosses as "the *āsaikṣadharmas* of the Buddha which comprise *bodhi*".<sup>89</sup> Despite surface appearances, this definition is in fact the same as the definition in terms of *anāsravaskandhas*. First, then, we must demonstrate this equivalence by turning to the *Abhidharmakośa*, which has been the source of the definition in terms of *anāsravaskandhas* for secondary scholars.

In AKBh 4.32, we find a similar definition, but without explicit mention of *āsaikṣadharmas*.<sup>90</sup> AKBh further specifies that *bodhi* is comprised of *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* (as elsewhere, as we shall see below), in addition to (one dimension or kind of) *samyagdrṣṭi*.<sup>91</sup> AKBh also adds that the Buddha is *bodhi* so defined "along with the *dharma*s that attend [those *dharma*s]" (*saparivārāḥ*).<sup>92</sup> To understand this definition, we must therefore understand: (1) the definition of *bodhi* as specific kinds of *jñāna*; (2) the definition of *āsaikṣadharmas*, explicit in *Vibh* but not in AK & Bh; (3) AKBh's term "attendant [*dharma*s]" (*parivārah*).

*Bodhi* is repeatedly defined throughout AK & Bh as *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna*.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>86</sup> La Vallée Poussin, "Sources," followed by Makransky, *Buddhahood Embodied*. Specific citations follow. Frank Reynolds notes that this doctrine is found in Buddhaghosa, but traces it no earlier in the Pāli materials; "The Several Bodies of the Buddha: Reflections on a Neglected Aspect of Theravada Tradition," *History of Religions* 16 (1977): 380.

<sup>87</sup> I have argued elsewhere that these "five pure aggregates" may themselves comprise a nascent model of "re-embodiment" as early as the Nikāyas, and through materials as diverse as reliquary inscriptions, *Prajñāpāramitā* (e.g. Lokakṣema's *Aṣṭa*), and Vinaya texts (the *Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya* as studied by Schopen). See esp. Radich, "Somatics" 529-538. I hope in future to dedicate a study to the five *anāsravaskandhas* as a model for re-embodiment upon liberation.

<sup>88</sup> See n. 34, revisited p. 143.

<sup>89</sup> 所歸依者謂佛無學成菩提法即是法身, T1545:27.177a14-18; see la Vallée Poussin, "Documents" 75. Already found in Buddhavarman; see n. 159. Cf. AK 4.32, where it is said that one takes refuge in the *āsaikṣadharmas* comprising the Buddha (and Saṃgha; *buddhasaṃghakarān dharmān āsaikṣān*); VP III, 76-77. The wording here is almost identical to *Vibh*, but speaks of *dharma*s comprising *buddha* rather than *bodhi*. See also e.g. Bh to 6.73c-74, VP IV, 293.

<sup>90</sup> Noted by la Vallée Poussin, and favoured over definition in terms of the *āveṇikadharma*s, "Documents" 70.

<sup>91</sup> As a member of the eightfold noble path, *samyagdrṣṭi* has both *śaikṣa* and *āsaikṣa* variants; Bh to AK 6.75b, VP IV, 295. On this same triad, see also AKBh to 6.12d, VP IV, 156.

<sup>92</sup> AKBh to 4.32, VP III, 77.

<sup>93</sup> AK 6.67a-b, VP IV, 282; Bh to 7.1b, VP V, 3. AK 7 & Bh specifies that *kṣayajñāna* is the special knowledge that the four noble truths are known, abandoned, etc.; *anutpādayajñāna* is knowledge that this former knowledge is exhaustive and complete, viz. there is no more to know, abandon etc., with regard to the same truths; VP IV, 9-11. *Kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* are positioned last in a schema of ten *jñānas* with complex interrelations, VP IV, 11-12 (not the ten *jñānas* comprising the ten "powers" in the eighteen *āveṇikadharma*s). Elsewhere, *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* are covered by the umbrella term *samyajñāna* (the tenth *āsaikṣadharma*), which is identified with *bodhi*; AK 6.76d, VP IV, 298. *Kṣayajñāna*

This highly technical definition is intimately linked to AK's account of the moment of transition to arhatship and buddhahood, and characteristics of the states thereafter. Complete liberation occurs with the transition from *vajrôpamasamādhi* ("the concentration like adamant", the last meditative accomplishment immediately before full awakening) to the arising of *kṣayajñāna*.<sup>94</sup> This moment is explicitly identified with arhatship itself,<sup>95</sup> and it is also the moment when a Buddha becomes a Buddha.<sup>96</sup> Where the Arhat is of the class called "unshakeable/ unmoveable" (*akopyadharman*),<sup>97</sup> he enters immediately after the arising of *kṣayajñāna* into *anutpādayajñāna*, that is, the knowledge that tainted (*āsrava*) *dharma*s will not ever arise again.<sup>98</sup>

In the context of the same transition to arhatship and buddhahood, the text also broaches the definition of the term *asaikṣa*. This term is glossed as referring to *dharma*s which are both untainted ("without outflows", *anāsrava*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*); by contrast, *saikṣadharma*s are untainted but conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).<sup>99</sup> In fact, the text identifies this transition into arhatship with entry into the category of *asaikṣa*. Thus, the category of *asaikṣa* is closely connected to that of *bodhi*, as defined by *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna*. Even though AK & Bh does not specify that the *asaikṣadharma*s are part of the Buddha-refuge, it is clear from context that this doctrine must be implicit (because the *asaikṣadharma*s are an inalienable definitional component of buddhahood as defined by *bodhi*, which the text does identify with the Buddha as refuge).

It is therefore relevant to ask what the *asaikṣadharma*s are for AK & Bh. Analysis shows they are identical to the five *anāsravaskandha*s.

AKBh counts ten *asaikṣadharma*s. (1) "perfect liberation" (*saṃyagvimukti*) and (2) "special knowledge of perfect liberation" (*saṃyagvimuktijñāna*) are considered exclusively *asaikṣa*.<sup>100</sup> *Samyagvimuktijñāna* is also called *saṃyagjñāna*, when it refers to *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* (= *bodhi*).<sup>101</sup> (3-10) The eight members of the eightfold noble path are also considered to have both *saikṣa* and *asaikṣa* variants. One qualified as *asaikṣa* possesses the *asaikṣa* variants.<sup>102</sup>

How does this tenfold rubric map onto the fivefold set of *anāsravaskandha*? To answer

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and *anutpādayajñāna* are also identified with two other "pure" *jñāna*s: (1) *dharmajñāna* ("special knowledge of *dharma*") and (2) *anvayajñāna* ("consequent/subsequent special knowledge"). They have as their respective objects the four noble truths in the *kāmadhātu*, or the *rūpa*- and *ārūpyadhātu* respectively; AK & Bh 2-4c, VP IV, 4-5; see also AK & Bh 4d-6b, VP IV, 6-8.

<sup>94</sup> AK 6.44d-45a, VP IV, 230; see also Bh to AK 7.8, VP V, 13-14; 7.25a and Bh, VP V, 57.

<sup>95</sup> AK 6.45b, VP IV, 230-231.

<sup>96</sup> AKBh introducing AK 28ab, VP V, 66. See also AKBh 2.44ab and Bh, VP I, 204-205.

<sup>97</sup> Defined later in the same chapter as part of a sixfold classification of types of Arhat, AK 6.56 ff., VP IV, 251 ff.

<sup>98</sup> AK & Bh 6.50ab, VP IV, 240; see also AK 25b and Bh, VP V, 57-58. Where an Arhat is not "unshakeable", by contrast, he enters thereafter into another moment of *kṣayajñāna*, or into the *asaikṣasaṃyagdr̥ṣṭi*. The latter therefore belongs to Arhats of both classes; AK 6.50b-d and Bh, VP IV, 240.

<sup>99</sup> AKBh to 6.45, VP IV, 231-232.

<sup>100</sup> Bh to AK 6.75b-d, VP IV 295-296. The text here says that the one qualified as *asaikṣa* is so-called in virtue of the fact that, because of complete liberation from the bonds of all defilements, he is infused with/empowered by (*prabhāvita*) *vimukti* and *vimuktijñānadarśana* (*vimuktitaṭṭhānamajñānābhyaṃ*): *asaikṣas tu sarvakleśabandhanāntanirmokṣād vimuktitaṭṭhānamajñānābhyaṃ prabhāvita iti tasyaiva tadvacanam nyāyāyam*. On *prabhāvita*, see Radich, "Somatics" n. 1525.

<sup>101</sup> AKBh to 6.76, VP IV, 298.

<sup>102</sup> I.e. "*asaikṣa* right view" (*asaikṣī saṃyagdr̥ṣṭi*) through to "*asaikṣa* right concentration" (*asaikṣī saṃyaksamādhi*); Bh to AK 6.75b, VP IV, 295.

this question, we must know what the text means by *parivārah*, "attendant [dharma]s", when it defines the Buddha-refuge as *bodhi* "along with [the dharmas that] attend [it]". La Vallée Poussin and Makransky identify these "attendants" as the five *anāsravaskandhas*. This identification is justified, but matters are not as straightforward as these authors make them seem. As far as I can determine, the only support for this identification is AKBh 1.2, and even that is somewhat tangential.<sup>103</sup>

At AK 1.2, the *kārikā* identifies "Abhidharma" itself, in the "ultimate" sense (*paramārthika*), as "immaculate *prajñā*, with its retinue" (*prajñāmalā sānucārābhidharmah*). To this, Bh adds,

"Here, '*prajñā*' means 'discernment of dharmas' (*dharmānām pravicaṣaḥ*).<sup>104</sup> '*Amalā*' ('immaculate') means *anāsrava* ('taintless, without outflows'). 'With its retinue' means 'with its attendants' (*saparivārā*). In this manner, we come to say that the fivefold collection of *anāsravaskandhas* is 'Abhidharma'.<sup>105</sup>

An identity between *prajñā* and *bodhi* is supported by AK 7.1b and Bh, which speaks of *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* as *dhī*. *Dhī* here seems to be used *metri causa* as a synonym for *prajñā*.<sup>106</sup> If *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* equal *bodhi*, and *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* are *dhī*=*prajñā*, then *bodhi* is *prajñā*. Thus, (Abhidharma=) "*prajñā* with its retinue" would seem a close equivalent to (the Buddha-refuge=) "*bodhi* with its attendants". Via these terminological identifications, we can infer that in the AKBh 1.2 definition of Abhidharma, the "attendants" of *bodhi* would be the *anāsravaskandhas*. Thus, the Buddha-refuge comprises *bodhi* and the five *anāsravaskandhas*.

We can support this identification from another direction. We just saw that AKBh defines the *āsaikṣadharmas* in terms of a tenfold set: (1) *saṃyagvimukti* (2) *saṃyagjñāna*; (3-10) *āsaikṣa* versions of the members of the eightfold noble path. The eightfold noble path is often analysed as *śīla*, *saṃādhi* and *prajñā*, the first three members of the fivefold *anāsravaskandha* rubric.<sup>107</sup> By the addition of *vimukti*=*saṃyagvimukti* and

<sup>103</sup> Makransky follows VP here. Primary sources cited by VP do not seem to support this identification. La Vallée Poussin, "Documents" 86 n. 2, referring to AK Ch. 1 p. 12 (? *sic*, perhaps referring to 1.2, as Makransky seems to silently correct him; see below) and AKBh (in fact, seemingly, *Vyākhyā*) to 6.76, VP IV, 297. Makransky refers us to the more useful Bh to AK 1.2, *Buddhahood Embodied* 25, but does not explore the ensuing complications.

<sup>104</sup> See also Bh to 2.24, VP I, 154, where *prajñā* is called *matī*.

<sup>105</sup> AKBh to 1.2a, VP I, 3. My translation of the last sentence differs from that of la Vallée Poussin. He translates, "Ce qu'on appelle la 'suite' (*anucara*) [de la *prajñā*], c'est son escorte (*parivāra*), [à savoir] les cinq *skandhas* purs [qui coexistent à la *prajñā*]" (the square brackets are my additions, to show those parts of the translation that appear to be la Vallée Poussin's own interpretative interpolations). To this, Skt. reads *evam anāsravaḥ pañcaskandhako 'bhidharma ity uktam bhavati*; Xuanzang 如是總說無漏五蘊名為對法, T1558:29.1b04; and Paramārtha 若爾則說無漏五陰。名阿毘達磨, T1559:29.162a03-04. In other words, all of these three versions agree that the five *anāsravaskandhas* alone are called "Abhidharma", with no further mention of *prajñā*.

<sup>106</sup> La Vallée Poussin freely uses the term *prajñā* for *dhī* in his translation, presumably on the basis e.g. of Bh to 7.1c. The *kārikā* at 7.1c states that "all other sacred (*aryā*) wisdom (*dhī*) are both [i.e. *jñāna* and *dr̥ṣṭi* = *darśana*]" (*tadanyobhayathāryā dhīḥ*). Bh comments that "all taintless (*anāsrava*, 'without outflows') wisdom (*prajñā*) other than the *kṣāntis* and *kṣaya*- and *anutpādayajñāna* are both *jñāna* and *dr̥ṣṭi* (*kṣāntikṣayānutpādayajñānebhyaḥ 'nyā 'nāsravaḥ prajñā dr̥ṣṭiḥ jñānam ca*); VP V, 3. Thus, Vasubandhu considers *dhī* and *prajñā* synonymous. From the mention of *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādayajñāna* under the name of *dhī* at 7.1b, *prajñā* can also be used for *jñāna*. In fact, it seems from the opening parts of Bh to Ch. 7 that *dhī* = *prajñā* is a broader blanket term that covers two not coterminous categories of *jñāna* and *dr̥ṣṭi*/*darśana*.

<sup>107</sup> See MN 44, the *Cūḷavedalla-sutta*, where Sister Dhammadinnā declares this subordination of the

*vimuktijñāna*=*saṃyagjñāna*, the *āśaikṣadharmas* rubric is exactly coterminous with the *anāsravaskandhas*.<sup>108</sup>

Thus, this AKBh 4.32 definition of the Buddha refuge in terms of *bodhi* and "attendants" varies only in wording from the *Vibh* definition in terms of (*dharmakāya* =) "the *āśaikṣadharmas* that comprise *bodhi*".<sup>109</sup> This is supported by other passages in *Vibh*. *Vibh* consistently identifies Buddha with the *āśaikṣadharmas*,<sup>110</sup> understood to comprise the Buddha's body (unqualified) or *dharmakāya*. The *āśaikṣadharmas* are also understood to be identical with the five *\*āśaikṣaskandhas*, i.e. *anāsravaskandhas*.<sup>111</sup>

Like the definition of *dharmakāya* as the *āvenikadharmas*, these definitions focus centrally on the Buddha's embodiment in his gnosis. *Vimuktijñānadarśana* = *saṃyagjñāna* is the fifth *anāsravaskandha* and the tenth *āśaikṣadharmas*, i.e. the culmination of each rubric. However, we saw that AKBh defines this instance as *kṣayajñāna* and *anupādajñāna*. These are precisely the two *jñānas* elsewhere identified with *bodhi* itself. Thus, if the Buddha-refuge is the *āśaikṣadharmas* comprising *bodhi* (*Vibh*), that same *bodhi* is already the tenth *āśaikṣadharmas*; and if it is [*bodhi* defined as] *kṣayajñāna*, *anupādajñāna* and its attendants = the *anāsravaskandhas* (AKBh), the *anāsravaskandhas* also already incorporate *bodhi*. In both cases, the Buddha as refuge is merely the *āśaikṣadharmas-cum-anāsravaskandhas*, with *bodhi* given pride of place therein.

Further, this whole discussion (according to AKBh) hinges on the transition from the "concentration that is like adamant" (*vajrôpamasamādhi*) to arhatship and buddhahood.<sup>112</sup>

eightfold noble path to these three aggregates in reply to a query from her former husband Visākha. Thus, *śīlaskandha* includes right speech (*saṃyagvāc*), right action (*saṃyakkarmānta*) and right livelihood (*saṃyagājīva*); *saṃmādhiskandha* includes right effort (*saṃyagvyāvāma*), right mindfulness (*saṃyaksamrti*) and right concentration (*saṃyaksamādhi*); and *prajñāskandha* includes right view (*saṃyagdr̥ṣṭi*) and right thought (*saṃyaksamkalpa*). See Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans., *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 398.

<sup>108</sup> A close relation between *āśaikṣadharmas* and the five *anāsravaskandhas* is also supported by an extended passage in both versions of JñP and two of three versions of *Vibh* (the passage in question seems not to be in *Samghabhūti*). Throughout this passage, each *anāsravaskandha* is referred to as the *\*āśaikṣaśīlaskandha*, the *\*āśaikṣasaṃmādhiskandha* etc., so that for this corpus, it would be at least equally accurate to refer to the rubric as a whole as the "five *\*āśaikṣaskandhas*". In JñP, see T1543:26.777b04-07 and 778a26-b10, T1544:26.923c25-924a07; in *Vibh*, T1545:27.171c05-172c04, T1546:28.130c15-131a12. In fact, on the whole, it is more common in Sarvāstivāda to refer to these *skandhas* as *āśaikṣa* than *anāsrava*. We only find a few references to *anāsravapañcaskandhas* 無漏五蘊, e.g. at T1537:26.505a02-03; T1542:26.733b21, 738a21, etc.; T1545:27.397a23-24, 727, b17-18, esp. 797a18-799c21, etc. At none of these places are the five *skandhas* meant identified by name, nor is any connection to *dharmakāya* apparent.

<sup>109</sup> For *Vibh*, see n. 66. Significant differences between the two texts are: AKBh does not present Buddha-refuge doctrine as a doctrine of *dharmakāya*, but *Vibh* does; AKBh elsewhere presents its own complex synthetic understanding of *dharmakāya*, in terms that are nowhere echoed in *Vibh*.

<sup>110</sup> Other echoes of this understanding: "Here [in the doctrine of the refuges,] 'Buddha' means the *āśaikṣadharmas* in the Buddha's body, and a taintless (i.e. 'without outflows', *anāsrava*) faith in that [Buddha so defined] is termed 'clear-minded faith in the Buddha' (佛證淨, *\*buddhaprasāda*)," T1545:27.533b20-21; repeated soon afterward as part of a commentarial analysis, 533c20-21; cf. AKBh to 6.73c-74ab, VP IV, 293; "All the *āśaikṣadharmas* possessed by the World-Honoured One are termed 'Buddha';" 世尊所有諸無學法說名為佛, T1545:27.620c12-13. "What are the *āśaikṣadharmas*? The five *āśaikṣaskandhas*;" 問無學法云何。答無學五蘊, T1545:27.396c04; Buddhavarman: 云何無學法。答曰。無學五陰, T1546:28.296a13. To my knowledge, this last passage is the only place in *Vibh* that justifies the explicit identification of the *āśaikṣa-/anāsravaskandhas* with the *dharmakāya*.

<sup>111</sup> "What are the *āśaikṣadharmas*? The five *āśaikṣaskandhas*;" 問無學法云何。答無學五蘊; T1545:27.396c04.

<sup>112</sup> AKBh leading into 7.28, VP V, 66. A connection to the other definition of *dharmakāya* discussed

The new Buddha acquires the two *jñānas* that comprise *bodhi*, and also, presumably, converts his attainments on the eightfold path into the *āśaikṣa* variants. These *āśaikṣa* variants of the members of the path are defined precisely by the fact and knowledge that "What is to be done is done" etc., i.e. that there is "no need for further training" (*āśaikṣa*). In all respects, this moment is of its essence a moment of gnostic attainment, and any "attendant" phenomena follow upon and are ancillary to that central gnostic fact. This is also shown by the very language of "attendants" (*parivāras*), "accompanying" etc.

#### **Vibh's main conception of *dharmakāya* as embodiment in *bodhi*: Summary**

In conclusion, in *Vibh* we find two main definitions of *dharmakāya* – in terms of *āveṇikadharmas*, and in terms of *āśaikṣadharmas*. To these two definitions, it was necessary for us to add a third Sarvāstivāda definition (perhaps later) from AKBh, in terms of the *ānāsravadharmas*. This diversity of definitions has been overlooked by previous scholars, who have tended to notice only one or another. The diversity is significant for at least three reasons. First, it shows that Sarvāstivāda Buddha-body doctrine is more complex than secondary scholarship has suggested. Second, as we will see below, that complexity may be a sign that Sarvāstivāda Buddha-body doctrine continued to develop until quite late, and this may have implications for relative chronological relations between Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna body doctrine. Third, this very flexibility in terms of surface expression, I believe, is another sign that the key issue is not this or that list of specific "*dharma*s", but a deeper underlying conception of the *dharmakāya*.

I have argued that the definitions of *dharmakāya* in terms of *āśaikṣadharmas* and *ānāsravadharmas* turn out to be reducible to the same concept, expressed in different terms. I argued further that both this definition of *dharmakāya* as *āśaikṣaskandha-cum-ānāsravaskandhas* and the definition in terms of *āveṇikadharmas* can be shown to hinge on a more fundamental underlying notion of the Buddha as embodied in his gnosis (*bodhi*, *jñāna* etc.). Not unobserving this underlying conception, previous scholars have sometimes suggested that Mainstream models of *dharmakāya* (of which Sarvāstivāda is a paradigmatic case) are pluralistic, which they take as a key point of contrast to Mahāyāna models.<sup>113</sup> This exaggerates the distance between the Sarvāstivāda model and Mahāyāna models, and attention to the underlying notion of the Buddha's embodiment in gnosis corrects this distortion, revealing that the Sarvāstivāda conception of *dharmakāya* is in fact quite close to the Mahāyāna conception in some respects.

#### ***Dharmakāya* in *Vibh*: Complications**

Thus far, this discussion of the *Vibh* doctrine of *dharmakāya* has focused on what I take to be the main characterisations of the term, in terms of an underlying embodiment of the Buddha in his gnosis, parsed variously in terms of several different lists of specific *dharma*s. Before closing, we should observe some complications to this tidy picture, lest we fall into an image of *dharmakāya* in *Vibh* that is unrealistically abstract and "bloodless".

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above is that AKBh discusses the *āveṇikadharmas* immediately following this moment of transition.

<sup>113</sup> I am thinking particularly of Harrison, "Phantom Body".

In discussing its contrast with the Buddha's ordinary body above, we already observed in passing several features of Vibh's *dharmakāya*: The body of the *bodhisattva* is "based upon" the *dharmakāya*.<sup>114</sup> *Dharmakāya* is the "body of the Buddha" upon which his *mahākaruṇā* is based.<sup>115</sup> *Dharmakāya* is perfect and complete, and therefore the Buddha cannot receive offerings of *dharma*. *Dharmakāya* never wanes or deteriorates, and neither does its "power" or strength. The sin of creating a schism in the *saṃgha* is an attack on the *dharmakāya*. The ear is considered by some authorities superior to other organs in "guiding the *dharmakāya*".<sup>116</sup> The Buddha as refuge is the *dharmakāya*, glossed as "the *āśaikṣadharmas* comprising *bodhi*".<sup>117</sup> "Modesty is the garb of the *dharmakāya*."<sup>118</sup> Where scripture says that the body of the Buddha is taintless ("without outflows", *anāsrava*), it means the *dharmakāya*.<sup>119</sup> To engage in correct practice and awaken to the four noble truths is "to cultivate the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha".<sup>120</sup>

Some of these passages seem to imply a very corporeal, organic understanding of the *dharmakāya*. Such an understanding is echoed elsewhere. In one curious passage, the possibility is envisaged that there might be a stage of realisation where the *kuśalamūlas* are small, which is equated with a state in which the *dharmakāya* is "not yet grown" (法身未長). In this condition, it is not possible to sever the *kleśas*, but it is also said that the practitioner is not "overcome" (摧伏) by the *kleśas*, because the fledgling *dharmakāya* is still "powerful" (有威勢). Such a *dharmakāya* is compared to a tiger cub, who, not yet being fully grown, cannot catch other beasts, but is equally not harmed by other beasts, because it is powerful or awe-inspiring (有威勢).<sup>121</sup> This passage seems to suggest that a kind of nascent or embryonic *dharmakāya* might be possessed by a practitioner before they attain to the stage of buddhahood. Similarly, we already saw that the monastic vocation is urged in terms of the imitation of the Buddha's body of birth and *dharmakāya*. In this context, the *dharmakāya*, also, can be "cultivated", and this cultivation specifically comprises "the cultivation of correct practice" and "giving rise to perfect awakening".<sup>122</sup> This would also seem to indicate that the *dharmakāya* can be created in a nascent form, and only eventually brought to full fruition,<sup>123</sup> on an understanding of growth closely modelled on the processes of organic "bodies".

In another passage, we read (as the third of a series of partly *nirukta*-style glosses on the term *upādāna*, "attachment, grasping, clinging"):

<sup>114</sup> See n. 39.

<sup>115</sup> See n. 31.

<sup>116</sup> Sources for these several statements in n. 42 to 47.

<sup>117</sup> Passage cited n. 34.

<sup>118</sup> See passage cited n. 48.

<sup>119</sup> See passages cited fns. 49 to 52.

<sup>120</sup> See passage cited n. 55.

<sup>121</sup> 問因論生論。世第一法。何故不能斷諸煩惱。答世第一法彼於爾時善根微小。法身未長而有威勢。以善根微小法身未長故不能斷惑。有威勢故不為煩惱之所摧伏。如師子子身小未長而有威勢。以身小未長故不能害獸。有威勢故不為諸獸之所侵害，T1545:27.15a28-b05. This passage is already in *Buddhavarman*; see n. 162.

<sup>122</sup> See passage cited n. 55.

<sup>123</sup> We have seen that the moment of perfect awakening is usually coterminous with entry into the category of *āśaikṣa*. If the *dharmakāya* comprises *āśaikṣadharmas*, these statements would mean there must paradoxically exist some form of the *dharmakāya* (-cum-*āśaikṣadharmas*) before the moment when the practitioner becomes *āśaikṣa*.

"'Upādāna' also means 'to harm' (傷害義). Just as, when one's body is repeatedly stabbed by sharp daggers, one's body will weaken and deteriorate, so too, where the \**dharmakāya* of a sentient being (有情) is repeatedly stabbed by the daggers of the poisons and the *kleśas*, that *dharmakāya* will weaken and deteriorate (法身便壞)."<sup>124</sup>

This passage is quite strange. It says that the *dharmakāya* could "weaken and deteriorate", but we have seen elsewhere that when *dharmakāya* is predicated of the Buddha, it is said that this cannot happen.<sup>125</sup> It also seems to attribute a *dharmakāya* to an ordinary "sentient being" (*youqing* 有情). Once more, it seems that the text here envisages a nascent *dharmakāya* that grows gradually over time. A possibly related idea is the claim that it is the *dharmakāya* that is "sustained and nourished" by the "food" of the *dhyānas*.<sup>126</sup>

The unusual and somewhat chaotic impression of *dharmakāya* that we receive from these passages is amplified by some mentions of *dharmakāya* found only in earlier versions of *Vibh*, but not in XZ. One passage in *Samghabhūti* compares the Buddha to a dragon-king. The dragon king "nurtures his body" in the sea, and then rises into the air to make it rain. Similarly, the Buddha nurtures his *dharmakāya* through long ages of past Buddhas before making the rain of the Dharma fall.<sup>127</sup> Once more, we are given the impression that the *dharmakāya* has a nascent form that grows gradually before the attainment of buddhahood. Elsewhere, *Samghabhūti* says that Brahmans of other schools have three truths, which comprise a "tripartite *dharmakāya*" comprising a *śīlaskandha*, a *samādhiskandha*, and a *jñānaskandha*.<sup>128</sup> The ascription of this view to non-Buddhists is very unusual. Another passage unique to *Samghabhūti*<sup>129</sup> describes the *dharmakāya* in very concrete terms that clearly equates it with the Dharma *qua* teaching, even going so far as to count texts and syllables. Of greatest interest here is the fact that this interpretation is so *unusual* among our materials, against some claims in secondary scholarship that Mainstream texts often present the *dharmakāya* in terms of the teaching (Dharma).

In sum, the notion of the Buddha's embodiment in his gnosis is central to the *Vibh*

<sup>124</sup> 復次傷害義是取義。如利毒刺數刺其身身便損壞。有情亦爾。煩惱毒刺數刺法身法身便壞, T1545:27.247c16-18. Already in *Samghabhūti* and *Buddhavarman*; see below.

<sup>125</sup> The waning of the strength of the Buddha's physical body is contrasted with the *dharmakāya*, which "never deteriorates or wanes" (無衰退); T1545:27.156b05-12. This passage discussed above in connection with the Buddha's ordinary physical body, n. 28.

<sup>126</sup> T1545:27.419b01-05; *Samghabhūti*, T1547:28.486c27-487a01; *Buddhavarman*; T1546:28.314a27-b01.

<sup>127</sup> The dragon king, "after long nurturing his body in the sea 海中長養身已," rises into the air and covers the sky with clouds, making lightning flash and thunder crash, and announcing, "I am about to make it rain." The Buddha, after "long nurturing his *dharmakāya*" (長養法身) through the ages of all the past Buddhas, "rises into the air on the vehicle of his great compassion, covers the world with the clouds of his great mercy, lets flash the lightning of his wisdom and lets resound the thunder of his great Dharma-voice" etc.; 以大悲乘虛空。以大慈雲覆陰世間。放智電光震大法音 etc., T1547:28.448a18-b03. In *Buddhavarman*, the term *dharmakāya* is absent, and we find instead *zhishen* 智身, \**jñānakāya* or "body of special knowledge/gnosis", clearly suggesting the centrality of embodiment in gnosis; T1546:28.278c17-279a01. In XZ, though the passage exists, the *dharmakāya* is not mentioned (and neither is the body of the Dragon-king); T1545:27.366b23-c09. *Buddhavarman* and XZ describe the Buddha rising into the metaphorical skies as "rising into the realm of *nirvāna* with a remainder of support", 上昇有餘涅槃虛空界中, T1546:28.278c25; 昇有餘依涅槃空界。興大悲雲遍覆世間, T1545:27.366c05-06.

<sup>128</sup> The specific gloss of these terms suggests adaptation to the non-Buddhist groups in question. 或曰。此中說三分法身戒身定身慧身。彼不害一切眾生者是戒身。我不為他他不為我者是定身。諸所習法皆是盡法者是慧身, T1547:28.472c11-14.

<sup>129</sup> Translated below, Appendix 3.

definition of *dharmakāya*, with that gnosis unpacked into lists of *āveṇikadharmas* and *asaikṣadharmas*. Here, the *dharmakāya* appears quite abstract, and naturally enough, to properly belong only to a fully-fledged Buddha. Alongside this concept, however, we find other traces of a much more literalist, corporeal interpretation of *dharmakāya*, where *dharmakāya* seems oddly enough to be understood as something that grows from an embryonic form well before the attainment of buddhahood, and indeed, that can as such even be ascribed in some sense to quite ordinary sentient beings.

### The disinterest in Buddha-bodies in earlier Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts

On internal evidence, it is thought that seven works in the Sarvāstivāda canon, extant almost exclusively in Chinese, are earlier than *Vibh*. They are the six "limbs" of the Sarvāstivāda (more literally, "feet", Skt. \**ṣaṭpādaśāstra*, *ṣaṭpādābhidharma* Ch. 六足論, 六足阿毘曇, 六分阿毘曇), and the *Jñānaprasthāna*, figured as the torso or trunk.<sup>130</sup> Thus, in approximate chronological order, scholars distinguish three main strata in the literature as a whole.<sup>131</sup>

(1) Three texts are considered oldest:<sup>132</sup>

*Samgītiparyāya* (阿毘達磨論, T1536);  
*Dharmaskandha* (法蘊足論, T1537);  
*Prajñapti śāstra* (阿毘達磨施設足論, T1538);

(2) They are followed by a second stratum comprising:

*Dhātukāya* (阿毘達磨界身足論, T1540);  
*Vijñānakāya* (阿毘達磨識身足論, T1539);  
*Prakaranapāda* (阿毘達磨品類足論, T1542; 眾事分阿毘曇論, T1541);  
*Jñānaprasthāna* (阿毘達磨發智論, T1544, 阿毘曇八犍度論 T1543; "JñP"), the root text upon which *Vibh* is a commentary;

(3) These in turn are followed by *Vibh*.

However, thus far in this study, we have taken *Vibh* as our main point of reference. The reason we have not examined these earlier texts instead is that those texts, even JñP, have little to say about the Buddha's special bodies. This suggests that at the stage represented

<sup>130</sup> See e.g. Kuiji's postface to the *Dhātukāya* speaking of the "six feet of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, T1540:26.625c09-13; postface to the 24<sup>th</sup> fascicle of the earlier translation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, 八犍度是體耳。別有六足可百萬言, T1543:26.887a21-22, etc. For further references see Willemen, Dessein and Cox 161.

<sup>131</sup> All of the seven pre-*Vibh* texts listed above but one (the *Prajñapti śāstra*, trans. \*Dharmarakṣa/\*Dharmapāla 法護, ?-1058) were translated by Xuanzang, in addition to *Vibh* itself. We also have earlier translations of two texts: (1) *Jñānaprasthāna* ("JñP"): the (Gautama) Saṃghadeva 瞿曇僧伽提婆 and Zhu Fonian 竺佛念 translation (阿毘曇八犍度論, \**Aṣṭagrantha* T1543), dating from 383; (2) *Prakaranapāda* (眾事分阿毘曇論 T1541), translated by Gunabhadra 求那跋陀羅 (394-468) and Bodhiyaśas 菩提耶舍, in 435-443. In addition, according to Ulrich Kragh, it is possible that Paramārtha's *Lishi Apitan lun* 立世阿毘曇論 (\**Lokaprajñāpyābhidharma*, T1644), may somehow be related to the *Lokaprajñapti* chapter of the *Prajñapti śāstra*, which is missing from the Liu Song Chinese translation. Ulrich Kragh, s.v. "Shishe lun" 施設論, DDB (accessed April 6, 2007).

<sup>132</sup> For this chronology, see Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 167, 171-175; for individual texts, see 177-221; Erich Frauwallner, *Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems*, trans. Sophie Francis Kidd (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 14-37, 211 n. 4; Ulrich Kragh, s.v. DDB, "Shishe lun" 施設論 (accessed April 6, 2007); Dan Lusthaus, s.v. "Apidamo jiyimen zulun" 阿毘達磨集異門足論, DDB (accessed April 6, 2007).

by *Vibh*, Sarvâstivāda saw a sudden burst of interest in the problematic of the Buddha's embodiments. In what follows, I will demonstrate this by briefly surveying the evidence in this corpus for each of the major concepts we examined above for *Vibh* in turn.

*Rūpakāya* almost *never* refers to a body of the Buddha. It refers only to the case of the ordinary sentient beings in the *kāma*- or *rūpadhātu* in the *Samgītiparyāya*<sup>133</sup> and the *Dharmaskandha*.<sup>134</sup> The earliest text in which *rūpakāya* is used of a body of the Buddha is the *Prajñāpti sāstra* (only once).<sup>135</sup> It is entirely absent in the *Dhātukāya*, the *Prakaranapāda*, the *Vijñānakāya*, and JñP. The doctrine that the Buddha bears the thirty-two marks of the *mahāpuruṣa* is almost entirely absent; it only appears twice in the *Prakaranapāda*. Not even the word "body" is mentioned.<sup>136</sup> The "body of birth" (*shengshen* 生身, *\*sāmbhavikakāya*) and "body born of father and mother" (*fumushengshen* 父母生身, *\*mātrpitṛsāmbhavakāya*) are entirely absent.<sup>137</sup> The term *dharmakāya* is entirely unknown prior to *Vibh*, even in JñP.

Even aside from these terms, these earlier texts are uninterested in the Buddha's bodies in general. With few exceptions,<sup>138</sup> we do not find even the general terms "body of the Buddha" or "body of the Tathāgata". The tangentially relevant *anāsravaskandhas*/*asaikṣaskandhas* do appear in isolated parts of this corpus,<sup>139</sup> but are never discussed in terms of a corporeal conceit or related to the Buddha's embodiment. *Sōpadhiṣeṣa*- and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu* are simply not discussed in this corpus prior to JñP.

Significantly, even JñP is no more interested than its predecessors in the overt discussion of the problematic of the Buddha's embodiments. We only have a couple of scant signs of the explosion of interest to come in *Vibh*: the definition of the Buddha refuge in terms of the *asaikṣadharmas* that comprise *bodhi* (without explicit mention of *dharmakāya*);<sup>140</sup> the five pure aggregates, called *asaikṣaskandhas* (without equating them with the *dharmakāya* or a corporeal conceit);<sup>141</sup> the key passage relating *sōpadhiṣeṣa*- and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu* to *rūpakāya* and the "body of birth".<sup>142</sup> In the case of the

<sup>133</sup> T1536:26.437c25-439a17, 446b29-447a17.

<sup>134</sup> T1537:26.509b19-21.

<sup>135</sup> Pericope claiming the Buddha can travel to the Brahma Heavens not only in his *manomayakāya*, but also in his physical body, T1538:26.528b03-18. See above p. 128 for corresponding *Vibh*. Otherwise, *rūpakāya* is never predicated of a Buddha before *Vibh*, and then, only in Buddhavarman (once) and in XZ (once). It is difficult to avoid the impression that the *term* entered the texts quite late. We must recall that though *Prajñāpti sāstra* itself *may be* early in the relative chronology, the only extant translation is very late (\*Dharmapāla/Dharmarakṣa, Song).

<sup>136</sup> T1538:26.516c11-14, 520c13.

<sup>137</sup> *Prajñāpti sāstra* cited at 135 clearly evokes the original DN 2 pericope, making the omission of the term "body born of father and mother" all the more significant. Even in *Vibh*, it seems that these terms creep in gradually over the history of the text; see below.

<sup>138</sup> The only exceptions I know of are the following: *Dharmaskandha* discussing harming the "body of the Buddha" 出佛身血 as an *ānantarya* sin, T1537:26.502b22; a similar passage in *Vijñānakāya*, "But in the very nature of things (法爾, *\*dharmaṭayā*?), it is not possible to harm the vitality of the Tathāgatas; it is only possible to draw the blood of a Tathāgata with violent and vicious intent," 然諸如來。法爾無有能害命者。唯可有能以勃惡心出如來血, T1539:26.587b14-16; another in the *Prajñāpti sāstra*, as already mentioned n. 135.

<sup>139</sup> Prior to JñP, only in *Samgītiparyāya* T1536:26.394b16-29; and *Dharmaskandha* T1537:26.463a10-12, 464a08-14, 493a02-03.

<sup>140</sup> In XZ, T1544:26.924c15-17. Cited above n. 109. In Samghadeva, we only see the very rudiments of this definition, 佛者彼覺行歸趣無學法, T1543:26.779a10.

<sup>141</sup> In Samghadeva, T1543:26.777b04-07 and 778a26-b10; in XZ, T1544:26.923c25-924a07.

<sup>142</sup> See Appendix 1, JñP root passages marked in bold, p. 155, 156 and 158.

last passage, in the earlier Saṃghadeva translation<sup>143</sup> the discussion is not still framed in terms of the "body", but rather "the four gross [elements]" and "the five sense-organs". In XZ, the five sense-organs have become "the body of the five sense-organs" (\**pañcēndriyakāya*). Even in Xuanzang's JñP, however, neither of the terms *rūpakāya* and "body of birth" appear; this step is only taken in *Vibh*.

### Comparison between different versions of *Vibh*

Thus, the rich ideas in *Vibh* about the Buddha's embodiments do not represent a Sarvāstivāda heritage from time immemorial. Instead, they can be specifically dated to *Vibh* itself. Much therefore hinges on how we date these ideas as they appear in *Vibh*. This question can be approached, if not solved, by comparison of XZ's *Vibh* with the earlier versions.<sup>144</sup> In the course of the discussion above, I noted in the footnotes places where earlier translations diverge from XZ. Here I will summarise that information.

### Samghabhūti

Saṃghabhūti's *Vibh* never uses the term *rūpakāya*. Saṃghabhūti does mention the thirty-two marks and other distinguishing features of the Buddha's physical body;<sup>145</sup> reference is made, in some of these passages only, to his "body", but as in XZ, this body is never named as a specific type.<sup>146</sup> Saṃghabhūti never mentions the "body born of father and mother". It does use "body of birth" (twice, opposed to *dharmakāya* as in XZ).<sup>147</sup> In comparison to earlier Sarvāstivāda texts, Saṃghabhūti's discussion of *dharmakāya* is extensive.<sup>148</sup> As we saw above (p. 144; see also Appendix 3), it even contains some passages on *dharmakāya* not found in XZ. Other passages too, speaking simply of "the Buddha's body" etc., represent a marked increase in interest in this problem: the passage explaining that the Buddha chose to be "womb-born" in order to leave relics;<sup>149</sup> reference to a "great body" to explain reference to the Buddha's compassion a "great" (*mahākaruṇā*);<sup>150</sup> discussion of whether it is possible to contemplate impurity using the body of the Buddha as an object.<sup>151</sup> The five pure aggregates feature only once, as part of a discussion of the *dharmakāya*.<sup>152</sup> Finally, the text knows the corporeal reading of *sôpadhiśeṣa-* and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, though it does not relate this

<sup>143</sup> T1543:26.777c14-22.

<sup>144</sup> Bearing in mind that correspondence between versions can at best only be partial, since the earlier versions themselves (especially Saṃghabhūti) are partial.

<sup>145</sup> T1547:28.416a08, 440b23-25 517c19-21, 496b13-21.

<sup>146</sup> In one passage the otherwise anomalous term "great body" (\**mahākāya*) is used, in explaining that the Buddha's compassion is called *mahākaruṇā* because it takes that body as its support; T1547:28.496b13-21. Cf. n. 22.

<sup>147</sup> In the controversy with the Mahāsāṃghika (see p. 131), T1547:28.463b06-10; and when stating that the *dharmakāya* is always "clothed" etc.; T1547:28.518b25-c13 (some variations from XZ) (see n. 48).

<sup>148</sup> In a rudimentary version of the passage that discusses "damaging" the *dharmakāya* as the physical body is damaged by a dagger, T1547:28.429a20-22 (cf. n. 124); in discussing the role of the ear in "guiding" the *dharmakāya*, T1547:28.442a18-29 (cf. n. 45); in discussing the four *dhyanas* as "food" for the *dharmakāya*, T1547:28.486c27-487a01 (cf. n. 126).

<sup>149</sup> T1547:28.522c17-18, 523a13-20. Also in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.83a21-b01. For this passage in XZ *Vibh*, see n. 41.

<sup>150</sup> 或曰。生大身故名大悲 etc., T1547:28.496b17-21. For the Xuanzang, see above n. 22.

<sup>151</sup> T1547:28.504c27-505a11. See above n. 16 for some discussion of the difference between the two versions of this passage.

<sup>152</sup> See n. 263.

understanding to the Buddha's bodies.<sup>153</sup>

In sum, Saṃghabhūti's version of *Vibh* already contains very much that is new in Sarvāstivāda. In particular, a host of new ideas about the *dharmakāya* have suddenly burst upon the scene.

### Buddhavarman

Buddhavarman's *Vibh* uses the term *rūpakāya* once in connection to the Buddha, in a context unique to this version of the text.<sup>154</sup> It mentions the thirty-two marks of the Buddha in a few places, but in that connection, simply speaks of the "body".<sup>155</sup> The term "body of birth" is used in the passage about *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu* (see Appendix 1);<sup>156</sup> when the Buddha bests the strongmen;<sup>157</sup> and in other passages already in Saṃghabhūti. The "body born of father and mother" appears for the first time in Buddhavarman, in two passages only: the discussion of the Buddha's prodigious physical strength;<sup>158</sup> and in discussion of the Buddha-refuge.<sup>159</sup> Buddhavarman contains new *dharmakāya* passages after Saṃghabhūti:<sup>160</sup> the passage on the Buddha's strength just mentioned also speaks of the powers of the *dharmakāya*;<sup>161</sup> the nascent *dharmakāya* compared to a tiger cub;<sup>162</sup> and definition of *dharmakāya* in terms of the eighteen *āveṇikadharma*s.<sup>163</sup> Buddhavarman knows the *anāsrava-/aśaikṣa-skandhas*, and calls them "bodies" (*shen* 身)<sup>164</sup> without associating them with the *dharmakāya*. It knows the corporeal reading of *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *anupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*.<sup>165</sup>

### Ideas only found in XZ

Thus, in sum, many ideas about Buddha-bodies are already present in Saṃghabhūti or

<sup>153</sup> One passage speaks of *abandoning* the *sôpadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu* in order to enter into *parinirvāṇa* in the *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*: 捨有餘涅槃界。入無餘涅槃界而般涅槃, T1547:28.518c09-10. Elsewhere, the text also speaks of the Arhat's *skandhas* being extinguished and him thereupon entering into the *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*: 阿羅漢盡滅陰入無餘涅槃界, T1547:28.425c07-08. However, Saṃghabhūti does not contain an analogue to the XZ passage studied in Appendix 1.

<sup>154</sup> The text is discussing why the earth goddess knew that the Buddha was turning the wheel of *dharma*, when she was not possessed of the necessary *jñāna*. The Buddha told others this was what he was doing (among several other reasons) because he "wanted to manifest the *rūpakāya* as a field of merit (*puṇyakṣetra*) for the world" (or "show that the *rūpakāya* was a field of merit for the world/show the world that the *rūpakāya* was a field of merit" 欲現色身為世福田). T1546:28.157c17-23. In XZ *rūpakāya* is lacking, T1545:27.210c02-03. The text also mentions briefly the more usual understanding of *rūpakāya*: 1546.290b12-14.

<sup>155</sup> It speaks of the Buddha in his status as *bodhisattva* or as prince of the Śākya, but nowhere explicitly states that the Buddha (or a Buddha) has these marks etc. T1546:28.267b28-c02; 271c22-24; 322a04-08.

<sup>156</sup> T1546:28.126a08-c16.

<sup>157</sup> T1546:28.119c24. See further n. 158.

<sup>158</sup> 父母生身, 父母所生, T1546:28.119c01-120a19; see also T1546:28.104a01-03; for XZ, see n. 38, n. 43.

<sup>159</sup> T1546:28.134b01-03. For XZ, see n. 34, n. 89.

<sup>160</sup> In addition, Buddhavarman contains the passage comparing the Buddha to the dragon-king who makes the rain (see p. 144), but speaks of *\*jñānakāya* instead of *dharmakāya*.

<sup>161</sup> See n. 157.

<sup>162</sup> T1546:28.10a21-27. For XZ see n. 121.

<sup>163</sup> T1546:28.70c29-71a20. For XZ see n. 63-66.

<sup>164</sup> See e.g. the long discussion at T1546:28.129c19-131a12.

<sup>165</sup> In fact, one of the most significant differences from XZ in the Appendix 1 passage is that Buddhavarman translates the very terms here as "the *nirvāṇadhātu* with/out a vestigial *body*". See n. 55. Other detailed discrepancies between Buddhavarman and XZ are noted n. 55, 209, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 232, 233. In many respects, however, Buddhavarman matches XZ closely; see n. 237-240.

Buddhavarman, and thus date to the early fifth century at the latest. However, we must also consider passages that only appear in XZ.

So far as I could determine, the following contents are unique to XZ: over a dozen mentions of the Buddha's body in discussion of the thirty-two marks;<sup>166</sup> the discussion of marks and *anuttarasamyaksambodhi* as conditions of Buddhahood in relation to Maitreya;<sup>167</sup> Māra adopting a Buddha-body for Upagupta;<sup>168</sup> how the Buddha won the hide-and-seek contest with the Brahma king;<sup>169</sup> Cuṇḍa seeing that the Buddha's body is weak just before the *parinirvāṇa*;<sup>170</sup> the Buddha's great compassion is based upon his body;<sup>171</sup> the Buddha's funeral pyre was extinguished with milk because his body of birth was nourished on milk;<sup>172</sup> the Buddha cannot receive *dharma*-offerings from others because his *dharmakāya* is already perfect;<sup>173</sup> breaking the *saṃgha* is an *ānantarya* sin because it is an attack on the *dharmakāya*;<sup>174</sup> exegesis of the two verbs of sight in the MPNS tradition of the Buddha's last display of his body in terms of "body of birth" and *dharmakāya*;<sup>175</sup> two senses in which the Buddha is *lokōttara* explained in terms of "body of birth" and *dharmakāya*, and the life of the ordinary monk parsed in terms of "cultivation" of each of these Buddha-bodies;<sup>176</sup> it is an *ānantarya* sin to harm the Buddha's body, even though he is not truly that body, because to harm the basis harms what is based upon it, viz. the *dharmakāya*.<sup>177</sup>

These many differences between the two earlier texts and XZ are significant. We have to remember that we are contending with various complications of textual history, and arguments from silence are obviously dangerous when the early texts are partial.<sup>178</sup> However, not all the differences between XZ and Buddhavarman can be explained by loss of part of Buddhavarman, for example. Four passages fall where Buddhavarman comments on the same parts of JñP as XZ.<sup>179</sup> In addition, there are numerous differences

<sup>166</sup> See n. 21.

<sup>167</sup> See also n. 21.

<sup>168</sup> See n. 23.

<sup>169</sup> See n. 27.

<sup>170</sup> See n. 29.

<sup>171</sup> See n. 31; T1546:28.121b09-16.

<sup>172</sup> See n. 41.

<sup>173</sup> See n. 42.

<sup>174</sup> See n. 44.

<sup>175</sup> See n. 47.

<sup>176</sup> See n. 55.

<sup>177</sup> See n. 26.

<sup>178</sup> (1) As discussed above, both earlier texts are partial. *Samghabhūti* differs fundamentally in structure from the other two, and comments only on two sections of the root text (see n. 5). Buddhavarman was lost and partially restored, and we have only sixty fascicles of an original hundred; the surviving text comments only on the first three of eight chapters of JñP (n. 6). (2) The three extant *Vibh* share much material, but may not be versions of "the same" text, but rather exemplars of the same genre (commentaries on JñP). Presence or absence of material could be due to authorial choice. (Kawamura has attempted to link the extant texts to different historical groups; Willemen, Dessein and Cox 235-237.) However, comparison of Buddhavarman and XZ with a Skt. fragment in the Pelliot collection suggest that both are different recensions of the same basic text. Further, "the [Skt.] fragment represents a recension of the *vibhāṣā* different from that represented by either Chinese translation, and . . . both of the Chinese translations represent *expanded, and possibly later versions of the text*;" Willemen, Dessein and Cox 233-234 (my emphasis).

<sup>179</sup> Excluding nine of the fourteen passages listed above in XZ and not Buddhavarman, which appear in Ch. 4 or later (after XZ T1545:27.578a14). The remaining passages are: (1) The hide-and-seek contest with Brahmā; (2) the Buddha's great compassion is based upon his *dharmakāya*; (3) the Buddha cannot receive *dharma*-offerings from others because his *dharmakāya* is already perfect; (4) the life of the ordinary monk

in detail in the Appendix 1 *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu* passage.<sup>180</sup> We have also seen that some ideas are present in Saṃghabhūti and Buddhavarman but absent from XZ, which cannot be explained by the smaller scope or loss of parts of the earlier texts. While these discrepancies might reflect differences of recension behind the two translation, they could also result from ideas being added to the text between Buddhavarman and XZ. This possibility is supported by other evidence about the general nature and history of the texts.<sup>181</sup> If this was the case between Buddhavarman and XZ, it could equally have been true before all of our Chinese translations. Thus, even ideas about Buddha- bodies shared by all three *Vibh*, may not necessarily date back early enough to predate relevant Mahāyāna ideas.

### **Sarvāstivāda body doctrine cannot be proven earlier than Mahāyāna body doctrine**

The received understanding holds that "Mainstream" Buddha-body doctrine, which is often taken to be represented by Sarvāstivāda doctrine, predates our earliest Mahāyāna sources, including Prajñāpāramitā.<sup>182</sup> This paper shows that we have no evidence warranting this assumption. Here I will review the several reasons that we cannot be sure any of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine we have studied predates key Mahāyāna ideas.

There seems to be a general tendency to presuppose that Mahāyāna texts were open to influence, while Mainstream texts were generally not. This may indeed have been the general tendency. But even the Āgamas contain numerous examples of apparent acceptance of apparently new ideas, such as *dharmakāya*, into contexts where they were previously unknown.<sup>183</sup> Such cases make it impossible to assume in any specific case that Mainstream sources cannot be adopting innovative concepts from Mahāyāna sources.

Our starting point in dating any early Prajñāpāramitā ideas must be the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* of Lokakṣema (道行般若經 T224; "Aṣṭa"), which serves as a *terminus ad quem* (Lokakṣema was active between 168 and 186 C.E.). It is often observed that the doctrines of this text must have already undergone some evolution. If, conservatively, the *terminus ad quem* for the composition of the underlying Indic text might be 125-150 C.E.,<sup>184</sup> some

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as "cultivation" of the "body of birth" and *dharmakāya*. In each case, the context is found in Buddhavarman: see n. 27, 31, 42, 55.

<sup>180</sup> See n. 165.

<sup>181</sup> The Pelliot fragment, Buddhavarman and XZ "correspond closely", but "some revealing differences" show that "both Chinese translations include additional material;" Willemen, Dessein and Cox 233-234. Consider, too, the size of Buddhavarman and XZ. Even before the loss of some text, Buddhavarman was only ever 100 *juan*, whereas XZ is 200. Willemen, Dessein and Cox think that texts of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma corpus in general were probably subject to ongoing interpolation and growth over a long period; 167. Frauwallner discusses aspects of the *Dharmaskandha* that seem to reflect such ongoing growth and modification; *Studies in Abhidharma Literature* 20-21. Willemen, Dessein and Cox give reasons that the *Prajñapti śāstra* probably underwent significant modification over a long history; 191-193: "Yamada Ryūjō contends that the *Prajñapti śāstra*, like other *sūtra* collections and Abhidharma texts, undoubtedly underwent expansion and restructuring over the centuries . . ." Willemen, Dessein and Cox also discuss categories apparently added to the *Prakaranapāda* between the translation of Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyaśas and that of Xuanzang; 312.

<sup>182</sup> Arguments similar to the following apply for the relation between almost any extant "Schools" material and our earliest Mahāyāna sources. In relation to body doctrine, this is also particularly relevant with regard to the chronological relation between Mahāsāṃghika/Lokōttaravāda and early Mahāyāna ideas. See Radich, "Somatics" Ch. 4.2, esp. §4.2.3.

<sup>183</sup> See also, for example, the shift in the Chinese Āgamas towards a corporeal reading of *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*, as detailed in Radich, "Somatics" Ch. 3.4.

<sup>184</sup> See Egil Fronsdal, "The Dawn of the Bodhisattva Path: Studies in a Religious Ideal of Ancient Indian Buddhists with Particular Reference on the Earliest Extant Perfection of Wisdom Sutra" (PhD dissertation,

form of Prajñāpāramitā literature must date back to at least the late first century. Little can be said for certain beyond this about the Prajñāpāramitā,<sup>185</sup> but it will suffice for present purposes. Central also for the study of early Mahāyāna Buddha-body doctrine is the *Lokānuvartanā sūtra*, which was also translated by Lokakṣema, sometime between 168 and 186 (內藏百寶經 T807).<sup>186</sup> Even on the traditional dates, therefore, we have no grounds for confidence that any version of *Vibh* is earlier than early Mahāyāna. *Vibh* was traditionally held to date from around or after the time of the Kuṣāna King Kaniṣka,<sup>187</sup> i.e. the second century C.E. at the earliest. Even this traditional date would not make it antedate Lokakṣema. It is also difficult to show on internal grounds that the Prajñāpāramitā is indeed, as is commonly claimed, reacting to Sarvāstivādin ideas, as has been shown by Onishi Yoshinori.<sup>188</sup>

A further problem is that the traditional date for *Vibh* is highly unreliable and cannot be followed. The modern scholarly consensus is that a relative chronology of the texts can be determined with some degree of reliability, but the absolute date of each text and the overall corpus cannot, beyond the very late *terminus ad quem* of Chinese translations.<sup>189</sup> Even early Chinese translations collectively date between 383 and ca. 443, already very late for purposes of comparison with the earliest known Mahāyāna ideas about Buddha-bodies. In addition, *Vibh* may have grown and changed over time. We therefore cannot be confident that any particular passage belonged to the text from its very inception, and was not added later on.

We have seen in this paper that very little of *Vibh*'s doctrine of Buddha bodies is found in the earlier Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, even in JñP. We thus have a situation in which the apparently open *Vibh*, still in the process of ongoing formation, evinces a sudden interest in the new topic of Buddha-bodies. Further, details of that view seem to be part of more general trends apparently close in time to the first translations of *Vibh* into Chinese: the development of a complex corporeal interpretation of *sôpadhiṣeṣa*- and

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Stanford University, 1998), 105.

<sup>185</sup> Some scholars see *Aṣṭa* itself as the oldest Prajñāpāramitā text; others consider the *Vajracchedikā* ("Diamond") possibly the oldest. A range of dates have been proposed for the origins of this literature, from the second century B.C.E. to the second century C.E. See Hanayama Shōyū, "A Summary of Various Research on the Prajñāpāramitā Literature by Japanese Scholars," *Acta Asiatica* 10 (1966): 16-93; Nakamura Hajime, "A Critical Survey of Mahāyāna and Esoteric Buddhism Chiefly Based upon Japanese Sources," *Acta Asiatica* 6 (1964): 57-88; Gregory Schopen, "The Phrase *sa prthivipradeśaś caityabhūto bhavet* in the *Vajracchedikā*: Notes on the Cult of the Book in Mahāyāna," in *Fragments and Figments of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India: More Collected Papers* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 31-32, 55 n. 16, 17; Edward Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000), 1.

<sup>186</sup> Paul Maxwell Harrison, "Sanskrit Fragments of a Lokottaravādin Tradition," in *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. L. A. Hercus et al. (Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982), 211-234.

<sup>187</sup> See e.g. Paul Demiéville, "L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramartha," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 1 (1931-32): 24, fn. "b". *Vibh* mentions Kaniṣka: 昔健駄羅國迦膩色迦王, T1545:27.593a15; cited in Onishi Yoshinori, "Is the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* Really Arguing against the Sarvāstivādins?" *Buddhist Studies Review* 16, no. 2 (1999): 169. Of course, if it was possible for material to be added over time, other parts of the text might predate Kaniṣka, even if this sentence did not.

<sup>188</sup> The only "meagre" signs of such a possibility are that it does criticise the idea of real existence in three times, and that it may owe something to Sarvāstivāda in its notion of merit. Onishi 179, 180. The relation is also complicated by *Vibh* as cited by Akanuma Chizen: "*Prajñā*' here refers to what is called *vaipulya*" (此中般若說名方廣, T1545:27.660a29). On the basis of this passage, Akanuma argues that Prajñāpāramitā in fact precedes *Vibh*; cited in Hanayama, "Various Research" 55.

<sup>189</sup> See Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 166-167.

*nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*; or the term "body of birth", very rare outside *Vibh* and MPPU.

For these reasons, we cannot be sure that the ideas about Buddha bodies that are found in Sarvāstivāda literature predate Mahāyāna ideas on the same topic.

### Conclusions and Implications

In this study, I have attempted to point out several misconceptions in received opinion about Sarvāstivāda Buddha-body doctrine and its place in the history of ideas about Buddha-bodies more generally, and to sketch a more accurate picture to put in its place.

First, it is true, in a sense, that Sarvāstivādins taught a "two-body" theory. However, our understanding of both bodies requires fundamental revision.

In literature early enough to matter, the *rūpakāya* is not ascribed to the Buddha as one of his two special bodies.<sup>190</sup> *Rūpakāya* is ascribed to the Buddha only very rarely in this literature, and far more frequently to ordinary sentient beings. Rather, the Sarvāstivāda (as represented by the *Vibhāṣā*) said that the Buddha had a "body of birth" or "body born of father and mother".

The Sarvāstivāda does indeed teach a *dharmakāya*, though only beginning with *Vibh*. However, previous scholars have tended to describe the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma *dharmakāya* as either (a) the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas* (Guang); or (b) the *āsaikṣadharmas*, with emphasis on *kṣaya-jñāna*, *anutpāda-jñāna* and the five *anāsravadharmas* (la Vallée Poussin, Makransky). In fact, both of these characterisations are propounded in different places in *Vibh*. I argued further that these definitions are related, and both can be reduced by analysis to an underlying conception of the Buddha embodied in his gnosis (*bodhi*, *jñāna*), which has been overlooked by in previous scholarship due to excessive attention to the surface enumeration of categories.

Thus, even though Sarvāstivāda is often characterised as the *locus classicus* of a supposed Mainstream *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model, Sarvāstivāda texts show that their model was different. However, it is certainly the case that a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model exists. Where, then, does it come from? Proper treatment of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I have already argued elsewhere that based on the evidence of the Chinese translation record, it seems that the opposition of *rūpakāya* to *dharmakāya* spread suddenly sometime before the late third century at the latest – but overwhelmingly in texts of Mahāyāna and not Mainstream provenance.<sup>191</sup> Beyond the

<sup>190</sup> Even in AKBh, only twice: see below p. 168.

<sup>191</sup> Radich, "Somatics" Ch. 4.5, p. 970-1010. Very briefly:

(1) The earliest clear mentions of the *dharmakāya* so named are in two passages in Zhi Qian's 支謙 (fl. 229-ca. 252) *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*: (i) T474:14.521a25-b27; corresponding to Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, ed., *Bonbun Yuimakyō : Potara kyū shōzō shahon ni motozuku kōtei* 梵文維摩經: ボタラ宮所蔵写本に基づく校訂 (Tokyo: Taisho University Press, 2006), 18-19 (where Skt. features the terms *dharmakāya* and *tathāgata-kāya* in parallel); Lamotte's Ch. II §8-13, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*) (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1962), 132-140; Burton Watson, trans., *The Vimalakīrti Sutra* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 34-36; Robert A. F. Thurman, trans., *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti: A Mahāyāna Scripture* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 22-23. (ii) T474:14.523c05-07; Study Group, *Bonbun Yuimakyō* 34 (where the term *dharmakāya* features once more); Lamotte's Ch. III §45, 187. Nattier mentions that some scholars have speculated that T474 might actually be by Dharmarakṣa, but on grounds she considers less than certain; for the present, she retains the attribution to Zhi Qian; Nattier, *Guide* 140-141.

(2) Already in Lokakṣema we find a suggestive opposition between *\*rūpakāya* and the Dharma, in the

Chinese canon, the opposition between *rūpakāya* and *dharmakāya* may already be present in the works of Nāgārjuna.<sup>192</sup> While this question certainly requires further research, these findings at least suggest that the *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* opposition may have originated in the very heart of the Mahāyāna itself. If this is true, our picture of a "Mainstream" *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model is doubly wrong.

These findings require a fundamental revision in our idea of the relation between Sarvāstivāda and other ideas about the Buddha's bodies. If Sarvāstivāda does not teach a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model, it is impossible that such a model was originally derived from the Sarvāstivāda, and was passively accepted therefrom by the Mahāyāna. More than this, however, we have seen that it is highly unlikely that any Sarvāstivāda model of Buddha-bodies – even the actual "body of birth"-*dharmakāya* model – preexisted or influenced the Mahāyāna. Before *Vibh*, Sarvāstivāda texts show almost no inkling of the very idea that the Buddha has special bodies, nor any interest in the nature of those bodies. *Vibh* speculation about the Buddha's bodies thus represents a sudden flourishing of interest in the topic, not the transmission of an old heritage from the earlier roots of the school. Moreover, it can be shown even after *Vibh*, major Sarvāstivāda and other Abhidharma texts (\**Abhidarmahrdaya*, \**Samyukābhīdharmahrdaya*, \**Satyasiddhi* etc.) show relatively little interest in the Buddha's bodies (see Appendix 5).

Even on traditional dating, there is no reason to think *Vibh* predates early interest in the Buddha's body in the Mahāyāna, as reflected in Lokakṣema. In addition, there are reasons to think that at least the exposition of Buddha-body doctrine in *Vibh* continued to evolve not only until the time of the first two translations in 383 and 437, but even thereafter, between them and XZ. Ideas about Buddha-bodies in our extant versions of *Vibh* could thus be substantially later than early Mahāyāna ideas. This means that the direction of any influence could easily be the opposite to what scholars have usually supposed, i.e. from Mahāyāna to Sarvāstivāda.<sup>193</sup>

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context of the idea of seeing the Buddha, T458:14.437a19-24.

(3) *Dharmakāya* is first opposed to *rūpakāya* in Dharmarakṣa, where this opposition is suddenly very frequent: \**Lokadharapariṣcchāsūtra*?, T481:14.628b22-27; *Vimaladattāpariṣcchāsūtra*, T338:12.92c20-29; *Aśokadattavyākaraṇa*, T337:12.86b28-c04; *Du shi pin jing* 度世品經 T292:10.617b13; *Daśabhūmika* T285:10.479a08-12, Johannes Rahder, ed., *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (Leuven: J.-B. Istas, 1926) 55, Honda Megumu, "Annotated Translation of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*," in *Studies in South, East, and Central Asia: Presented as a Memorial Volume to the Late Professor Raghu Vira by Members of the Permanent International Altaicist Conference*, ed. Denis Sinor (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968), 200; *Daśabhūmika* T285:10.491a09-22, Rahder 86, Honda 264; *Tathāgatōtpattisambhavanirdeśa* T291:10.612c25-613a11. Note the number of proto-Avatamsaka texts here (*Du shi pin jing*, *Daśabhūmika*, *Tathāgatōtpattisambhavanirdeśa*).

In my dissertation, I mistakenly stated that the first opposition between *dharmakāya* and *rūpakāya* was in Moksala's *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*. This error was based upon a confusion of T221 (Mokṣala) and T223 (Kumārajīva). I am grateful to Jan Nattier for saving me from repeating this embarrassing mistake.

<sup>192</sup> In *Ratnāvalī*: (1) 3.10; *gang tshe sangs rgyas gzugs sku yü/rgyu yang de ltar 'jig rten bzhi/ gzhäl med de tshe chos sku yü/rgyu lta ji ltar gzhäl du yod*, Michael Hahn, *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī: Vol. I. The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese)* (Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982) I, 74; Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinpoche with Anne Klein, *The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975), 48. No Skt. extant. 諸佛色身因/尚如世無量/況佛法身因/而當有邊際, T1656:32.498a15-16. (2) 3.12, *sangs rgyas rnam kyü gzugs sku ni/ bsod nams tshogs las byung ba ste/ chos kyü sku ni mdor bsdu na/ rgyal po ye shes tshogs las 'khrungs/*, Hahn I, 74; Hopkins et al., *Precious Garland* 49. No Skt. extant. 諸佛有色身/皆從福行起/ 大王佛法身/由智慧行成, T1656:32.498a19-20. For other possibly early Indic references, see Radich, "Somatics" 999-1000.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. also n. 30, 36, 56.

Finally, the results of this study urge further re-investigation of the relation between all Mahāyāna ideas of the Buddha's bodies and similar Mainstream ideas, especially regarding *dharmakāya*.<sup>194</sup> Paul Harrison has influentially argued that the early Mahāyāna doctrine of *dharmakāya* should be read in line with a pluralistic "Mainstream" view (in which it means the Buddha is embodied in plural *dharmas*).<sup>195</sup> To the extent that Sarvāstivāda represents the Mainstream, our results suggest that there may have been no "Mainstream" view for Mahāyāna texts to inherit and continue. In addition, I have argued that careful study of *Vibh* shows that its notion of *dharmakāya* hinges on the idea that the Buddha is embodied in his gnosis (*bodhi*, *jñāna*), expressed in various rubrics. On this analysis, the gap between Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna doctrines of *dharmakāya* is less than it appears from Harrison's emphasis on the plurality of "*dharmas*" in the supposed "Mainstream" *dharmakāya*.

Thus, not only in chronology, but also in content, my findings are compatible with a general working hypothesis that the very idea of special Buddha bodies, and especially the naming of those bodies as various *-kāya*, may have first arisen in the Mahāyāna, and only then spread to Mainstream texts. Further exploration of that hypothesis must await future work.

In closing, we might also ask, if the Sarvāstivāda were indeed adopting and adapting Mahāyāna ideas, rather than the other way around, what patterns might be discerned in the way the Sarvāstivādins work to modify body discourse.<sup>196</sup> At the present stage of my research, I can only offer some preliminary observations on this issue. However, it seems on the evidence surveyed here that if Sarvāstivāda were appropriating ideas of Mahāyāna origin, they were, on the one hand, careful to retain a common basis with the ideas they were reacting against, in the basic reading of *dharmakāya* to mean that the Buddha is embodied in his *bodhi* or *jñāna*. On the other hand, however, they seem at the same time to have been grounding these ideas more firmly in more traditional "*dharmas*", and that in two ways. First, they attempted to ground these ideas in the authority of the Āgamas, for example in the notion of the "body of birth", which I have suggested is founded upon the *Sāmaññaphala* / *Śrāmaṇyaphala*. Second, they attempted to tie the notion of *dharmakāya*, somewhat general in Mahāyāna, to specific Abhidharmic rubrics of multiple, named *buddhadharmas*. This second step does have the effect of making the *dharmakāya* look more pluralistic on the surface, since Abhidharma itself is what we might call a "pluralist realism"; but we should not forget the underlying identity between Mahāyāna and Sarvāstivāda visions, in the basic notion of embodiment in gnosis. This relation between Sarvāstivāda concepts and their possible Mahāyāna origins is another area that calls for further investigation.

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<sup>194</sup> At least in the Pāli canon, I contend that there is no "classically" recognisable doctrine of *dharmakāya*. Radich, "Somatics" Ch. 3.2. Comparative study suggests that Āgama passages expounding *dharmakāya* may be later additions to the texts concerned. It is also possible in principle, of course, that *dharmakāya* arose in schools other than those who transmitted the Pāli canon, and their Āgamas, as reflected in our extant Chinese translations, contain the concept for that reason.

<sup>195</sup> Harrison, "Phantom Body".

<sup>196</sup> I am grateful to Prof. Nattier for stimulating me to think further about this aspect of the problem.

**Appendix 1: Vibh on the "body of birth" and *sôpadhiṣeṣa/ nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu***

The most detailed *Vibh* passage on the "body of birth",<sup>197</sup> as discussed above,<sup>198</sup> is part of an extended history in which *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa* came gradually to have corporeal meaning.<sup>199</sup> This *Vibh* passage may be one of the earliest extended treatments of the "corporeal" reading of *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*. In light of this historical interest, I translate it here in full. Text from JñP<sup>200</sup> (i.e. the root-text upon which *Vibh* is commenting) is given in bold. Passages to do with embodiment are underlined. "Paragraphs" are introduced and numbered for convenience of discussion:

"[JñP:] It says in the *sūtras*, "There are two kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu*, namely the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remaining support, and the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remaining support,"<sup>201</sup> etc. etc.

<1> "[*Vibh*:] Why does [the root text] engage in this disputation? In order to trace out the detailed ramifications of the message of the *sūtra* 為廣分別契經義. . . . Although the *sūtras* say this, they do not elaborate on the distinction in detail 不廣辨 [to say] what is the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support, and what is the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support. This is the basis for the present disputation, that those points not distinguished in the *sūtra* should now be distinguished . . . .

<sup>197</sup> T1545:27.167b14-168b20. The passage is found in Buddhavarman but not Saṃghabhūti; see above n. 156.

<sup>198</sup> See above p. 132-133.

<sup>199</sup> I argue this in detail in Radich, "Somatics" Ch. 3.4. Stereotypically, on the basis of expositions in texts at least as late as the Common Era, *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa* are taken to refer respectively to a moment of awakening during the aspirant's final lifetime, after which the aspirant continues to have a physical body (the "support"); and the final *parinirvāṇa* (physical death) at the end of that lifetime, at which the physical body "drops away", as it were (the awakened person is now "without support", i.e. no longer has a body). However, this reading is the result of a long development. In the Pāli canon, *saupādisesa* originally referred to liberation "with a vestige of clinging", pertaining to a category of people who were destined to be liberated, but who still had to undergo further rebirths before they finally realised that destiny. This category was opposed to those liberated "here in this visible world", i.e. in the here and now (*diṭṭhe dhammeva*). Over time, *saupādisesa* came to be opposed to *anupādisesa*, "without a vestige of clinging". The opposition between the two came to refer to a twofold typology of different kinds of "Nibbāna element/realm" (*nibbānadhātu*). This development perhaps begins with *livuttaka* 44, which, though it is usually taken as the *locus classicus* for these concepts, is in fact highly anomalous in the Pāli canon in precisely this respect. In the Chinese translation record, the new interpretation of the two terms can be shown to coexist, alongside remnants of the older one, down at least to the turn of the fifth century, sometimes in the same texts. The new reading creeps in alongside the old in Āgamas, for example, where comparative textual evidence suggests it was not originally present. A further development occurred when *saupādisesa-* and *anupādisesanibbānadhātu* (Skt. *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*) came to refer to different bodily concomitants to enlightenment in *the same* person. The terms thus finally took on their more familiar corporeal significance. Here, *upadhi-ṣeṣa* refers to the physical body of a person as a "remnant" of that which is clung to, viz. the *upādānaskandhas*. *Upadhi* itself was correspondingly reinterpreted to mean "basis, ground, substratum", reflected in the ("New") Chinese translation 新譯 of this element of the term as *yi* 依 "basis, ground, support" and not *yu* 餘 "excess, remainder". It might be in principle conceivable to read Pāli *upādi* "clinging" to refer to the *object of clinging*, but this was not the reading in the Pāli canon. The overall trajectory of these developments seems to suggest that corporeal readings of *sôpadhiṣeṣa-* and *nirupadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa* are unlikely to date back much before the Common Era. The history of these concepts thus forms part of a larger pattern I believe we can observe in our evidence, where the idea of buddhahood as being embodied in various special forms *tout court* also does not emerge much before the start of the Common Era.

<sup>200</sup> T1544:26.923b12-19. For this passage in Saṃghadeva's JñP, see T1543:26.777c14-22.

<sup>201</sup> Perhaps the most significant variation between Buddhavarman and XZ is that the very *terms* under discussion are rendered by Buddhavarman 有餘身涅槃界 and 無餘身涅槃界, lit. "*nirvāṇadhātu* with/out a remainder of *body*," T1546:28.126a08-09. I have rendered this "*nirvāṇadhātu* with/out a vestigial *body*". Very clearly, the corporeal reading is at play. This term otherwise only ever appears once in Wōnhyo (T1769:38.243c06-23). Incidentally, this translation shows the extent to which the "vestige", understood strictly as all of the five *skandhas*, was understood with primary reference to the body.

"[JāP:] What, then, is the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support? If an Arhat, a person in whom taints (諸漏, *āsravas*) are eternally exhausted, nonetheless still has life 壽命, the 'series (相續 *saṃtāna*, *saṃtati*) of physical form constituted by the gross elements 大種造色 is not yet severed, and, based upon (*\*āśrīya*) that body of the five senses 依五根身, the series of mind [still] functions, because there is a remaining support. This eternal cessation of the fetters (諸結, *saṃyojanāni*), [but with continued] apprehension (得獲, *\*pratyanubhāvanā*) and experience (觸證, *\*pratisaṃveda*),<sup>202</sup> is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support' (*sōpadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu*).<sup>203</sup>

<2> "[Vibh:] Here, 'life' refers to the 'faculty of life[-force]' (命根, *jīvitēndriya*).<sup>204</sup> Why does the text not mention the mutual identity [of sentient beings] ([眾]同分, *\*[satva]-sabhāga[tā]*)?<sup>205</sup> Because of simple authorial intent, etc.<sup>206</sup> Alternatively, if the author should have mentioned it but did not, we should know that there is a further intent here. Further, then, he only speaks of [faculty of life-force] out of [the two categories at issue] because the faculty of life[-force] and the mutual identity [of sentient beings] are both alike effects of the *karma* that determines existence *per se* (牽引業, *ākṣepakakarma*).<sup>207</sup> but of these, the faculty of life[-force] is entirely 一向 an effect of a

<sup>202</sup> Cf. *Itivuttaka* 44, "the five faculties still persist, as a result of whose non-disappearance he receives that which is charming and otherwise, experiences pleasure and pain" (*manāpāmanāpam paccaṇubhoti sukhadukkhāṃ paṭisaṃvedeti*), contrasted to a state in which "all that is sensed right here, not being rejoiced in, will become cold" (*idheva sabbavedayitāni anabhinanditāni sīti bhavissanti*); PTS 38, Peter Masefield, trans., *The Itivuttaka* (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001), 35.

<sup>203</sup> These two sentences translated by la Vallée Poussin, AK IV, 211 n. 3, who, however, takes them from Vibh, and does not note that they go back to JāP.

<sup>204</sup> *Jīvitēndriya* is a *cittaviprayuktadharma* (a *dharma* not associated with mind). Collett Cox translates "vitality". *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence: An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995), 289 ff. Note that this definition of *sōpadhiṣeṣanirvāṇa* is echoed in the *Vinīścavasamgrahani* of YBh; see Sakuma Hidenori 佐久間秀範, "Yugashi-ji ron ni okeru tenne shisō 『瑜伽師地論』における転依思想," *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 39, no. 1 (1991): 436; Sakuma, *Die Āśrayaparivṛtti-theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi*, 2 vols., *Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien* 40 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990) I, 168; Radich, "Somatics" n. 2528.

<sup>205</sup> In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *sabhāga[tā]* is a *cittaviprayuktadharma* (a *dharma* not associated with mind) which accounts for the mutual identity (categorical stability) of sentient beings over multiple incarnations, such that they remain sentient beings always and do not become insentient things like stones. Collett Cox translates "the homogeneous character"; *Disputed Dharmas* 229 ff. Clearly, the commentator asks here why this *dharma* was not mentioned because it, in addition to the *jīvitēndriya*, is a condition of the ongoing possession of a living human body at issue in the category of *sōpadhiṣeṣa*.

<sup>206</sup> 是作論者意欲爾故乃至廣說. This appears to be an abbreviated way of stating a frequent comment on the particularities of the root text. In a fuller form this reads, "This is a matter of simple authorial intent. The author disputes this because he wishes to do so; [in so doing] he does not contravene the nature of the case (lit. 'the nature of [the] *dharma*(s)'), and so what need is there for arguments in proof?" 彼作論者意欲爾故。隨彼意欲而作此論。不違法性何煩徵詰, T1545:27.5b21-22, c21-22, 23c25-27 etc. In other words, such a comment on a feature of the root text means that it is merely an inconsequential quirk of the root author's mode of expression.

<sup>207</sup> Lit. "*karma* that throws, casts (*ākṣip*), lays down" etc., i.e. the consequential act (*karma*) that "projects" (VP) a sentient being into a specific existence characterised by certain general conditions, such as human existence, existence as a hell being, etc. ("lays down" the basic conditions of that existence), prior to any particular features of that existence (being *this or that* human, here or there, etc.). Opposed to *manve* 滿業 (prob. *\*paripūrakakarma*, cf. AK 95b *anekam paripūrakam*, "the act(s) that fill out [that destiny] are not singular"), which does lead to the particular conditions of the new existence. Vasubandhu compares these two types of *karma* respectively to a single line with which an artist delimits the border of a picture (*ākṣepakakarma*) and the details with which he fills in that border (*\*paripūrakakarma*); AKBh to 4.95b, VP III, 199-200. Cox uses the excellent terms "skeletal" for *ākṣepaka* and "fleshing [out]" for *paripūraka*; *Disputed Dharmas* 110. These two types of *karma* are also called, in Ch. translations, 一業 "single act" (*\*ekakarma*) and 別業 "various acts" (*\*anekakarma*), e.g. Buddhavarman Vibh, T1546:28.82b16, cf. AK 4.95a-b, *ekam janmākṣipaty ekam anekam paripūrakam*, "a single [act] projects a single birth, but various [acts] fill it out", VP III, 198-199. Later Chinese commentators were to refer to the fruits of these two types of *karma* respectively as *zongbao* 總報 "general reward" and *biebao* 別報 "specific

cause heterogeneous to itself (異熟, *vaipākika*).<sup>208</sup> It is on the basis of this remaining physical form that mind etc. [i.e. and associated *dharma*s] continue to function.<sup>209</sup>

<3> Because what is referred to here as 'the gross elements' is the [ultimate] support (所依),<sup>210</sup> it is mentioned first. 'Physical form comprised of the gross elements' arises on that basis. On the basis of the physical form so comprised[, in turn], mind and *dharma*s associated with mind arise.<sup>211</sup> [However,] because mind is the main focus, the text here speaks only in terms of the partial [designation] 'physical form comprised of the four elements', in order to indicate the body of physical form (*rūpakāya*) in general, and of 'the mental series based upon the body of the five senses' in order to indicate mind and *dharma*s associated with mind; alongside these, there also still exist the [the other] *dharma*s dissociated from mind, such as birth (生), etc.,<sup>212</sup> [but] because these

reward"; so esp. Tunnyun 通倫 (d.u., fl. 8th century) T1828:42.621c02-05; also e.g. 371c05-13; Chengguan 澄觀 (738-839) T1736:36.465c22-24; Yijing/Huizhao, 下別釋緣起, T1788:39.328a20ff, etc. These latter terms show it is possible to think of these two kinds of *karma* as "generic *karma*" or "*karma* of species" and "specific *karma*".

<sup>208</sup> *Vipākaphala* ~果, "effect of a heterogeneous cause", is opposed to *niśyandaphala* 異熟果, a "homogeneous effect" or an effect of a cause homogeneous to itself. Elsewhere in both JñP (T1544:26.920c27-921a10) and *Vibh*, *vaipākika* is defined (from the side of cause, *hetu*) in terms immediately relevant for the present passage. The first portion of that passage runs:

"[JñP:] 'What is heterogeneous cause? It refers to what happens when mind and *dharma*s associated with mind (*citta*, *caitāsikadharmā*) undergo (受) [the effects of] physical form (*rūpa*), mind, *dharma*s associated with mind, or *dharma*s dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayuktadharmas*) heterogeneous to themselves, such that the mind or *dharma*s associated with mind are effects heterogeneous to those [*rūpa*, *citta*, *caitāsika*, *cittaviprayukta*], [and takes them] for their heterogeneous causes.'

"[*Vibh*.] Here, 'mind and *dharma*s associated with mind' refers to all bad and good (不善善, i.e. excluding the category of the karmically neutral) states of mind and *dharma*s associated with mind; this term also includes the *rūpa* that comes into being in association with them (彼隨轉色, \**īdanuvartakārūpa*) and the [*citta*]-*viprayukta*, because they constitute a single effect along with mind and *dharma*s associated with mind. Thus, visible form as an effect of a cause heterogeneous to itself (異熟色, \**vipākārūpa*) refers to the eye and the other five organs (*pañcēndriya*), [and their objects, viz.] visible form, [sound,] scent, taste and tangibles; 'mind' refers to the aggregate of consciousness (*viññānaskandha*), i.e. to the six consciousness of eye, etc.; [and] 'dharma' associated with mind' refers to [the other] three aggregates (*skandhas*), i.e. sensation (*vedanā*), conception (*saṃjñā*) and 思 (? , sic), etc. [sic; by my count we run out of *skandhas*!]. '[*Dharma*s] dissociated from mind' (*cittaviprayukta*) refers to the aggregate of karmic intention (*samskārasandha*), i.e. the faculty of life[-force] (*jīvitēndriya*), the mutual identity of sentient beings (*sattvasabhāga*), etc. Thus, it is apparent that heterogeneous cause and heterogeneous effect (*vipākahetu*, ~*phala*) are both coterminous with the five aggregates (*skandhas*);" T1545:27.96b12-21.

The implication for our present passage seems to be that *jīvitēndriya* alone is purely *vaipākika*, even though, as we see, *vaipākika* karmic causation is a very broad category, by means of which all five *skandhas* are brought into existence. Presumably, therefore, there is something special about *vaipākika*-causation that makes it the real reason that the person of the Arhat, comprising all five *skandhas*, continues to exist. Bearing in mind the fact that the Arhat is one in whom, by definition, the "outflows" (*āsravas*) have ceased, might we suppose that it is only in virtue of heterogeneous causation that the five *skandhas*, understood as impure by definition, can continue to exist for such a person?

<sup>209</sup> This entire paragraph is absent in Buddhavarman.

<sup>210</sup> This reading of *upadhi* as "support", meaning the body of the five *skandhas*, begins here to dovetail with the meaning of *āśraya*, also translated *yi* 依. This equation was eventually worked out in the later theory of *āśrayaparāvṛtti*. On *āśrayaparāvṛtti* as a doctrine of (re-)embodiment, see Radich, "Somatics" 5.2.

<sup>211</sup> This definition of the "support" and what is "supported by it" (所依, \*能依) recalls the definition of *āśraya* and *āśrita* at AKBh to 3.41, Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary of Acharya Yaśomitra* (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970), 496: *āśrayo 'ti sēndriyāḥ kāyāḥ. tasya puṣṭaye kavaḍḍikārāhārāḥ. āśritāś cittacaitās tesāṃ puṣṭaye sparśah*; VP AKBh II, 126. It thus affords a link between the notion of "remainder" (*upadhi*, 餘依) and "support" (依), and thereby perhaps between *sōpadhiśeṣa*- and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu* and *āśrayaparāvṛtti*. See further Radich, "Somatics" Ch. 5.2.

<sup>212</sup> "Birth" is not among the list of *cittaviprayuktadharmas* in Saṃghabhadra's list, as studied by Cox. It appears that *Vibh* assumes a different set of *cittaviprayuktadharmas*, viz., in addition to *jīvitēndriya* and *sattvasabhāga*, "possession" (*prāpti*), birth, old age, subdurance, and impermanence (得生老住無常); see

points are abstruse (難了知), and because they are included in the *dharma*s already previously listed, they are not indicated or mentioned separately. Thus, the eternal cessation of the fetters attained by one in whom the series of these various *dharma*s have not ceased is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support'.<sup>213</sup>

<4> "There are also those who propound the following interpretation: 'Material form comprised of the gross elements' is the body, 'the five sense-organs' are the sense-organs, and 'the series of mind' (*cittasamāna*) is 'mind' (覺, \**bodhi*). The eternal cessation of the fetters where these series of body, organs and mind have not been severed<sup>214</sup> is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support'. As it says in the *sūtras*, "'Nirvāṇa with a remainder of support" refers to [a state in which] body, sense-organs, and mind have not yet ceased.'

<5> "Now, [JāP] says, '[mind still functions] because there is a remainder of support.' There are two kinds of 'support'.<sup>215</sup> (1) the support comprised by the *kleśas* (\**kleśôpadhi*); and (2) the support comprised by the body of birth (\**sambhavikakāyôpadhi*).<sup>216</sup> Thus, although the Arhat in the case discussed here is without the base comprised by the *kleśas*, he nonetheless does [still] have the base comprised by the body of birth. Or again, support is of two other kinds: (1) the defiled support (染汚依), and (2) the undefiled support. The Arhat in the case discussed here is without the defiled support, but nonetheless does still have the undefiled support.<sup>217</sup> Therefore, the eternal cessation of the fetters attained in such a case is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support'.

<6> "[As for] 'apprehension (得獲, \**pratyānubhāvanā*) and experience (觸證, \**pratisamveda*): although these words differ, they both indicate the same meaning.<sup>218</sup>

"[JāP:] What, then, is the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support? It is [the state of] the Arhat, in whom taints (諸漏, *āsravas*) are eternally exhausted, [when] life is extinguished, and the series of physical form constituted by the gross elements has been severed, such that the mind does not function any longer on the basis of the body of the five senses, because there is no remaining support. This eternal cessation of the fetters is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support' (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu*).

<7> "[*Vibh.*] Here, 'life is extinguished' indicates that the faculty of life[-force] (*jīvitēndriya*) and the mutual identity of sentient beings (*sattvasabhāgatā*) are extinguished. These are both effects of the *karma* that determines existence *per se* (*ākṣepakakarma*);<sup>219</sup> although the text here happens to bring up explicitly only the faculty of life-force, it should be understood that it also refers to the mutual identity of sentient beings.<sup>220</sup>

<8> 'The series of physical form constituted by the gross elements has been

T1545:27.a28-b01, 100b17, 100c03-04.

<sup>213</sup> This paragraph is paralleled in Buddhavarman by a much simpler discussion, the gist of which is basically the same. "Here, 'the four gross [elements]' means the four gross elements. 'The sense-organs' means the material form (*rūpa*) comprised [by those elements]. 'The series of mind' means mind and *dharma*s associated with mind. This is [what is meant by] 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a vestigial body';" T1546:28.126a23-25.

<sup>214</sup> Following an obvious repunctuation of the Taishō thus (my punctuation in square brackets, original Taishō in round brackets): 大種造色是身[。]五根[。]是根[。]心相續是覺[。]此身根覺相續未斷 . . .

<sup>215</sup> In keeping with its translation in terms of *nirvāṇadhātu* with/out a vestigial body, Buddhavarman here reads, "There are two kinds of body" etc., T1546:28.126a28-29.

<sup>216</sup> Buddhavarman here has only "the body of birth".

<sup>217</sup> Basically the same in Buddhavarman; T1546:28.126a28-b02.

<sup>218</sup> This paragraph is absent in Buddhavarman.

<sup>219</sup> See above n. 207.

<sup>220</sup> This paragraph is absent in Buddhavarman.

severed' indicates that the series of the rūpakāya<sup>221</sup> in general has been severed. 'The mind does not function any longer on the basis of the body of the five senses' indicates that the mind and *dharma*s associated with mind do not continue [in series] any longer.<sup>222</sup> The significance of the fact that the text does not speak of birth, etc. is as above.<sup>223</sup> "There are also those who propound the following interpretation: 'Physical matter comprised of the gross elements' indicates the body; 'the body of the five sense-organs' indicates the sense-organs; 'the series of mind' indicates mind (覺, \**bodhi*).

<9> "A case where (a) (i) the rūpakāya,<sup>224</sup> (ii) mind and (iii) *dharma*s associated with mind, or (或?) (b) the series of (i) body, (ii) sense-organs and (iii) and mind thus have been severed, [so that] the fetters cease eternally, is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remaining support'.<sup>225</sup> This means that when the Arhat is about to [enter] *parinirvāṇa*, [a] 'wind' arises in the body, and throws it out of kilter (不調適); because it is out of kilter, the inner fire grows weak; because the inner fire is weak, food is not digested; because food is not digested, he has no appetite; because he has no appetite, he no longer eats or drinks; because he does not eat or drink, the gross elements deteriorate; because the gross [elements] wane, the sense-organs of physical form comprised [of the elements] also deteriorate with them; because the sense-organs deteriorate, mind and *dharma*s associated with mind, having no support, do not continue [in series, 相續<sup>226</sup>] any longer; because mind and *dharma*s associated with mind do not continue [in series], the faculty of life[-force], etc. is severed; and because the faculty of life[-force] etc. is severed, it is called 'entering *nirvāṇa*'.<sup>227</sup>

<10> "When the text says 'because there is no remaining support', [it means] that two kinds of support do not exist: (1) there is no support comprised of *kleśa*s; (2) there is no support comprised by the body of birth. Or, also, that (1) there is no defiled support; and (2) there is no undefiled support. Because there is no remaining support [in these senses], the eternal cessation of the fetters is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* with no remainder of support'.<sup>228</sup>

<sup>221</sup> *Rūpakāya* does not occur in Buddhavarman.

<sup>222</sup> Or "that there is no longer a series of mind and *dharma*s associated with mind". Strictly speaking, however, *xiangxu* is here clearly being used as a verb, 心心所不復相續, as in my translation. Up to this point, this paragraph differs significantly in Buddhavarman, paralleling the discrepancy already noted above for para. <3>, n. 213. "Here, 'the four gross [elements] means the four gross elements. The sense-organs' means the material form (*rūpa*) comprised [by those elements]. 'The series of mind' means mind and *dharma*s associated with mind. This is [what is meant by] 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a vestigial body';", T1546:28.126b06-09.

<sup>223</sup> This sentence is absent in Buddhavarman.

<sup>224</sup> This entire paragraph is absent in Buddhavarman, leading to the absence of *rūpakāya* noted in n. 221.

<sup>225</sup> The introduction to this paragraph differs fundamentally in Buddhavarman: "This portion of the text should not propound the theory that it is 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* without any vestigial body' when the body, sense-organs and mind are extinguished. Rather, it should explain that it is called 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* without any vestigial body' when an Arhat who has completely severed all fetters enters into *nirvāṇa*. What is the meaning of the fact that it nonetheless does not give this explanation? Because that elder is explaining in accordance with ordinary worldly discourse, and because of faith in the scriptures;" T1546:28.126, b11-15. This sentence partially echoes the second half of the introduction to para. <13> in XZ below.

<sup>226</sup> Once more, *xiangxu* is a verb; see n. 222.

<sup>227</sup> From this point, Buddhavarman begins to agree more closely with XZ, but still with variation: "When an Arhat dies, the gross element of wind harms the gross element of fire, and the gross element of fire being harmed, food and drink are not digested; because food and drink are not digested, the four gross elements weaken; because the four gross elements weaken, the sense-organs also deteriorate; because the sense-organs deteriorate, they cannot act as support for mind and *dharma*s associated with mind; because mind and *dharma*s associated with mind find no support, then mind and *dharma*s associated with mind no longer arise; and the state in which they no longer arise is 'the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a vestigial body';" T1546:28.126b15-19. This explanation is slightly simpler than XZ, and is missing (as is the rest of the paragraph) discussion of the "life-force" (*jīvitēndriya*), appetite, and failing to eat or drink.

<sup>228</sup> Basically the same in Buddhavarman: T1546:28.126b19-23.

<11> "Why do the words '**apprehension and experience**' not occur here? Because it is only on the basis of present apprehension that we can speak of 'apprehension' etc. But [in this case] present apprehension is severed, and so we do not speak of it. Also, because it is [only as] a conventional designation (施設, *\*prajñapti*) based upon the person (補特伽羅, *pudgala*) that [there is] '**apprehension and experience**'. But in this case, there is no *pudgala*, only the true nature of dharmas (*dharmaṭā*); for this reason, [also,] we do not speak [of 'apprehension and experience']".<sup>229</sup>

<12> "Is it really true (頗 . . . 耶) that there are Arhats who dwell neither in the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support nor the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support? Although there are in truth (理) no such cases, there would indeed be such cases according to what is said here. For according to what is said here, each of the three criteria must be met in order for us to speak of the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support; and only where all three criteria are absent can we speak of the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support. [Thus,] an Arhat born into the formless realm (無色界, *ārūpyadhātu*) has an immaterial body (無色身, *\*ārūpyakāya*?, alternatively perhaps 'does not have a *rūpakāya*'),<sup>230</sup> and therefore does not dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support; [and yet] his mind does function, and therefore he does not dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support. [Again,] if an Arhat born into the *rūpadhātu* enters into the 'absorption of complete cessation' (滅盡定, *nirodhasamāpatti*), he does not dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support, because his mind has ceased to function, but neither does he dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support, since he still has a *rūpakāya*. Finally, if an Arhat is born into the *kāmadhātu* with incomplete sense-organs (不具根), then, because he does not have all five sense-organs, he does not dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support, and yet, because he still has a *rūpakāya*, he does not dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support."<sup>231</sup>

<13> "Some say, therefore, that the text here ought to say, 'What is the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support? It refers to a case where an Arhat still has life, [where] all the fetters have eternally ceased, [and where there is] apprehension and experience. What is the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support? It is the eternal cessation of the fetters in an Arhat whose life is extinguished."<sup>232</sup> If we were to adopt this interpretation, then Arhats of the three realms (*kāma*-, *rūpa*- and *ārūpyadhātu*), regardless of whether they have bodies of material form (*rūpakāya*) or they have an immaterial body; regardless of whether they have mental function, or do not have mental function; regardless of whether they have all five organs, or whether they do not have all five organs – just so long as they have life, they would all be said to dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support; and when their life is extinguished, they would all be said to dwell in the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support."<sup>233</sup> That the author should propose this interpretation, and nevertheless does not do so, is because the author of the original treatise wished to favour his throng of disciples and make it easy for them to understand, for which reason he [instead] advanced the interpretation we see here."

The Chinese canon down to 400 C.E. contains a surprising paucity of passages reflecting the

<sup>229</sup> Basically the same in Buddhavarman: T1546:28.126b23-28.

<sup>230</sup> It would be easy to erroneously read 無色身 to mean "do not have a *rūpakāya*". However, we have seen above (n. 11) that the text elsewhere speaks of *wuseshen* = *\*ārūpyakāya* as a positive form of embodiment available to sentient beings in the *ārūpyadhātu*. This is what is most likely implied here.

<sup>231</sup> Basically the same in Buddhavarman: T1546:28.126c05-11.

<sup>232</sup> The last two sentences here are echoed in Buddhavarman by the passage cited n. 225, in a different context.

<sup>233</sup> The paragraph to this point is paralleled in Buddhavarman T1546:28.126c11-16. The remainder of the paragraph is missing.

corporeal interpretation of *sôpadhiṣeṣa* and *nirupadhiṣeṣa*. If we accept the traditional date of *Vibh* to the Kanīṣka era, therefore, the extended interest in that interpretation here is truly exceptional. We see here not just clear evidence of the corporeal interpretation *per se*, but detailed exposition of its precise workings (paras <2>, <3>, <5>), including a detailed explanation of the precise process of transition from *sôpadhiṣeṣa*~ to *nirupadhiṣeṣa*~, i.e. what it means to "die" when that death constitutes entry into *parinirvāṇa*; and also accounts of opposing views on the same doctrine (para. <4>, revisited in para. <8>).<sup>234</sup>

The discussion is further complicated by another part of this passage, omitted above to focus attention on the complex relation between *sôpadhiṣeṣanirvāṇadhātu* and the "body of birth"/*rūpakāya*. Here *Vibh* says JñP engages this topic of dispute to refute a range of incorrect interpretations of the *sôpadhiṣeṣa*-/*nirupadhiṣeṣa*- distinction. The range of opinion cited is simply astonishing:

"[The root text] also engages in this disputation to counter other schools, and demonstrate the correct interpretation.<sup>235</sup> Thus, there are those who insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is an essential entity (lit. "has own-nature", 自性), whereas the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is not an essential entity;<sup>236</sup> [the root text engages in this disputation] to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are not essential entities. Again, there are those who insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is tainted (*sâsrava* 有漏, lit. 'has outflow'), whereas the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is taintless (*anâsrava* 無漏, 'is without outflow');<sup>237</sup> [the root text engages in this disputation] in order to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are taintless. There are others again who insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is conditioned (有為 *samskrta*), and the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is unconditioned (無為, *asamskrta*);<sup>238</sup> [the root text engages in this disputation] to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are unconditioned. There are others again who insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is (karmically) good (善, *kuśala*), and the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is (karmically) neutral (無記, *avyākṛta*); [the root text engages in this disputation] to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are good. Or, again, there are others who insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is of the path (道, *mārga*) but is not the fruit of the path (道果, *mārgaphala*), while the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is the fruit of the path but not of the path; [the root text engages in this disputation] to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are the fruit of the path. Still others insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is included in the [four noble] truths (諦攝), while the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is not included in the truths; [the root text engages in this disputation] to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are included in the truths. Still others insist that the *nirvāṇadhātu* with a remainder of support is of the stage beyond training (無學, *asaikṣa*), whereas the *nirvāṇadhātu* without a remainder of support is neither of the stage of training nor of the stage beyond

<sup>234</sup> Other passages in JñP and *Vibh* also mention this interpretation. See JñP T1544:26.1031c02-10 (*Vibh* apparently does not comment on this passage); T1545:27.321b07-322b09. The corporeal reading does not have a monopoly in the text: see T1545:27.874b21-875c01.

<sup>235</sup> On this formula, and the listing of "faulty theories of other schools or masters" so introduced, as a feature of the style of the *vibhāsā* compendia, see Willemsen, Dessein and Cox 237; they refer further to Hirose Tomoichi 広瀬智一, "Abidaruma ni okeru haja no keitai" アビダルマにおける破邪の形態, *Nihon bukkō gakkai nenpō* 日本仏教学会年報 48 (1983 [not 1993, as given in their bibliography]): 87-102.

<sup>236</sup> Cf. Buddhavarman 有體/無體, T1546:28.126a13-14.

<sup>237</sup> This topic of dispute is absent in the earlier Buddhavarman translation.

<sup>238</sup> This topic is absent in Buddhavarman.

training (非學非無學); [the root text engages in this disputation] to refute this dogma, and to demonstrate that that both kinds of *nirvāṇadhātu* alike are neither of the stage of training nor of the stage beyond training.<sup>239</sup> It is for the various reasons laid out here that the root text engages in this disputation."<sup>240</sup>

The bulk of this passage is already in Buddhavarman, with significant exceptions: "with remainder of support" is translated "with a vestigial body"; the term *rūpakāya* itself is absent; technical discussion of "life-force" (*jīvitēndriya*) and "mutual identify [of sentient beings]" (*satvasabhāgatā*) is absent, etc. This means that most of the complexity and detail cannot date much later than the turn of the fifth century C.E. However, if we wish to adhere to the much earlier traditional dating of *Vibh* for this material, we must be ready to accept the implication that *Vibh* (and the JñP passage upon which it comments) is a single large exception to the overall pattern of evidence about the gradual growth of the corporeal interpretation of *sa-* and *nirupadhiśeṣa*.

The alternative, of course, is to consider the possibility that the Chinese translations contain material that developed later than the traditional dates. This possibility would be supported by the discrepancies between Buddhavarman and XZ, as discussed above.<sup>241</sup>

#### **Appendix 2: \*Nirmāṇikakāya is not a body of the Buddha in Vibh**

Louis de la Vallée Poussin claimed that Sarvāstivāda also recognises a *\*nirmāṇakāya* (*huashen*, 化身).<sup>242</sup> He seems to have based this claim entirely upon a single passage in *Vibh*,<sup>243</sup> in which the text asks why the Buddha had not left behind such a body when he entered into *parinirvāṇa*, so that he might continue to teach the Dharma thereafter to the benefit of sentient beings.<sup>244</sup> This claim might indeed seem to bear a close resemblance to the notion of the *nirmāṇikakāya* known from elsewhere. However, closer examination of other passages using the same term show that this resemblance is largely coincidental. The term *huashen* features in the text in both nominal uses ("body produced by magic") and verbal ("to produce a body by magic"). This body is not special to the Buddha. Further, even where such a body is attributed to the Buddha (even hypothetically), it does not match the "classic" understanding of *nirmāṇikakāya*. It seems, therefore, that la Vallée Poussin's identification of a supposed Sarvāstivāda *\*nirmāṇakāya* is part of an overall tendency to fit all materials to the Procrustean bed of a supposedly perennial three-body theory of the Buddha.<sup>245</sup>

Immediately after la Vallée Poussin's passage, the text contemplates the possibility that a Buddha might elaborate a *\*nirmāṇabuddha* (化佛, referred to immediately thereafter as *\*nirmāṇakāya* 化身), replete with all the marks, and make the magical body sit silent while he talks, and vice versa. The Sarvāstivāda doctors then consider in bizarre detail the mental multi-tasking this extraordinary feat would entail.<sup>246</sup> Elsewhere, as we saw, the Buddha assures Ānanda

<sup>239</sup> The matter of whether or not *nirvāṇa* of the two kinds is *śaikṣa* or *aśaikṣa* is discussed at length following the portion translated here: *Vibh* T1545:27.168c26 ff.; JñP T1544:26.923b19-924a07.

<sup>240</sup> T1545:27.167b23-c13. This passage is present in its essentials, with the exception of the absence of two topics of dispute, in Buddhavarman, T1546:28.126a10-22.

<sup>241</sup> See p. 149.

<sup>242</sup> La Vallée Poussin, "Notes" 770-773, esp. 772-773.

<sup>243</sup> In the same section of "Notes", la Vallée Poussin also examines an eclectic range of other sources, but either (1) they are not Sarvāstivāda sources; or (2) they only recognise related concepts, but do not speak overtly of a *nirmāṇakāya*.

<sup>244</sup> T1545:27.698b09-10, b27-28.

<sup>245</sup> See also Radich, "Somatics" §3.2.6.

<sup>246</sup> T1545:27.698c18-28. The same passage also considers the situation when "great disciples" (*mahāśrāvakas*) also elaborate such magical bodies, so that the power of *nirmāṇakāya* is not ascribed to the Buddha alone. Cf. AK & Bh 7.51c, VP V, 118-119, where Skt. only uses the term *nirmāṇa*. Although la Vallée Poussin also cites AK (7.48-53, VP V, 112-122, cited at "Notes" 771) for his claim that Sarvāstivāda

that he can travel to the *brahmāloka* even in his "body of the mundane elements born of father and mother". Two speculative explanations of this power invoke the concept of *nirmāṇakāya*.<sup>247</sup> The concept is also invoked in one of the theories to explain how the Buddha won his contest of hide-and-seek with Mahābrahman, though here the term is used in a verbal sense: "[The Buddha] transformed his body (化身) so that it could not be seen."<sup>248</sup> As in la Vallée Poussin's example, although the text here contemplates the possibility of the Buddha (among others) himself elaborating a *nirmāṇakāya*, the emphasis is on hypothetical or counterfactual situations. Thus, the only situations in which the text predicates such bodies of the Buddha are in speculative, hypothetical doctrinal debate.

Elsewhere in the text, *nirmāṇakāya* are ascribed to beings other than the Buddha. The text discusses whether it is possible for a magical voice to speak apart from a magically elaborated body (*nirmāṇakāya*).<sup>249</sup> The same term is also used to label the copy of the *kāmadhātu* body that an accomplished meditator can produce and project into the *rūpadhātu*.<sup>250</sup> *Nirmāṇakāya* is also the term used for the bodies magically produced by Māra's three daughters when they tempted the *bodhisattva* under the *bodhi* tree.<sup>251</sup> It is also used for the Buddha body magically produced by Māra for the benefit of Upagupta.<sup>252</sup>

In sum, the text does indeed recognise the possibility of the Buddha elaborating a *nirmāṇakāya*, but only because many spiritually powerful beings, including *mahāśrāvakas*, Māra and his daughters, and accomplished meditators can elaborate a *nirmāṇakāya* at will. *Vibh* never ascribes a *nirmāṇakāya* to the Buddha as part of a regular schema of embodiment. Indeed, where the Buddha is indeed ascribed with such a body, the text is always speculating or entertaining hypotheses. We are far from the conceptual world in which the Buddha regularly elaborates *nirmāṇakāya* that (appear to) perdure for the duration of an entire lifetime; where such bodies are elaborated primarily for the purpose of teaching sentient beings; and where his final earthly body is interpreted as such a *nirmāṇakāya*.

### Appendix 3: *Dharmakāya* passages in earlier *Vibh* translations not found in XZ

As I mentioned above (p. 144), Saṃghabhūti's *Vibh* contains an interesting unique passage unusually, among the materials surveyed here, implying the equation of the *dharmakāya* with the teaching, and even with the linguistic form of the texts (without obvious prejudice as to whether those texts are oral or written). The passage reads:<sup>253</sup>

"The scriptures of the Buddha speak of 'the eighty-thousand-fold *dharmakāya*'. What then is the enumeration that delimits the extent of this *dharmakāya*? One theory holds that each scripture (*jīṅg*, *sūtra*) counts as one *dharmakāya*, and this is what is meant by an enumeration that delimits a single *dharmakāya* [i.e., this is the definition of '*dharmakāya*' as a unit of measure]; in this manner, one arrives at eighty thousand in all. There is another theory that holds that [one?] foundation of mindfulness (意止, *smṛtyupasthāna*) counts as one *dharmakāya*, and so, also, for [each of] the [four] [correct] endeavours (*prahāṇa*), the [four] supernatural powers (*rddhipāda*), the [five] faculties (*indriya*), the

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Abhidharma recognises a *nirmāṇakāya* of the Buddha, the text nowhere uses the term *nirmāṇakāya* (or *\*nirmāṇabuddha*). The current passage can be traced back at least to the *Prajñapti śāstra*, T1538:26.526a08-20; speaking however of a "magical person" 化人, not a *\*nirmāṇakāya*.

<sup>247</sup> T1545:27.699b10-12.

<sup>248</sup> 化身令不顯現, T1545:27.66a06-13.

<sup>249</sup> T1545:27.640b04-13.

<sup>250</sup> T1545:27.696b24-697a06.

<sup>251</sup> T1545:27.697c07-15.

<sup>252</sup> T1545:27.698a09-22.

<sup>253</sup> For this passage, see Guang Xing, *Concept of the Buddha* 36. My translation differs from Guang's on many points.

[five] powers (*bala*), the [seven] members of enlightenment (*bodhyāṅga*) and the [eight members of the eightfold] path<sup>254</sup> – each of these, too, counts as one *dharmakāya*,<sup>255</sup> and thus (?) in all it comes to eighty thousand.<sup>256</sup>

"But the reckoners (算者) say: Eight syllables (字) make a 'foot' (句, certainly for *padā/pāda*); thirty-two syllables make a *śloka* (首盧), and thus

Five hundred thousand, and five thousand again –  
Five hundred and five thousand  
Is the measure of one *dharmakāya*."<sup>257</sup>

This notion of the *dharmakāya* as the teaching is significant primarily because it is so unique in the Sarvāstivāda corpus.<sup>258</sup>

Immediately following, the text explains two different theories for why the word *kāya* (身) is applied to the *dharmakāya* so defined. These explanations are also noteworthy, but for other reasons. In each case, it is because it is possible to subsume the *dharma* so labelled to a rubric of the five *skandhas*. (1) The Buddha's word (佛語, *\*buddhavācana*), considered from the perspective of its nature as a verbal teaching (教性, *\*deśanatvār?*) falls under the *rūpaskandha*,<sup>259</sup> whereas considered from the perspective of its nature as ideas (名性, *\*nāmatvār?*) it falls under the *samskāraśkāndha*. (2) For the first time,<sup>260</sup> we see an understanding of the *dharmakāya* as the five pure aggregates (*anāsravaśāikṣaskandha*<sup>261</sup>), which are listed<sup>262</sup> and subsumed to the ordinary five *skandhas*, thus justifying the use of the term *dharmakāya*.<sup>263</sup>

#### Appendix 4: The "body born of father and mother" in Kumārajīva, esp. MPPU

The term "body born of father and mother" (var. 父母生身, 父母所生身, 父母所生其身, 父母所生之身) is relatively unusual in the Chinese canon.<sup>264</sup> Apart from *Vibh*, the only text in which it

<sup>254</sup> The syntax seems somewhat garbled here. It is clear, nonetheless, that the operative rubric is the thirty-seven "members of enlightenment" (*bodhipakṣikadharmas*); Cf. AK 6.66-73, VP IV, 280-292. Elsewhere in the text 四意止 [var. 四] 意斷神足根力覺道 (e.g. T1547:28.485b02, T1547:28.485a05) corresponds to XZ 四念住四正斷四神足五根五力七等覺支八聖道. The text reads 謂契經說。意止此是一法身齊限數。如是契經說。意斷神足根力覺種道種。是謂一法身齊限數, which we might speculate reflects a fairly direct or literal translation of a Sanskrit word order (e.g. roughly *\*sūtre uktam smṛtyupasthānam etad ekadharmakāyasya gaṇas, tathāpi sūtre uktā prahānārdhipādēndriyabalabodhyāṅgamārgādaya eva ekadharmakāyasya gaṇāḥ[?]*). Guang Xing's translation of 意止 as "mental concentration", denoting as a general class to which the remaining items belong, is mistaken; *Concept of the Buddha* 36.

<sup>255</sup> Given the frequent identification elsewhere of *bodhi* as the *dharmakāya*, it seems logical enough that the *bodhipakṣikadharmas* would be identified as the *dharmakāya*. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that this move is not made more frequently.

<sup>256</sup> The logic whereby the *bodhipakṣikadharmas* go from being thirty-seven to eighty thousand in number escapes me.

<sup>257</sup> T1547:28.459a16-24.

<sup>258</sup> Obviously, since *dharmakāya* is never discussed prior to *Vibh*, this interpretation is unprecedented in Sarvāstivāda. This same concept disappears from *Vibh* itself after Saṃghabhūti's version.

<sup>259</sup> Presumably, in virtue of its nature as sound.

<sup>260</sup> As we saw, *Samgītaparyāya* knows a fourfold scheme of the pure aggregates; *Dharmaskandha* knows all five; but it is not until JñP that we find this schema linked to the Buddha, and even then, not in terms of embodiment.

<sup>261</sup> Here called 五陰身, as if to emphasise the corporeal conceit.

<sup>262</sup> 戒身定身慧身解脫身解脫知見身. We should note, however, that in this context, the pure aggregates are referred to as neither *anāsrava* nor *śāikṣa*.

<sup>263</sup> T1547:28.459a27-b06. The key portion of the passage reads 謂餘五陰身。戒身定身慧身解脫身解脫知見身。問曰。如此餘五陰身。何以故。立五陰。答曰。彼亦盡入中。戒身入色陰中。餘者入行陰中。以是故佛契經說五陰 etc. We have already encountered the reduction of the five pure aggregates to the ordinary *skandhas* in this fashion in the context of AKBh 1.27, VP I, 48; see above n. 103.

<sup>264</sup> Otherwise, it is found approx. 78 times by a CBETA search. Only 32 instances outside MPPU are early enough to be remotely relevant here. In most other texts the term appears only once: in Jñānagupta

appears more than once is Kumārajīva's *\*Mahāprajñāpāramitōpadeśa* (MPPU). MPPU is thus the earliest translation in which the term appears.<sup>265</sup> The term also occurs there seven times,<sup>266</sup> more often than in any other text.

In *Vibh*, as we have seen, the "body born of father and mother" occurs in opposition to the *dharmakāya*, as part of a broadly "two-body" theory. In MPPU it is part of an apparent nascent theory of more than two bodies, very different to "classic" Yogācāra *trikāya* theory. The "body born of father and mother"/"body of birth" is sometimes opposed to *dharmatā[kāya]*, and sometimes to an apparent prototype of the *nairmāṇikāya*.<sup>267</sup> The following two key MPPU passages define the "body born of father and mother" in contrast to each of these other bodies in turn:

"Further, the Buddha has two bodies: (1) the body of *dharmatā* (法性身, *\*dharmatākāya*); and (2) the body born of father and mother 父母生身. The *\*dharmatākāya* fills the space of the ten directions; it is infinite and boundless; it is handsome in visible form, and ornamented by the major and minor marks; [it is characterised by] infinite light and infinite sound,<sup>268</sup> and the throngs of sentient beings that listen to [its] Dharma also fill space.<sup>269</sup> It constantly emits all kinds of bodies, all kinds of words and names, all kinds of rebirth destinies, and all kinds of expedient means (*upāya*) in order to save sentient beings; it constantly saves all [beings], without a moment's rest. In this manner, the Buddha in his *\*dharmatākāya* 法性身佛 saves sentient beings in the worlds of the ten directions. It is the Buddha in his body of birth 生身佛 [, on the other hand,] who undergoes the retribution for sins. The Buddha in his body of birth teaches the Dharma in sequence, as if it were a human *dharmā*. Because there are these two kinds of Buddha, there is nothing wrong with the fact that the Buddha undergoes retribution for sins."<sup>270</sup>

"It is fitting to ask these questions<sup>271</sup> of a man, but it is not fitting to ask them even of the gods; how much the more so of a Buddha? [Reply:] The Buddha has two kinds of body: (1) the body of transformation 變化身<sup>272</sup> [created by] his supernormal powers (神通, *abhijñā*); (2) the body born of father and mother 父母生身. The body born of father and mother assumes the conditions of human [existence] 受人法, and so it is not like [that of] a god. For this reason, one should inquire of the Buddha in accordance with human custom."<sup>273</sup>

(523-600), T310:11.613b03-11; in Yijing義淨 (635-713), T1448:24.38b08-10; Bodhiruci (fl. 693-727), T310:11.323a01-08, 683c18-28, T761:17.631c02-08; in Prajñāruci (fl. 516-543), T354:12.232b12-15; Devākara (fl. 676-688) repeats Jñānagupta verbatim T347:12.182a15-22; in *\*Pāramitī*? 般刺蜜諦 (fl. 705) T945:19.119b03-10, 137c25-28; in Amoghavajra (705-774), T961:19.333c17, T1000:19.594b20, T1133:20.575b20-23 (and in parallels), T1665:32.574c21-22; in Śubhākarasiṃha (637-735), T906:18.913b09-10, 914a17-18.

<sup>265</sup> MPPU is earlier than either Buddhavarman or XZ *Vibh*, which contain the term; and earlier than Buddhābhaddra, who uses the term once.

<sup>266</sup> T1509:25.90a17-20, esp. 121c26-122a05, esp. also 131c06-08, 620a27-b06, 624c15-18; in Buddhābhaddra, T643:15.692c17-693a01.

<sup>267</sup> This MPPU doctrine is of great interest, especially considering its date. To my knowledge, it has not been considered in its possible bearing upon the genesis of *trikāya* theory in Yogācāra.

<sup>268</sup> These qualities, here ascribed to the *dharmatā[kāya]*, might broadly be described under the rubric of the "body of marks". Secondary literature to date would thus normally ascribe them to the *\*rūpakāya*.

<sup>269</sup> An interlinear note here reads "These sentient beings are also *\*dharmatākāya*, and cannot be seen by people in *samsāra*."

<sup>270</sup> T1509:25.121c26-122a05, Lamotte, *Traité* 513.

<sup>271</sup> I.e. Ratnākara's questions to the Buddha about his health and welfare, which might imply the Buddha's vulnerability and imperfection.

<sup>272</sup> Lamotte here reconstructs *\*nirmāṇakāya*, which seems apt enough, but uncertain.

<sup>273</sup> T1509:25.131c05-08, Lamotte, *Traité* 585. The opposition between the "body born of father and mother" and the body of transformation also features in the following question, but not its answer: 問曰。乃至不生一念瞋心者。為是變化身。為是父母生身。若是變化身則不足為奇。若是父母生身未斷結人。

Thus, in the earliest Chinese text that use "body born of father and mother", it is apparently part of an emergent theory more complex than "two-body" theory. MPPU also uses *rūpakāya* more than any of the *Vibhāṣā* texts. MPPU thus seems to be a veritable hotbed of doctrinal ferment regarding Buddha bodies, and promises to reward further study.

MPPU is thought to represent a hybrid of Sarvāstivāda scholasticism and Prajñāpāramitā doctrine. If it is indeed connected to Sarvāstivāda, this obviously opens up the question of the relation between its ideas and those of *Vibh*. Does the fact it speaks so much of the *\*mātrpitṛkasambhavadakāya* mean it originated the idea, and did it then find its way into a still-accreting *Vibh*? Or might *Vibh* rather have been one of its sources for the doctrine? Regardless of the direction of borrowing, or whether both got the concept from an unknown third source, we should note that the "body born of father and mother", though otherwise rare, is tightly concentrated in *Vibh* and MPPU. It may not be coincidence that these texts appear in the Chinese record within three decades of one another. Thereafter, the fad for this term seems rapidly to fade, making it something of a flash in the pan. This may indicate that at least *Vibh* passages containing *\*mātrpitṛkasambhavadakāya* date quite close to MPPU. Perhaps, then, *Vibh* was open to new ideas quite late in its history.

Apart from *Vibh* and MPPU, another early text in which a closely related concept appears is, very interestingly, the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* (MPNS). The context is an explanation of the formulae "originally did exist, originally did not exist" etc. (本有, 本無), themselves interesting for the evidence they provide of possible links between MPPU and parts of MPNS.<sup>274</sup> MPNS reads: "We might say 'originally did exist'. [For instance,] I originally had a body [born from] the union of father and mother [i.e. such a body did originally exist]. But on these grounds [i.e. were this true], I would not now have a subtle *dharma* body of adamant. . . ."<sup>275</sup> The text adds a little further on: "We might say, 'originally did not exist': [for instance,] that I originally had a body sustained by various kinds of food, but on these grounds [i.e. where the infinite body did not originally exist], I would now not have an infinite body. . . ."<sup>276</sup> Given the rarity of the "body born of father and mother" in Chinese texts of this period, this evidence, in conjunction with the notion of *benyou/benwu*, may be one more piece of evidence linking MPNS to MPPU.<sup>277</sup>

The term "body of birth" also appears as part of a threefold *buddhānūsmṛti* meditation recommended in the "Essentials of the Manual on Five Methods of Meditation" 五門禪經要用法 T619, a text ascribed to Dharmamitra (trans. c. 441 C.E.). This threefold meditation, which has been studied by Yamabe, instructs the practitioner to visualise in turn 1) a statue of the Buddha (in order to "take" the image firmly, i.e. become familiar enough with it to be able to go away from it to a quiet place and visualise a perfect eidetic copy of it without distraction); 2) the "body of birth",<sup>278</sup> identified with the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks; and then 3) the

云何能不生一念瞋心, T1509:25.624c15-18.

<sup>274</sup> See Takeda Kohgaku 武田浩学, "Daichido ron wa 'Hon'u konmu' ge wo ikanaru kū rikai no reveru de ronjiteiru no ka: yonjikkabon Dainehan gyō seiritsuron to no kanren ni okeru ichikōsatsu 「大智度論」は「本有今無」偈を如何なる空理解のレベルで論じているのか: 四十卷本「大涅槃經」成立論との関連における一考察," *Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies* 4 (2001): 203-261.

<sup>275</sup> 言本有者。我本有父母和合之身。是故現在無有金剛微妙法身。言本無者。我身本無三十二相八十種好。以本無有三十二相八十種好故。現在具有四百四病 T375:12.707b07-13; Yamamoto Kosho, trans., *The Mahayana Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (Ube: Karinbunko, 1973-1975), II, 413.

<sup>276</sup> 言本有者。我昔本有雜食之身。以食身故現在無有無邊之身, 707b27-28, Yamamoto II, 413.

<sup>277</sup> Note also that the *Mahāmegha sūtra*, like MPNS translated by Dharmakṣema and closely related to MPNS for many other reasons, also opposes the "birth body" to the *dharma* body identified as *vajrakāya*: the Buddha is asked how aspirants can attain the "adamant *dharma* body" (金剛法身 *\*vajradharma* *kāya*); the same list of questions also asks about the "true birth body and true *dharma* body" 真實生身, 真實法身 of the Tathāgata, his *\*vajrakāya* 金剛之身, and his "destructible gross body" 破壞雜身; T387:12.1081a19-20, 1081a22-25.

<sup>278</sup> Yamabe incorrectly translates this (admittedly obscure) term "living body".

*dharmakāya*, identified with the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas*.<sup>279</sup>

### Appendix 5: Buddha-bodies in other early Abhidharma and related texts

I have argued in this paper that Sarvāstivāda down to *Vibh* neither taught a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* doctrine, nor did its actual body doctrine necessarily predate relevant Mahāyāna ideas. On this basis, I have also suggested it is unlikely that any putative Mainstream *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model of the Buddha's embodiment preceded Mahāyāna. However, even if my evidence and interpretation of it here is correct, it is of course logically conceivable that the *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model was found somewhere in the Mainstream, but not in Sarvāstivāda. I cannot here consider this possibility exhaustively.<sup>280</sup> In this Appendix, however, I briefly survey a number of additional Abhidharma texts from a similarly early period in the Chinese translation tradition<sup>281</sup> for their ideas about Buddha-bodies. In most cases, opinions of modern scholars about relative dating place the original Indic works themselves approximately as late or later than *Vibh*.

So far as I could determine, none of the ideas under study here appear in Ghosaka's *\*Abhidharmāmṛtarasa* 阿毘曇甘露味論 T1553 (the Chinese translation of which may date, in its present form, between the mid-third and late fourth centuries);<sup>282</sup> nor in Dharmasīrī's *\*Abhidharmahrdaya* (or *\*Abhidharmasāra*) 阿毘曇心論 T1550.<sup>283</sup> The only place that T1551 *\*Abhidharmasārasāstra* (*\*Abhidharmahrdayasāstra*) mentions the "body of the Buddha" is in a discussion of the *ānantarya* sins (drawing the Buddha's blood); otherwise it too is silent on all the ideas studied here.<sup>284</sup>

In the *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* 雜阿毘曇心論 T1552<sup>285</sup> we find a small selection of the *Vibh* ideas discussed, and very few new ideas. Lying in order to create a schism in the Saṃgha is the worst of the *ānatarakarmas* because it "proceeds in" 轉 the *dharmakāya*.<sup>286</sup> Giving (*dāna*) to a

<sup>279</sup> T619:15.327a12-b15; Yamabe Nobuyoshi, "The Paths of Sravakas and Bodhisattvas in Meditative Practices," *Acta Asiatica* 95 (2009): 58-59. A parallel meditation in Kumārajīva's "Manual of Seated *Dhyāna* Meditation" 坐禪三昧經, T614:15.276a07-277a20, also studied by Yamabe, does not use these terms, and in fact, uses *rūpakāya* for the same visualisation here called "body of birth", 277a04-05.

<sup>280</sup> In particular, I do not possess the necessary expertise to evaluate relevant materials from the Pāli tradition. As I understand it, Reynolds, "Several Bodies" does not present any evidence to suggest a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model predates relevant Mahāyāna models.

<sup>281</sup> I thus omit from consideration the XZ translations of *\*Abhidharmāvatāra* T1554, *\*Nyāyānusāra* T1562, and *\*Abhidharmasamāyapradīpikā* [or *\*Abhidharmapiṭakaprakaraṇasāsaśāstra*, *\*Abhidharma-kośasāstrakārikāvibhāṣya*] T1563.

<sup>282</sup> The translator is unknown, but tradition dates the text to the period of King Qi (齊王) of the Cao Wei dynasty (曹魏) (A.D. 240-254). José Van Den Broeck argues that it may have been at least revised by Saṃghadeva or a contemporary during the time of Huiyuan 廬山慧遠 (334-416); *La saveur de l'immortel* (A-p'i-t'an Gan Lu Wei Lun): *La version chinoise de l'Amṛtarasa de Ghosaka* (T1553) (Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut orientaliste, 1977), 8-11. The *Amṛtarasa* seems to be a revision of Dharmasīrī's *Abhidharmahrdaya-sāra*; see n. 283 following.

<sup>283</sup> Tradition held that this text was written after *Vibh*, but Willemen disagrees, and thinks Dharmasīrī came before the Vaibhāsikas and was one of the "western masters" (*bahirdeśakas*) to whom they refer; Charles Willemen, *The Essence of Metaphysics* (*Abhidharmahrdaya*), Publications de l'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques, Serie 'Études des Textes' No. 4 (Brussels: 1975), vii. Willemen, Dessein and Cox report that modern scholars usually consider the *Abhidharmahrdaya* contemporaneous with or immediately prior to *Vibh*, 174-175. However, Frauwallner regards this text as our oldest evidence for Sarvāstivāda doctrine (cited in Willemen, Dessein and Cox, 124 n. 454).

<sup>284</sup> T1551:28.843b29. Although this text was translated by Narendrayaśas, later than others mentioned here, I have included it because it is thought to immediately follow after Dharmasīrī's *\*Abhidharmahrdaya-sāra*; Willemen, Dessein and Cox 259.

<sup>285</sup> By Dharmatrāta 法救, translated by Saṃghavarman 僧伽跋摩 et. al. in 434. Willemen, Dessein and Cox report that this text shows the influence of *Vibh* and is thus usually thought to date to the period immediately after it, 174-175.

<sup>286</sup> 壞僧妄語是為最惡、以轉法身故 etc. T1552:28.899b15-17; Bart Dessein, *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya: Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999) I, 235.

person who teaches the Dharma bears much fruit because it increases the *dharmakāya*.<sup>287</sup> Giving that nourishes the "body of birth" is opposed to giving that nourishes the *dharmakāya*.<sup>288</sup> Discussion of the Buddha-refuge proceeds in the now familiar terms of "body of birth" and *dharmakāya*, and the metaphor of bottle and milk is again used to explain the relation between the two.<sup>289</sup> The text also contains the notion that the *dharmakāya* is clothed.<sup>290</sup> The text mentions once the decoration of the body of a *bodhisattva* by the thirty-two marks.<sup>291</sup> The "Buddha's body" in general is mentioned in the context of the *ānantarya* sin of drawing the Buddha's blood,<sup>292</sup> and of Māra taking on a "Buddha-body".<sup>293</sup>

The *\*Satyasiddhi* (*\*Tattvasiddhi*) 成實論 T1646, not a Sarvāstivāda text, is relevant as a (partly) Abhidharma text translated into Chinese in the same period (by Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什 [344-413]). It knows neither the *rūpakāya* nor the "body of birth". It mentions *nirupādhiśeṣanirvāṇa* twice, but not in any elaborate connection to the body.<sup>294</sup> Twice only, it speaks simply of the "Buddha's body".<sup>295</sup> It only mentions *dharmakāya* once, where it appears to be identifying it with the five *anāsravaskandhas*.<sup>296</sup> In one passage it presents a doctrine we have not seen elsewhere, claiming that some sentient beings attain the end of defilement in reliance on the Buddha's "true body", and some on the basis of a "body of transformation (化身, *\*nairmāṇikāya*?)."<sup>297</sup>

Finally, we will also look briefly at the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Bhāṣya*. This text was not translated into Chinese until Paramārtha (499-569), but Vasubandhu is thought to have been alive around the period that concerns us here (turn of the fourth-fifth centuries). His text casts interesting light on the state of Sarvāstivāda Buddha-body doctrine even at this relatively late stage.

Perhaps the most significant thing about Buddha-body ideas in AKBh, for our purposes, is that we finally see some signs of the idea of *rūpakāya* opposed to *dharmakāya*. It is therefore possible that AKBh is the source of the characterisation of Sarvāstivāda against which I have been arguing. In the discussion of the Buddha-refuge as the *asaikṣadharmas*, AKBh 4.32 opposes *rūpakāya* to *dharmakāya*, where we saw *Vibh* speaks of "body of birth": "As for the *rūpakāya* of the Buddha, it has undergone no modification in virtue of the acquisition of the qualities of a Buddha."<sup>298</sup> Thus one does not take refuge in the *rūpakāya* of the Buddha which is, in fact, the *rūpakāya* of the Bodhisattva."<sup>299</sup> Again, in AKBh to 7.34, alongside perfection (*sampad*) of the *dharmakāya*, perfection of the *rūpakāya* is also discussed. It entails acquisition of the major and minor marks, prodigious strength, and the body.<sup>300</sup> We saw above that *Vibh* tends to discuss these things in terms of the "body of birth". However, to my knowledge these are the only two

<sup>287</sup> 說法者增長法身故...得大果, T1552:28.932c17-18, Dessein I, 509.

<sup>288</sup> 長養生身施, 長養法身施 etc. T1552:28.932c28-933a02 ff, Dessein I, 510-511.

<sup>289</sup> T1552:28.953a03-04, 953a09-16, Dessein I, 677-678;

<sup>290</sup> T1552:28.958c21-24, Dessein I, 725.

<sup>291</sup> T1552:28.959a08-09, Dessein I, 726. Other mentions of the marks at 961b28, Dessein I, 746; 961c17, c19-20, Dessein I, 748.

<sup>292</sup> T1552:28.898b21, b24, Dessein I, 228.

<sup>293</sup> T1552:28.931a25, Dessein I, 496.

<sup>294</sup> T1646:32.243b28, 357b29-c02.

<sup>295</sup> The Buddha's body emits many-coloured flames in *samādhi*, 又佛入火種定。從佛身出種種焰色。是中何者為火種 T1646:32.263a07-08; in the context of the *ānantarya* sins, T1646:32.300a15-16.

<sup>296</sup> 問曰。經中別說正見正智。故智非見。答曰。若爾則正見不名正智。若汝謂正見是正智。正智亦應是正見。又五分法身從慧品中別說解脫知見。應當非慧, T1646:32.366b03-06.

<sup>297</sup> 又有眾生。待佛真身。又待化身。而得漏盡 T1646:32.240a11-12. These terms are not mentioned again.

<sup>298</sup> The notion of the perfection of the *rūpakāya* at AKBh to 7.34, mentioned above (see n. 300), seems to contradict this claim.

<sup>299</sup> P. Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967), 216, VP III, 77.

<sup>300</sup> Pradhan 415-416, VP V, 84, T1558:29.141b27-c12.

passages, even in AKBh, which might support the claim that Sarvāstivāda teaches a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model.<sup>301</sup>

There is also some discussion of other related concepts in AKBh, but little is new. Like *Vibh.* AKBh to 7.34 says the *dharmakāya* is a respect in which all Buddhas are equal. However, AKBh here presents a much more complex picture than *Vibh.*<sup>302</sup> AKBh also relates the tradition that deliberately acting against the Dharma and lying to create schism in the Saṃgha is the worst of the *ānantarya* sins because it harms the *dharmakāya*.<sup>303</sup> AKBh 4.32 also discusses the Buddha-refuge as the *asaikṣadharmas*. The text does not, however, overtly identify these *dharma*s with the *dharmakāya*.<sup>304</sup> The only new idea about the *dharmakāya* that I could find is that offerings to a preacher of the Dharma (*dharmabhāṇaka*) are "immeasurable", even though not given to an Ārya, for reasons connected (in most versions of the text) with the *dharmakāya*: he "edifies the immaculate *dharmakāya*" (Skt); he "makes sentient beings give rise to the pure *dharmakāya*" (XZ); he "produces the *dharmakāya*" (Paramārtha).<sup>305</sup>

XZ's AKBh knows the term "body of birth" 生身, but the Skt. text does not. XZ uses the term in posing the question: Why should it be an *ānantarya* sin to physically harm the Buddha, when it only affects his "birth body"?<sup>306</sup> Similarly, XZ again uses the term "body of birth" 生身 (once) when discussing the Buddha's titanic physical strength, but also speaks just of the "body".<sup>307</sup> AKBh knows the doctrine of the thirty-two marks of the *mahāpurusa*.<sup>308</sup> and connects these marks with the *bodhisattva* as well as the Buddha *per se*.<sup>309</sup> However, it does not use any special body term in connection with this doctrine. Finally, AK 7.51 and Bh contains a discussion of the production of magical bodies, but the term *nirmāṇakāya* (or *nairmāṇikakāya*) is not used.<sup>310</sup>

In some of these passages, XZ has body terms where Skt. and other versions of the text do not.

<sup>301</sup> In XZ but not Skt., *rūpakāya* is mentioned, as in several *Vibh* contexts, as the form in which ordinary sentient beings are born in the *kāmadhātu*; AKBh to 3.3, Pradhan 112, VP II, 5, T1558:29.41b03-05. Another apparent instance of *rūpakāya* 色身 in XZ turns out not to be paralleled in Skt. 言身異者。謂彼色身種種顯形狀異故 etc., Skt. *nānāvena kāya eṣām iti nānāvakāyāḥ. anekavarṇalingasamsthānatvāt*; Pradhan 115, VP II, 17. It is difficult to tell if this is a chance byproduct of translation, or a sign that the notion of *rūpakāya* has been introduced; certainly we would imagine Chinese readers would have understood it to refer to *rūpakāya*.

<sup>302</sup> Vasubandhu holds that the "perfection" (*sampad*) of the *dharmakāya* is a perfection of fruit/effect as opposed to the perfection of cause constituted by the *sambhāras*; that it *includes* the perfection of the physical body, here called *rūpakāya*; and that it otherwise constitutes perfection of *jñāna*, "abandonment" (*prahāṇa*) and "power" (*prabhāva*); VP V, 82. Various detailed explanations are given of each of these components of the complex *dharmakāya* so envisaged, VP V, 82-84. The analysis does not even mention the *āvenikadharmas*; neither, however, does it mention *kṣayajñāna*, *anutpādayajñāna* and the five *anāsravaskandhas*. Perfection of *jñāna*, a gnostic perfection, is listed first, in keeping with my general thesis that embodiment in perfect gnosis is a central aspect of the Sarvāstivāda *dharmakāya*.

<sup>303</sup> 4.105ab, Pradhan 264, VP III, 217, T1558:29.94b04-06.

<sup>304</sup> Yaśomitra glosses the "perfected" *dharmakāya* by saying that it is the "series of untainted *dharma*s (i.e. *dharma*s "without outflow", *anāsrava*), or the revolution of the support/basis (*anāsravadharmasamāntāno dharmakāyah/ āśrayaparāvṛtti vā*). Clearly by his time, even Yogācāra ideas could be applied to a Sarvāstivādin text. VP III, 79; Makransky, *Buddhahood Embodied* 25.

<sup>305</sup> Bh to 4.118: *anāsravasya dharmakāyasyātinivartayitā*; 令有情生起無漏法身故; 能生起無流法身; Pradhan 271, VP III, 240; T1558:29.96c12-16; T1559:29.251a02-03. In Tibetan, however, where these parallels would lead us to expect *chos sku*, we find *chos smra ba* = \**dharmabhāṇaka*, VP III, 240 n. 4.

<sup>306</sup> In Skt., however, the word used here is *āśraya*, "support". Pradhan 216, XZ T1558:29.76c07-08. Immediately following, XZ speaks of "the Buddha's body" 佛體, and here Skt. again speaks of *āśraya*.

<sup>307</sup> Bh to 7.31. Vasubandhu simply uses the unmodified term "body" (*kāya*; *kāye* . . . *nārāyaṇam balaṃ*), Pradhan 413, VP V, 72-73; T1558:29.140c03 and ff. AKBh states explicitly that this body is "of the essence of a tangible" (*spraṣṭavyāyatanaśvabhāva*), made of the four elements, but of a special kind (*mahābhūtaśiṣeṣa*); leading to the conclusion that it is of *upādāyarūpa*, but different from the seven normal kinds, etc.; VP V, 74.

<sup>308</sup> Pradhan 186, VP II, 203, T1558:29.65b12-15.

<sup>309</sup> AKBh to 4.108b, Pradhan 265, VP III, 220, T1558:29.94c13-14.

<sup>310</sup> Terms that do appear are *nirmīta*, *nirmāṇa*, *nirmāṇacitta*, *nirmātr* etc; Pradhan 427, VP V, 117-119. However, XZ's translation does contain 化身, T1558:29.144a18-b23. Neither does *nirmāṇakāya* appear anywhere else in Skt. AKBh.

This variation may indicate, once again, that this body talk remained volatile even at quite late stages of the development of the Sarvāstivāda.

Thus, AKBh is the only Sarvāstivāda text that gives even slight support to the common claim that the Sarvāstivāda teaches a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model. However, Vasubandhu is obviously far too late to support any claims that this model preceded similar Mahāyāna ideas. Moreover, the complete absence of the "body of birth" from (Skt.) AKBh alone shows that it is somewhat distanced from the more elaborate *Vibh* understanding of the Buddha's bodies. We also see that on the whole, AKBh is still less interested in the problem of Buddha-bodies than *Vibh* (though it is also, of course, a much shorter text). It is thus unclear how much AKBh should be taken as representative of Sarvāstivāda in respect to Buddha-body doctrine. Indeed, given the larger pattern I argue elsewhere seems to be observable in the rise of the *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model,<sup>311</sup> this may ironically be a sign of Mahāyāna influence upon AKBh.

In sum, even when we look further afield, to later Sarvāstivāda texts also translated before approx. 440, to the seminal AKBh, and to the *\*Satyasiddhi* and the *\*Abhidharmasāraśāstra*, we find that Sarvāstivāda and some other Abhidharma texts were still remarkably uninterested in Buddha-bodies; and that the only very slender support for a *rūpakāya-dharmakāya* model is found in two passages in AKBh.

### Abbreviations

AK(Bh)	<i>Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)</i>
Aṣṭa	<i>Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā</i>
DDB	Muller, <i>Digital Dictionary of Buddhism</i>
DN	<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i>
JñP	<i>Jñānaprasthāna</i>
MN	<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>
MPNS	<i>Mahāparinirvāna sūtra</i> T374
MPPU	<i>*Mahāprajñāpāramitōpadeśa</i> T1509
para.	paragraph
PTS	The Pāli Text Society
Skt.	Sanskrit
SN	<i>Saṃyutta Nikāya</i>
T	<i>Taishō shinshū daizōkyō</i> 大正新脩大藏經 (CBETA version)
<i>Vibh</i>	<i>*Mahāvibhāṣā</i>
VP	Louis de la Vallée Poussin
XZ	Xuanzang 玄奘; Xuanzang's <i>Vibh</i> T1545

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<sup>311</sup> See n. 191.

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